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INTRODUCTION
Every nation's survival and self-governance hinges on its ability to
maintain law and order and secure "comfortable, safe, and peaceable
living" among its citizens.1 Indian nations are no different. Tribal
governments need to maintain an adequate measure of justice and
peace among their members if they are to survive and develop as
viable entities. Tribal justice systems, including tribal courts and law
enforcement, are essential institutions of tribal self-government.
Currently, many tribal justice systems-widely varied in their relative
sophistication and form-find themselves at a pivotal point in their
development. Although increasing in number and prominence,
uneven political, legal, and financial support impedes the ability of
many tribal justice systems to function in full parity with state and
federal systems. The challenges facing tribal justice systems are
significant and complex: a chronic shortage of resources and
technical assistance; an increase in the level and severity of violent
crime, including youth and gang violence; disputes and conflicts
related to economic development initiatives; congressional
limitations on tribal court sentencing authority; insufficient facilities
for incarceration and rehabilitation; and confusion over jurisdictional
1. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 58 (Richard Cox ed., Harlan
Davidson, Inc. 1982) (1690).
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lines between federal, state, and tribal authorities.
2
Recognizing these and other challenges in his recent directive on
"Law Enforcement in Indian Country," President Clinton expressed
concern that "many Indian citizens receive police, investigative, and
detention services that lag far behind even this country's poorest
jurisdictions."' Similarly, the U.S. Department of Justice has noted
that "[t]here is a public safety crisis in Indian country"A and that the
"violence and crime interfere with the ability of Indian tribes to
achieve meaningful self-governance and assure peace and stability in
their communities. 5  The President's August 1997 directive to
Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt and Attorney General Reno
culminated in the creation of an Executive Committee on Indian
Country Law Enforcement Improvements.6 The primary task of the
Executive Committee was to draft a report on the present state of law
enforcement in Indian country. Research and consultation with
2. See, e.g., Philip Brasher, Reservation Crime Booming: U.S. Attorneys to Meet with Leaders of
Indian Country to Seek Solutions, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug. 29, 1997, at A3 (explaining that
the homicide rate in Indian country has risen in the last five years in contrast to a national
declining rate, and that tribal and Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") law enforcement activities
are not sufficient); Feds Urge More Cops on Reservations, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 19, 1997, at A24
(noting that there are only 1.3 tribal and BIA officers for every 1000 residents in Indian country
as compared to 2.9 officers per 1000 residents in "small non-Indian communities"); Don
Hunter, Indian Country Lawsuit Debated in Televised Forum, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 24,
1997, at lB (discussing the stress on tribal governments created by the habsence of state law
enforcement); Tom Kizzia, Whose Law and Order? Tribal Courts Fill Void Left by State, But Critics
Say Rights Lost in Process, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, July 3, 1997, at Al (recognizing that tribal
courts are active but lack state acknowledgment of their authority, that Alaska is unwilling to
increase funding for law enforcement and juvenile programs in Native Villages in the face of
the "era of state budget cuts," and that adult misdemeanor programs were halted because of
current litigation questioning tribal and state jurisdictional authorities).
3. See Presidential Memorandum, 33 WEEKLY COMrP. PRES. Doc. 1268 (Aug. 25, 1997).
4. See Memorandum from Kevin V. Di Gregory, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to
Janet Reno, Attorney General, Final Report of the Executive Committee for Indian Country
Law Enforcement Improvements 1 (Oct. 31, 1997) <http://www.usdoj.gov/otj/icredact.htm>
[hereinafter Executive Committee Memorandum]; see also Deborah Baker, Violence on Indian
Lands Up, Study Says, DENVER POST, Nov. 23, 1997, at B5 (citing a report given by Attorney
GeneralJanet Reno and Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt).
5. Letter from Attorney General Janet Reno to All Tribal Leaders 1 (Aug. 27, 1997) (on
file with authors) (seeking tribal leaders' support in detailing options to increase law
enforcement in Indian country).
6. In 1997, two cabinet membersjoindy established the Executive Committee for Indian
Country Law Enforcement Improvements to study the law enforcement problem and make
recommendations. Six tribal leaders joined representatives of the Justice and Interior
Departments in forming this body. See Report from the Executive Committee for Indian
Country Law Enforcement Improvements to the Attorney General and the Secretary of the
Interior, tab h (Oct. 1997) (on file with authors) (hereinafter Executive Committee Report].
7. In 1948, the term "Indian country" was codified in the United States Code. The Code
provides:
[T]he term "Indian country," as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the
limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way
running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the
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Indian tribal leaders by the Executive Committee in the latter months
of 1997, pursuant to the President's directive, detailed the following
systemic deficiencies with law enforcement in Indian country:
* Law enforcement, as presently organized, often fails to meet basic
public safety needs;
e Serious and violent crime is rising significantly in many parts of
Indian country-in stark contrast to national trends;
* The single most glaring problem is a lack of adequate resources
in Indian country; and
o The current criminal justice system results in poor coordination
and delivery of services.
In response to the Executive Committee's findings, the Justice and
Interior Departments have urged an infusion of resources, proposed
a reconfiguration of federal Indian country law enforcement services
within the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA"), and agreed to maintain
primary responsibility for law enforcement with the BIA, provided
that the Bureau obtain adequate funding and implement necessary
reforms. 9
The recent emphasis on criminal justice in Indian country at the
highest levels of the Federal Government might suggest that the
inadequacy of law enforcement in tribal communities is a new
phenomenon. This is not so. As early as 1975, a "Task Force on
Indian Matters" within the Department of Justice found that "law
enforcement on most Indian reservations is in serious trouble."' The
borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian
allotments, the Indian tiles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-
way running through the same.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994)).
Although the definition appears in the section of the code governing the federal criminal
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has held that the definition also applies to civil jurisdiction. See
Sandra Hansen, Survey of CiviJurisdiction in Indian Country 1990, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 319, 324-
25 (1991) (citing DeCoteau v. District County Court for the Tenth Judicial Dist., 420 U.S. 425,
427 n.2 (1975)).
8. See Executive Committee Memorandum, supra note 4, at Executive Summary.
9. See Letter from Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt and Attorney General Janet
Reno to President Clinton (Jan. 20, 1998) (on file with The American University Law Review)
(responding to the findings of the Executive Committee).
10. See DORIS MEISSNER, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON INDIAN
MATTERS 23 (1975) [hereinafter MEISSNER REPORT). The major problems identified in the
report included confusing jurisdictional schemes, inadequate funding, inadequate training of
law enforcement, the lack of centralized command structure in the BIA, and the lack of a clear
division of labor between the BIA and the FBI. See id. at 25-34. The MEISSNER REPORT also
found that there was a widespread lack of confidence in the reservations' law enforcement
systems and that residents of several reservations believed there had been a complete
breakdown of law and order. See id. at 23. The report further found that many citizens were
cynical about the willingness and ability of the government to protect persons and property. As
a result, in many cases, no effort was made to report crime because of the belief that nothing
1630
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Task Force also found that most reservations received inadequate
police services given their size and extraordinarily high rate of
crime." Most significantly, the Task Force found that the complex
and often ambiguous overlap of federal, state, and tribal jurisdiction
in Indian country left each component of the system uncertain as to
the extent of its authority. 2 The Task Force concluded that the root
of many of the problems of Indian country law enforcement was the
confusion caused by the very federal laws intended to establish clear
lines of civil and criminal jurisdictional authority among tribal,
federal, and state governments.
3
These historic underlying problems in the administration ofjustice
in Indian country continue to the present day and demand an
immediate response. Law enforcement on Indian lands has never
been successfully ameliorated through federal policy. With each
successive generation, the criminal justice problem in Indian country
manifests itself with renewed intensity and viciousness, 14 periodically
invoking heightened federal scrutiny and media attention. 5 It is the
would be done. See id.
11. See id. at 26. The MEISSNER REPORT found that the violent crime rate was 50 percent
higher on Indian reservations than it was in rural America as a whole. See id.; see also William
Claiborne, As Law Forces Erode, Violent Crime Grows on Indian Lands, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1998, at
A3 (describing the national homicide rate as decreasing by 22 percent nationwide and
increasing on reservations).
12. See MEISSNER REPORT, supra note 10, at 54.
13. See id. at 76. When the MEISSNER REPORT was issued, legislation had already been
introduced in Congress to repeal Public Law 280, "the termination policy law under which
states exercise jurisdiction over Indian reservations." See id. at 9.
14. One particularly disturbing evolution of the law enforcement problem in Indian
country is the emergence of Indian youth gangs. The BIA estimates that there are 375 gangs
with approximately 4650 gang members on or near Indian country. See Criminal Gangs in Indian
Country: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary and Comm. on Indian Affairs, 105th Cong.
712 (1997) (statement of Kevin V. Di Gregory, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division) [hereinafter Criminal Gangs in Indian Country]; see also S. REP. No. 105-108, at 78 n.22
(1997) (citing Di Gregory testimony which acknowledges that recidivism is high among Native
American juveniles). The Justice Department also noted that juveniles are responsible for an
increasing percentage of all serious crimes committed in Indian country and are committing
offenses at younger ages. In particular, gang members in Indian country are frequently
engaging in crimes for profit, and do not hesitate to attack law enforcement officers. See
Criminal Gangs in Indian Countiy, supra, at 11-12.
15. Since the issuance of the President's Executive Memorandum in August 1997, Indian
country crime has been the subject of considerable focus in the press. See, e.g., Baker, supra
note 4, at B5 ("The problems: not enough police officers, not enough money for criminal
investigations, not enough jails, not enough funding for tribal courts."); Claiborne, supra note
11 (comparing the 1600 BIA police officers for the over 1.4 million residents residing on
reservations to the 3600 police officers protecting 540,000 residents in the District of
Columbia); Feds Urge More Cops on Reservations, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 19, 1997, at A24 (noting
that American Indians receive less than half the police protection provided to other rural
communities and discussing a proposal for the Department of Justice's takeover of BIA law
enforcement responsibilities); Matt Kelley, Indian Reservations Harried by Youth-Gang Crime Wave,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1997, at B4 (explaining that the number of youth gangs has doubled since
1994 and that increased youth gang activities are putting strains on the "already scarce
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purpose of this Article to demonstrate that restructuring or funding
alone will not provide an adequate resolution to the problems of law
enforcement in Indian country without directly addressing one of the
most controversial and detrimental federal statutes affecting Indian
tribes: Public Law 83-280 ("Public Law 280").'6
In 1953, ostensibly acting to remedy lapses in law enforcement in
Indian country,17 Congress exercised its power to delegate the Federal
Government's jurisdiction' s over Indian country to the states and
enacted Public Law 280.'9 Public Law 280 fundamentally disrupted
the traditional allocation of Indian country law enforcement
responsibility among the federal, state, and tribal governments by
authorizing six states-Minnesota, Alaska, California, Nebraska,
Wisconsin, and Oregon (known as the "mandatory states") 2 --to
resources and threatening to overwhelm tribal police and courts"); Police on Reservations Fight
Losing Battle Against Crime, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 30, 1997, at A20 (illustrating the stark
contrast between public safety throughout Indian country and rest of the United States); Louis
Sahagun, Crime Grips Indian Territory on a Navajo Reservation, the Problem of Violence Rivals that in
Large Cities. Police are Overwhelmed, PHILA. INQUIRERJan. 12, 1998, at C12 (discussing the rise of
homicide and sexual violence against minors in Navajo Reservations in the midst of the need to
increase tribal police recruitment and improve facilities and communication systems).
16. SeeAct of Aug. 15,1953, ch. 505,67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162,
25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)). Public Law 280 was amended on several
occasions. SeeAct ofJuly 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 342; Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2668; Act of Nov. 25, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-523, 84 Stat. 1358; Act of Apr. 11,
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73; Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545; Act of
Aug. 24, 1954, ch. 910, 68 Stat. 795. The 1968 and 1970 amendments are discussed later in the
Article.
17. See State LegalJurisdiction in Indian Country: Hearings on H.R. 459, H.R. 3235, and H.R.
3624 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 82d
Cong. 16 (1952) (statement of Rep. Wesley A. D'Ewart) (describing "the complete breakdown
of law and order on many of the Indian reservations"); S. REP. No. 83-699, at 5 (1953), reprinted
in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2409, 2411-12 (citing the need to remedy the gap in states' law
enforcement authority as the reason for transferring criminal and civil jurisdiction to the
states).
18. Throughout this Article the use of the term "jurisdiction" will refer to either judicial
jurisdiction, legislative jurisdiction, or both. Legislative jurisdiction concerns whether a
legislative body-tribal or otherwise-has the authority to make laws that govern the conduct of
individuals, while judicial jurisdiction refers to whether the tribe, state, or federal court has the
authority under law to hear and decide a case. See FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS:
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 82-83 (1995) (describing the
differences between tribal judicial jurisdiction and tribal legislative jurisdiction).
19. See Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 560-61 (9th Cir.
1991), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. Ct.
948 (1998) (describing the transfer of civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian country from
the Federal Government to the governments of five states); Anderson v. Gladden, 293 F.2d 463,
467-68 (9th Cir. 1961) (discussing Public Law 280's enactment and affirming the lower court's
opinion regarding congressional power to relinquish its jurisdiction to states).
20. Minnesota, California, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin were part of the original 1953
enactment and Alaska was added to the list by amendment in 1958. See supra note 16 (noting
various amendments and citing to the Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1994))). These six states are
referred to as the mandatory states because they had little choice in the acceptance of this
congressional delegation. See STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES: THE
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assume partial Federal Government criminal' and civil2 jurisdictional
BAsIcACLU GUIDE TO INDIAN AND TRIBAL RIGHTS 114 (2d ed. 1992); see also Venetie, 944 F.2d at
560-61 ("[The Act] mandated the transfer... to the governments of five states, and permitted
other states to assume such jurisdiction voluntarily."). Although the forced nature of the
transfer is often spoken about, there is some indication that there was state-federal dialogue on
the matter. See infra note 171 and accompanying text (detailing state-federal dialogues on
transfer).
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994). As last amended in 1970, section 1162 provides that:
(a) Each of the States or Territories listed in the following table shall have
jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian
country listed opposite the name of the State or Territory to the same extent that such
State or Territory has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the state
or Territory, and the criminal laws of such State or Territory shall have the same force
and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State or
Territory:
State or Territory of Indian country Affected
Alaska All Indian country within the State,
except that on Annette islands, the
Metlakatla Indian community may
exercise jurisdiction over offenses
committed by Indians in the same
manner in which such jurisdiction
may be exercised by Indian tribes in
Indian country over which State
jurisdiction has not been extended.
California All Indian country within the State.
Minnesota All Indian country within the State,
except the Red Lake Reservation.
Nebraska All Indian country within the State.
Oregon All Indian country within the State,
except the Warm Springs
Reservation.
Wisconsin All Indian country within the State.
(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation
of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or
any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United States or is
subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States; or shall
authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any
Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or
shall deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community of any right,
privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with
respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or regulation thereof.
(c) The provisions of section 1152 and 1153 of this chapter shall not be applicable
within the areas of Indian country listed in subsection (a) of this section as areas over
which the several States have exclusive jurisdiction.
Id.
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994). As last amended in 1970, section 1360 provides that:
(a) Each of the States listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over civil
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responsibilities over Indian country23 The tremendous impact of
Public Law 280 stems from the fact that while it initially addressed
only six states, these states alone contain within their borders 359 of
the over 550 federally recognized tribes and Native Villages.
causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the
areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of the State to the same extent that
such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of the
State that are of general application to private persons or private property shall have
the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the
State:
State of Indian country Affected
Alaska All Indian country within the State.
California All Indian country within the State.
Minnesota All Indian country within the State,
except the Red Lake Reservation.
Nebraska All Indian country within the State.
Oregon All Indian country within the State,
except the Warm Springs
Reservation.
Wisconsin All Indian country within the State.
(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or
taxation of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any
Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United
States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States; or
shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with
any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant
thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in probate
proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of such property or any
interest therein.
(c) Any tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or hereafter adopted by an Indian
tribe, band, or community in the exercise of any authority which it may possess shall, if
not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the State, be given full force and effect
in the determination of civil causes of action pursuant to this section.
Id.
23. But cf JACK UTTER, AMERICAN INDIANS: ANSWERS TO TODAY'S QUESTIONS 155 (1993)
(explaining that there were limitations to this grant in areas of "water rights, taxation of trust
property, regulatory control over trust property... [and] tribal activity otherwise protected by
treaty or statute, and federally protected hunting, trapping, and fishing rights").
24. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 62 Fed. Reg. 55,270, 55,271-75 (1997) (listing tribal entities
recognized and eligible for funding and services from the BIA by virtue of their status as Indian
tribes).
The Department of the Interior is responsible for updating the list of federally recognized
tribes including Alaskan Native Villages. See id. at 55,271. To become federally recognized, a
tribe must satisfy certain requirements established by the Department of the Interior. See
Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe, 25 C.F.R.
§§ 83.1-.13 (1997). Although a group of Indians may recognize themselves as a tribe and be
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Public Law 280's deleterious effects, however, are a result of the
jurisdictional uncertainty that the law has created. There is no
federal, state, or tribal consensus as to the scope of the jurisdictional
transfer that has actually occurred as a result of the Act. One
argument is that the statute effectuated not only a partial transfer of
federal jurisdiction2s over Indian country to these six states, but also a
transfer of tribal civil and criminal jurisdiction to the states.2 3 The
better argument, subscribed to by the Departments ofJustice and the
Interior among others, is that the statute did not divest tribes of their
jurisdiction, but rather provided for concurrent 27 state and tribal
jurisdiction over Indian country.28 Under any interpretation, the
recognized as such by others, a tribe must be federally recognized to be eligible for many of the
benefits provided by the BIA. See PEVAR, supra note 20, at 14-15, 268-95 (giving an overview of
the primary government services available to recognized tribes, covering areas such as housing,
health and education).
25. For purposes of this Article, "partial" federal jurisdiction refers to the limited nature of
the federal jurisdiction transferred to the states through Public Law 280 and the Federal
Government's retained jurisdiction pursuant to statutes of general applicability. See United
States v. Pemberton, 121 F.3d 1157, 1164 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that Public Law 280 did not
deprive the Federal Government of jurisdiction over members of the Leech Lake Band of
Chippewa Indians in Minnesota when the crimes charged were covered by federal laws of
general applicability-specifically mail fraud and conspiracy). In Pemberton, the Court affirmed
its prior position in United States v. Stone, 112 F.3d 971,973 (8th Cir. 1997), stating:
Public Law 280 transfers from the Federal Government to the state of Minnesota
jurisdiction over only those crimes encompassed by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153.
Crimes of general applicability-that is, actions that Congress has declared illegal
regardless of where they occur-are not affected by the enactment of Public Law 280
and remain within the subject-matterjurisdiction of the federal courts.
Id. (citations omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1994) (limiting the states' assumption of
federal jurisdiction over Indian country to "offenses committed by or against Indians ... [only]
to the same extent that such state or Territory has jurisdiction over [such] offenses committed
elsewhere within the State or Territory"); supra note 21 (providing the full text of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162). In other words, states cannot create new offenses to prosecute Indians; they may only
enforce the offenses they would enforce against their own citizens.
26. See Kizzia, supra note 2, at Al (describing tribal court activity in several Alaskan Native
Villages despite the fact that the state does not acknowledge tribal jurisdiction).
27. Throughout this Article, "concurrent" will be used to describe the situation where
more than one sovereign has authority to adjudicate a particular case or legislate a particular
conduct.
28. In a recent amicus curiae brief filed by the United States, the government
acknowledged that "[i] t is the established position of the Department of the Interior that Public
Law 280 effected a transfer, from the federal government to certain States, ofjurisdiction that the
federal government had previously shared with tribal governments, thus leaving room for the
possibility of concurrent tribal jurisdiction." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 26,
John v. Baker, No. S-08099 (Alaska May 4, 1998) [hereinafter U.S. BriefJohn v. Baker].
This opinion is consistent with the Department of the Interior's prior position stated in 1976.
Read in conjunction with the position of the United States in the John v. Baker litigation, the
prior litigation by the Alaska State Supreme Court in Native Village of Nenana v. State of Alaska
Department of Health & Social Services, 722 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1986), should be disregarded. See
U.S. Brief, John v. Baker, supra, at 6. In Nenana, the Alaska Supreme Court held that Public
Law 280 divests tribal courts in Alaska of all jurisdiction, including jurisdiction over child
custody matters. The United States, in urging that Nenana and its progeny should no longer be
followed, argued that the holding in Nenana "is contrary to the vast weight of authority
construing the effect of Public Law 280." Id.
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statute is confusing and perhaps ambiguous as to the scope of
residual tribal jurisdiction.
While federally recognized Indian tribes throughout the nation
exercise their right to self-governmentr and vie for the respect and
limited resources of federal and state governments, tribes in Public
Law 280 states face an additional obstacle: they must also establish
the continued existence of their jurisdiction and concurrent
authority with the states. Without a common understanding of the
jurisdictional foundations established by Public Law 280, tribal
communities experience an uneven administration ofjustice in terms
of respect for their authority, their eligibility for state and federal
funding, the effectiveness of their justice systems, and the level of
participation and cooperation with state and federal justice systems.
As a result, Public Law 280 actually serves to increase lawlessness in
Indian country. Even Congress has acknowledged its failure by
stating that "Public Law 280... [has] resulted in a breakdown in the
administration of justice to such a degree that Indians are being
denied due process and equal protection of the law."3"
Carole Goldberg, arguably the preeminent scholar of Public Law
280, has documented numerous ways in which Public Law 280 may
have increased lawlessness in Indian country, particularly in
California.1 She asserts that as the import and effect of Public Law
280 are misconstrued and misapplied, members of Indian tribes in
In a 1976 memorandum to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Lawrence Aschenbrenner
wrote:
What Public Law 280 accomplishes, is a transfer of that jurisdiction which the federal
government has over Indian country, to the applicable states. Since the only
jurisdiction which the United States has is concurrent with the tribe ... that part of its
concurrent jurisdiction is all that it could transfer to the states. It could not transfer
more than what it had, that is, it could not transfer tribal jurisdiction to the states....
P.L. 280 gives the states concurrent and not exclusive jurisdiction over Indian country
therein. The tribes retain the other part of the concurrentjurisdiction.
Memorandum from Lawrence A. Aschenbrenner, Acting Associate Solicitor, Division of Indian
Affairs, U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor, to Commissioner of Indian
Affairs 3, 5 (July 13, 1976) [hereinafter Aschenbrenner Memorandum] (on file with authors);
see also Telephone Interviews with Russell Bradley, Superintendent, Winnebago Agency, BIA
(July 21, 1997 & Nov. 13, 1998) [hereinafter Bradley Interviews] (explaining that concurrent
jurisdiction under Public Law 280 did not remove tribes' right to establish their own courts and
have their own law enforcement officers); infra notes 322-323 and accompanying text (outlining
support for concurrentjurisdiction by former Attorneys General of Wisconsin and Nebraska).
29. For purpose of this Article, sovereignty means the inherent right or power to govern.
See William C. Canby,Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes In American Law Today, 62 WASH. L. REV. 1, 1
(1987).
30. SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 94th Cong., Background Report on
Pub. L. 280, 29-30 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter PUBLIC LAW 280 REPORT].
31. See generaly CAROLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, PLANTING TAIL FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL
AND PUBLIC LAW 280 (1997) (discussing at length federal and state fiscal neglect of tribal justice
systems in California, resulting in the underdevelopment of these systems and the increased
risks to public safety and community welfare).
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Public Law 280 states suffer both abuses of authority by state
governments and a lack of law enforcement responsiveness. For
example, in Alaska, tribal justice systems struggle to fill the vacuum
caused by the retreat of federal law enforcement and the state's
inability or unwillingness to assume its Public Law 280
responsibilities." Public Law 280 has also complicated the delivery of
law enforcement services in Nebraska. 34 In fact, the Superintendent
of the BIA's Winnebago agency has suggested that Public Law 280 is
one reason why the Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska has struggled in
their development of tribal courts and police.'5
Although numerous factors and conditions have precipitated the
law enforcement dilemma in Indian country, Public Law 280 has
been an undeniable source of persistent tribal justice inequity since
its enactment.w The ambiguous language used in the Act, 7 the
"sparse legislative history,"38 the fact that the law was enacted during a
period of antagonism toward tribal self-government,39 and the lack of
32. See id. at 12-33. In the chapter "Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness,"
Goldberg-Ambrose offers the following case studies to demonstrate both the abuse of authority
by state authorities in California and the virtual vacuum of authority that results when parties
are uncertain of their jurisdiction to intervene: (1) sludge dumping at Torres Martinez
(unresponsiveness of local authorities); (2) evicting undesirables at Coyote Valley (lack of tribal
court systems where no state jurisdiction exists); and (3) confrontations with police at Round
Valley (abuse of authority through police misconduct). See id.
33. See Kizzia, supra note 2, at Al (describing the complexities and obstacles to the effective
administration ofjustice in Alaskan Native Villages).
34. See Bradley Interviews, supra note 28 (explaining that when federal law enforcement
funding was not forthcoming, state law enforcement over Indian country was conducted "totally
inadequately" and in a way that was neither proper nor helpful). Superintendent Bradley also
noted that law enforcement worsened because the statute restricts the BIA from getting
involved in the resolution of certain civil or criminal matters occurring on the reservation even
when it is willing to allocate the time and resources. See id. As a result, the tribes must often
rely upon the state officials' willingness (or unwillingness) to investigate and prosecute matters.
See id.
35. See id. (noting that the Omaha and Winnebago Tribes in Nebraska may be more
favorably situated than the Santee Sioux of Nebraska in terms of law enforcement and tribal
court development ever since they were able to get the state to retrocede its Public Law 280
jurisdiction over them); infra note 341 and accompanying text (providing more details about
retrocession and Public Law 280).
36. See CAROLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE & DUANE CHAMPAGNE, UCLA AMERICAN INDIAN
STUDIES CENTER, A SECOND CENTURY OF DISHONOR: FEDERAL INEQUITIES AND CALIFORNIA
TRIBES 49 (1996) (on file with authors) (explaining how tribes in Public Law 280 states have
received dramatically less law enforcement funding through the BIA than tribes in non-Public
Law 280 states).
37. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 374 (1976) (describing Public Law 280 "as an
admittedly ambiguous statute").
38. See id. at 379 (observing that lawlessness on Indian reservations and inadequate tribal
law enforcement were the primary concerns confronting Congress as gleaned from the "sparse
legislative history" of Public Law 280).
39. See infra Part II.B.3 (describing the Termination Period, its policy, and its influence on
Public Law 280's interpretation).
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a conclusive ruling by the Supreme Court on the complete
jurisdictional effect4' of Public Law 280, have caused the confusion to
proliferate.
This Article establishes that Public Law 280 provides for concurrent
state and tribal jurisdiction without divesting tribal governments of
their authority. Part I provides the general Indian law42 context of
Public Law 280 by explaining tribal sovereignty, plenary power, state
authority over Indian affairs, and general jurisdictional allocations in
Indian country. Part II discusses the provisions of Public Law 280
with greater specificity, addresses the distinctions between the civil
and criminal sections, and details the statute's policy justifications.
Part III analyzes Public Law 280 as a limited transfer of Indian
country jurisdiction from the Federal Government to the states
without disturbing tribal criminal and civil jurisdiction,3 thereby,
preserving concurrent tribal jurisdiction. Lastly, Part IV provides
several recommendations to reform law enforcement in Indian
country and ameliorate the destructive impact of Public Law 280.
Part IV emphasizes that the most meaningful action the Federal
Government can take to preserve law and order in Indian country is
"to help Indian tribes to strengthen their own justice systems." 4 With
adequate resources, tribal governments are not only the most
appropriate institutions to maintain order on reservations,45 but have
40. See DANID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAl. INDIAN LAw 570 (3d
ed. 1993) ("[Plotential concurrent jurisdiction of the tribal courts under Public Law 280 has
not been conclusively litigated.").
41. See infra Part III.D.1 (discussing cases and commentary interpreting Public Law 280).
42. It is important to note the distinction between what is commonly referred to as "Indian
law" and "tribal law." One commentator has described the differences this way: "Indian law
refers to the system of federal laws and regulations that govern U.S. relations with the various
Indian tribes. In contrast, tribal law is the law that the Indian tribes enact and enforce within
their own communities." J. Clifford Wallace, A New Era of Federal-Tlibal Court Cooperation, 79
JUDICATURE 150, 151 (1995); see also WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 1 (2d ed. 1988) (asserting that "'Indian Law' might better be termed 'Federal Law
About Indians'" because it refers primarily to the body of federal laws that defines the status of
Indian tribes and their members, their relationship with the Federal Government, and the role
that tribal, state, and Federal Governments have in this field).
43. This Article places a stronger emphasis on proving the continued existence of criminal
jurisdiction rather than civil jurisdiction. While both are discussed because both are implicated
in the context of Public Law 280, the statutory language has created greater speculation and
criticism as to the continued existence of residual tribal criminal jurisdiction. In light of the
increased crime on reservations, the final reconciliation of the statute's criminal provision is the
more pressing issue.
44. Criminal Gangs in Indian Country, supra note 14, at 10 (testimony of Kevin V. Di
Gregory); see alsoJanet Reno, A Federal Commitment to Tribal Justice Systems, 79 JUDICATURE 113,
114 (1995) ("[T]ribal justice systems are ultimately the most appropriate institutions for
maintaining order in tribal communities .... Fulfilling the federal government's trust
responsibility to Indian nations means not only adequate federal law enforcement in Indian
country, but enhancement of tribal justice systems as well.").
45. Attorney General Janet Reno, testifying before the Senate Committee on Indian
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demonstrated their capacity to keep the peace and resolve disputes
on Indian lands.46
For the United States' policy toward Indian tribes to have value and
meaning, tribal law enforcement systems must be regarded as equal
and essential components to our country's "multilayered justice
system." 7 This can only be accomplished if appropriate federal, state,
and tribal authorities directly confront the issues surrounding Public
Law 280 and engage in meaningful dialogue despite the political and
fiscal maelstroms that may ensue. Recent law enforcement reforms
such as the recommendations of the Departments of Justice and the
Interior, transmitted to the President pursuant to his August 1997
directive, are noticeably silent regarding Public Law 280. This Article
is written in the hope that future tribal justice reforms will include a
commitment to assure that tribes in Public Law 280 jurisdictions can
fully achieve meaningful self-governance.
I. BACKGROUND TOJURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
A. Three Sovereigns, Four Principles
In the context of a government's sovereignty, jurisdiction is an
integral, inherent aspect of authority, involving the power to make
and enforce rules, resolve disputes and conflict within the
community, and maintain a stable and safe environment through the
application of criminal laws. Jurisdiction in Indian country has
Affairs, stated that "[t]ribal police are best situated to respond to and gather information about
violence and criminal activity" and that "most effective federal initiatives to combat violence
recognize the need to strengthen tribal law enforcement in Indian Country." See Statement of
U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno Before Comm. on Indian Affairs, U.S. Senate, The
President's Initiative on Law Enforcement in Indian Country, 11 available at
<http://www.senate.gov/scia/1998hrgs/O603-jr.htm> [hereinafter Reno Statement]; see also
Douglas B.L. Endreson, The Challenges Facing Tribal Courts Today, 79JUDICATURE 142, 146 (1995)
(asserting that reservation communities are expanding and only tribal governments can attend
to the "social, economic, political and legal" needs of such communities); Gloria Valencia-
Weber, Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225, 262 (1994) (maintaining that because
tribal courts "affirm and sustain cultural values," they generate law that is most appropriate for
those communities).
46. Tribal courts' adjudication over an increasing range of subjects indicates that Indians
and non-Indians alike are increasingly more confident in their ability to administer justice. See
Endreson, supra note 45, at 145-46 (discussing the increasing efficacy of tribal courts'
adjudication of tribal disputes without the intervention of the federal courts); Valencia-Weber,
supra note 45, at 263 (discussing tribal courts' commitment to the protection of individual
rights).
Despite criticism that tribal courts may be underdeveloped and lack impartiality, a review of
their decisions shows that they are "legitimated by fairness in procedure and result." See id. at
262-63. Moreover, tribal courts are "willing to respond to claims of unfairness based on tribal
law or the Indian Civil Rights Act." Endreson, supra note 45, at 146; see also infra notes 159, 333-
42 and accompanying text (providing additional information on the Indian Civil Rights Act).
47. See Wallace, supra note 42, at 152.
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evolved as a shifting, precarious balance of power among multiple
sovereignsi' Federal, state, and tribal governments share jurisdiction
in Indian country, at times seamlessly, though more often with some
degree of conflict and controversy49 resulting from "the tensions that
sharing jurisdiction imposes."5 Moreover, the rules and principles
that shape the parameters ofjurisdiction in Indian country have long
defied mechanistic application and uniformity." Profound
differences of history, sociology, and politics52 assure that notions of
justice and fairness will differ markedly among tribal, state, and
federal governments. 53  Each government seeks formalized
recognition of its autonomy and sovereignty, but may lack adequate
resources to realize full authority over the lands and people under its
control.54
Issues of state federalism pervade the discussion of jurisdiction in
Indian country and therefore Public Law 280.5' Some states oppose
assertions of tribal governmental authority within state boundaries
48. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 118 (1993) (recognizing
that tribal governments are part of "'the family of governments in the federal constitutional
system'") (citation omitted); Address of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor Before the Indian
Sovereignty Symposium IX, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts 11 (June
1996) (on file with The American University Law Review) [hereinafter O'Connor Address]
(asserting that the tribal courts' role in our nation's administration ofjustice is important and
expanding, and that each sovereign can learn from the other's strengths and weaknesses);
Valencia-Weber, supra note 45, at 227-28 (noting that while tribal government is a third
sovereign, its authority is still "indeterminate" and "unlike the federal and state governments").
49. SeeJudith Resnik, Multiple Sovereignties: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Government,
79 JUDICATURE 118, 118 (1995) (observing that overlapping sovereignty over Indian country is
often problematic).
50. See id. (stating that while the U.S. Constitution grants Congress jurisdiction over
Indians, it also recognizes Indian tribes' separate status).
51. See Canby, supra note 29, at 1-2 (canvassing the issues surrounding fundamental
assumptions about federal Indian law, in particular the effect certain legal developments in the
Supreme Court have had on these assumptions).
52. See Resnik, supra note 49, at 118 (speaking more specifically about the relationship
between states and tribes).
53. See Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems and Tribal Society, 79 JUDICATURE 126,
128-29 (1995) (providing a comparative chart on the differences between indigenous and
American "justice paradigms").
54. See Hunter, supra note 2, at 1B (describing Alaska's assertions of jurisdiction despite
statements by Colonel Glen Godfrey, Director of the Alaska State Troopers, that his agency is
already "spread thin because of lack of money and manpower").
55. See SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG'S CAsF 25 (1994) (explaining that federal Indian
law evolved in the battle between the states and the Federal Government over control of Indian
people and their lands). In fact, one of the premier cases in Indian Law is Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). In Worcester, the Court ruled that state laws had no force in the
Cherokee territory and the state had no authority to prosecute a missionary who entered the
Cherokee Nation territory without obtaining a prior permit from the Georgia Governor
pursuant to an 1830 enactment of the legislature. See id. at 520. Although Worcester is cited as a
victory for tribal jurisdiction, the primary issue in Worcesterwas federalism, not tribal sovereignty.
See HARRING, supra, at 55.
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and resist federal governmental primacy over Indian affairs. 6 Many
Indian tribes are forced to make a Hobson's choice: they can
uncomfortably argue in favor of federal plenary power over Indian
affairs, 7 or subject themselves to increased interference from the
states."
The basic principles which have shaped the tripartite division of
authority in Indian country and informed the discussion of Public
Law 280 include: (1) inherent tribal sovereignty; (2) the plenary
power of the Federal Government over Indian affairs; (3) the states'
limited power over Indians absent an express delegation from
Congress; and (4) the Federal Government's trust responsibility to
the tribes and their resources.59 A brief summary of each of these
principles follows.
1. Inherent tribal sovereignty
Indian tribes are self-governing political communities whose
original sovereignty predates that of the United States.4 Accordingly,
Indian tribes have long been recognized as "domestic dependent,,ti* 62
nations,"" vested with inherent tribal sovereignty. The self-
56. See Carole Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation
Indians, 22 U.C.LA L. REV. 535, 537-38 (1975) (setting the background for future conflicts
between the sovereigns that arise under Public Law 280).
57. SeeJEWELL P.W. JAMES, COORDINATOR OF THE LUMMI TREATY PROTECTION TASK FORCE,
LUMMI INDIAN BUSINESS COUNCIL, TESTIMONY OF THE LUMMI INDIAN NATION ON 'THE
GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP-A QUESTION OF POLITICAL INTEGRITY IN INDIAN
COUNTRY" 1-2 (not dated) (on file with The American University Law Review) (reciting the
testimony of the Lummi Indian Nation describing the American Indian belief that the powers
of the United States over Indians are "legal fictions... for justifying the taking of Indian rights
and resources" that have resulted in the "worsening erosion of [tribal] jurisdiction and
sovereign powers").
58. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567 (1903) (noting that tribes have no
allegiance to individual states, do not look to them for protection, and "[b]ecause of the local
ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies"); see
also Goldberg, supra note 56, at 545 (explaining that Indians often prefer federal jurisdiction
over state jurisdiction for fear of being discriminated against in state courts through longer
sentences, and out of concern that state law enforcement will ignore crimes where the victim is
Indian and not white).
59. See Canby, supra note 29, at 1-2 (proposing that these four principles pervade every area
of federal Indian law); see also PEVAR, supra note 20, at 129-30 (listing these four key principles
in context of a discussion on criminal jurisdiction). Pevar's four principles mirror Canby's
except in one instance. Pevar adds the fact that tribal jurisdiction does not extend over non-
Indians. See id.
60. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Kiowa Tribe
v. Manufacturing Techs., 118 S. Ct. 333 (1997) (No. 96-1037) [hereinafter U.S. Brief for Kiowa]
(noting that federal law did not create tribal sovereignty since it was already in existence at the
dawn of the Republic).
61. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 2, 16 (1831) (declaring that the
Cherokee Nation is in fact "a distinct political society, separated from others, capable of
managing its own affairs and governing itself'); see also Robert Laurence, Dominant-Society Law
and Tribal Court Adjudication, 25 N.M. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (explaining that tribal government's
power "is inherent, neither deriving from nor depending upon the United States. This ability
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governing powers of tribes are not federally delegated, but derive
from aboriginal possession and occupancy; therefore tribes maintain
a self-governing political status that predates the European settlement
of the Americas. 3 Similarly, the Constitutional Convention, while
significant to the extent that it established federal primacy over
Indian affairs, did not diminish the sovereignty of tribes. 4
The Supreme Court has interpreted relevant treaties and statutes
against this "backdrop" of Indian sovereignty.6'5 In so doing, the
Court has found that the incidents of inherent tribal sovereignty
include: (1) the power to "regulat[e] their internal and social
relations"; (2) sovereign immunity from suit;67 and (3) the power to
prescribe laws for their community and enforce these laws against
their membersi5 The Court has also held that the power of a tribe to
to exercise power over people, not all of whom consent to each individual exercise of that
power, is the center about which all of Indian Law revolves").
62. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886) (describing tribes' power to
regulate their internal relations as being outside the laws of the state in whose territorial
boundaries they reside).
63. See U.S. Brief for Kiowa, supra note 60, at 15 (recognizing that a judicial decision could
not create tribal sovereignty as it already exists); Richard Monette, Comment, Indian Country
Jurisdiction and the Assimilative Crimes Act, 69 OR. L. REV. 269, 273 & n.25 (1990) (stating that
tribal jurisdiction is an aspect of sovereignty maintained by tribes before the European arrival to
the New World, and terming such a phenomenon the "Reserved Rights Doctrine"); see also
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978) (acknowledging that tribal
sovereignty existed before the Constitution); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384-85 (1896)
(holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not diminish or alter tribal
sovereignty as possessed by the Indians before the U.S. Constitution was written); Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823) (explaining the principle whereby the discovery
of land by Europeans gave their respective governments title against other European
governments). This principal is now known as the "Doctrine of Discovery." See Monette, supra,
at 280 n.71.
It should be noted that while the Supreme Court recognizes that tribes retain inherent
sovereignty, the Court also recognizes that tribes do not possess the degree of sovereignty of an
independent, foreign state, but rather a sovereignty subject to congressional plenary power. See
Kagama, 118 U.S. at 381-82 (asserting that tribes have a semi-independent status whereby they
have a possessory right to land but no title to transfer land without consent of the U.S.
Government).
64. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2034 (1997) (reasoning that the
Constitutional Convention did not surrender tribes' immunity from the states); Blatchford v.
Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (noting that tribes, like foreign sovereigns,
could not surrender immunity from suits by states at the Constitutional Convention since they
were not a party to the Convention).
65. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1993)
(explaining that the "Indian sovereignty doctrine", while historically giving state law no role
within tribal boundaries, provides a context within which the courts must consider treaties and
federal statutes); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (noting
that the Indian sovereignty doctrine is not definitive, but rather a relevant consideration in the
interpretation of treaties and statutes).
66. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 382.
67. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizens Band Potowatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505,
509 (1991) (finding that a tribe does not waive its right to sovereign immunity by filing an
action for injunctive relief).
68. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 54-55 (finding that the Indian Civil Rights Act did not
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prosecute its members was not lost, even implicitly, by virtue of its
dependent status its location within the United States, or its
subjection to "ultimate federal control."7  Most importantly, the
inherent tribal powers of self-government are not subject to judicial
defeasance,7' and remain unless expressly limited or extinguished by
Congress through treaty or statute.7
2. Federal plenary power over Indian affairs
The sovereignty of Indian tribes and the right of self-governance
are subject to the broad powers of Congress to regulate and modify. s
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that this power is plenary,
giving Congress exclusive authority over the Indians, their tribal
give a female member of an Indian tribe authorization (i.e., did not waive tribal sovereign
immunity) to seek declaratory and injunctive relief against a tribal officer for denying her
children tribal membership); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1978) (stating
that the right to create tribal law and hold tribal members accountable to it is inherent to all
sovereign tribal communities); see also United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)
(noting that "Indian tribes are a unique aggregation possessing attributes of sovereignty over
both their members and their territory").
69. See Wieler, 435 U.S. at 326 (acknowledging that the power to self-government is not
lost by a tribe's dependent status).
70. See id. at 322 (stating that tribes retain sovereignty over internal matters
notwithstanding federal control).
71. An awkward phenomenon has evolved in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Recently, Congress, to whom the power over Indian affairs is exclusively committed in the
Constitution, has been notably silent, while the Supreme Court has acted as the arbiter of the
scope of tribal authority. See infra notes 91, 93 and accompanying text (discussing judicial
disregard and lack of deference for tribal sovereignty in the face of state interference); see also
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 118 S. Ct. 789, 793 (1998) (finding that tribal jurisdiction
is diminished and ruling in favor of state land-use regulation on ceded lands of the reservation);
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2034 (1997) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment prevents suit by a tribe against a state); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404
(1997) (ruling that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over a vehicle collision between non-
Indians on a state highway); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 56-57, 66 (1996) (holding
that the Eleventh Amendment barred suit by a tribe against Florida under the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act). These cases listed above demonstrate that the present Supreme Court has not
exhibited much deference or regard for tribal authority when it abuts state jurisdiction, despite
the rule that only Congress should have the power to reduce or repeal tribal jurisdiction. See
infra note 75 and accompanying text (defining "plenary power").
72. See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 205 (1997) (affirming that unless expressly
limited by Congress, tribes maintain jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians on Indian
lands); Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 (stating that Indian sovereignty "exists only at the sufferance of
Congress and is subject to complete defeasance"); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 381
(1976) (ruling that Public Law 280 did not remove tribal immunities from state taxation
because any congressional mention of "such a sweeping change in the status of tribal
government and reservation Indians" was absent in both the committee reports and the floor
discussion); see also Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 22 (1934) (explaining that
internal sovereignty is still vested in tribes and can be freely exercised absent express restriction
or limitation by Congress); FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 241-
42 (1982) (noting that tribal sovereign powers are subject to the following limitations: tribal
sovereignty is internal only; tribes have no external powers; and tribal powers are subject to
qualification by treaty or by express congressional legislation).
73. See Canby, supra note 29, at 1; see also Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 (recognizing that tribal
sovereignty "exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance").
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relations, and their tribal property.7 4  This constitutionally-based
principle has evolved in federal common law as the Plenary Power
Doctrine] 5  While the legitimacy of such plenary power raises
questions as to its source and breadth, 76 it has been repeatedly
recognized by the Supreme Court.7 7 The existence of congressional
plenary authority over Indian affairs is an obstacle that continually
confronts tribes when congressional action threatens destructive or
detrimental effect.78
74. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (ruling that "Congress has
plenary authority to limit, modify, or eliminate the powers of local self-government which the
tribes otherwise possess"); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (basing plenary power
on treaty history with Indians and their guardianship status with the United States); Winton v.
Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 391 (1921) (asserting that Congress has plenary power to legislate issues of
tribal property because of the dependent relationship the Indians have with the U.S.
Government); see also Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (asserting that tribal
sovereignty is subject to the "supreme legislative authority of the United States").
75. See Laurence M. Hauptman, Congress, Plenary Power, and the American Indian, 1870 to
1992, in EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE: DEMOCRACY, INDIAN NATIONS, AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 317, 318 (Oren R. Lyons et al. eds., 1992) (defining the doctrine as that which
allows Congress "to unilaterally intervene and legislate over a wide range of Indian affairs,
including the territory of Indian Nations").
76. The Supreme Court has justified Congress' power over Indians by looking to the
Constitution. See Vine Deloria, Jr., The Application of the Constitution to American Indians, in
EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE, supra note 75, at 298-301 (detailing the following
constitutional sources of power over Indians as asserted by the courts: U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.
3 (Indians not taxed); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Indian Commerce Clause); U.S. CONT. art.
I, § 8, cls. 1, 4, 7, 9, 11, 12, 15-17 (War Powers); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, (Treaty Clause);
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Property Clause)). Furthermore, in a rather circular manner, the
Supreme Court has justified the power by stating that it exists in Congress because it "never has
existed anywhere else," see United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886), and because "the
power has been exercised by Congress from the beginning," see Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187
U.S. 553, 565 (1903). Nevertheless, despite the Court's attempts to justify the source of
Congress' authority over Indian affairs, there is considerable criticism over whether such a
justification is possible. See id. at 567-68; see also Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v.
Swimmer, 740 F. Supp. 9, 11-12 (D.D.C. 1990) (explaining that the notion of congressional
plenary power arose from cultural and racial prejudice and a need to justify acquisition of
Indian land); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 195-98 (1984) (detailing the doctrine of plenary authority and the
failings in its alleged origins).
77. See Canby, supra note 29, at 2-6 (discussing the early development of case law on
congressional plenary authority); supra note 74 (discussing Supreme Court cases affirming
plenary power).
78. In the 105th Congress, Senator Slade Gorton (R-WA) introduced riders to the
Department of the Interior's appropriations bill that would have limited the sovereign
immunity of certain tribes and imposed means-testing for certain federal benefits. Among the
riders introduced by Senator Gorton were sections 118 and 120 of the Fiscal Year 1998 Interior
and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill. Section 118 would have prohibited distribution of
certain Tribal Priority Allocation ("TPA") funds unless the BIA developed a means-testing
formula. Section 120 provided that acceptance of TPA funding by tribes would constitute a
waiver of any claim of sovereign immunity by the tribe and subject the tribe to federal court
jurisdiction. See Letter from Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, to Senator Ted Stevens,
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations 1 (July 21, 1997) (opposing the bill because it "singles
out Indian tribal governments to undermine the principle of government-to-government
relations") (on file with authors); see also Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General,
U.S. Dep't ofJustice, to Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman, Committee on Appropriations 1 (July
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3. The states' limited authority over Indian country
One of the clearest and most persistent themes involving Indian
sovereignty has been the continuous struggle by the states to assert
greater control over Indian reservations, usually at the expense of
federal or tribal governments. Over time, the Supreme Court has
softened its longstanding restrictive view of permissible state
incursions into Indian country.
In 1832 Justice Marshall ruled in Worcester v. Georgia0 that state laws
would have no force or effect in Indian country.$' The Supreme
Court has since held that states have only limited authority over
Indian country absent an express grant by Congress."2  Thus,
although Worcester has never been expressly overruled or diminished,
the Supreme Court has ruled that states may exert some authority
over Indian country. For instance, the Supreme Court in United States
v. McBratney found that states possess exclusive jurisdiction over
crimes committed by non-Indians against non-Indians in Indian
country 84 and over victimless crimes committed by non-Indians. 5
The cases since Worcester have modified the test to determine the
22, 1997) (on file with authors) (noting that the Justice Department "strongly opposes these
measures because they are contrary to the United States' longstanding protection of tribal self-
government and the federal trust responsibility").
79. See ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 493 (3d
ed. 1973).
80. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561, 590-95 (1832) (holding that the laws of Georgia have no
force on the Cherokee Nation).
81. See id. at 520; see also Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) ("Congress has also
acted consistently upon the assumption that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of
Indians on a reservation.").
82. Se, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 202, 207 (1987)
(disagreeing with the state that Public Law 280 entailed express permission by Congress to
apply its gaming ordinance); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 390 (1976) (ruling that if
Congress intended Public Law 280 to give the states general civil regulatory power over
reservations, "it would have expressly said so"); McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164,
180-81 (1973) (holding that Arizona exceeded its authority by taxing Navajo Indians' income
derived from reservations); Williams, 358 U.S. at 220-21 (ruling that states cannot have civil
jurisdiction over cases involving non-Indians and Indians over matters arising on reservations);
see also Op. Att'y Gen. Neb. No. 48 (1985), available at 1985 WL 168524, at *1 (Neb. A.G.)
(confirming that without a specific delegation via a federal statute, jurisdiction in Indian
country was shared exclusively between the federal and tribal governments).
83. 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
84. See id. at 624 (rejecting federal jurisdiction in favor of state jurisdiction in the case of a
non-Indian murdering a non-Indian on the Ute reservation in Colorado); see also Draper v.
United States, 164 U.S. 240, 247 (1896) (upholding state jurisdiction over the non-Indian
murder of a non-Indian on the Crow Reservation in Montana).
85. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 465 n.2 (1984) (providing a summary of criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country within a case concerning a rape committed by an enrolled
member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe). State jurisdiction over victimless crimes is based
upon the notion, illogical as it might be, that if the crime is really victimless, then no Indian
interest has been affected. See COHEN, supra note 72, at 353 (explaining that the allocation of
jurisdiction over victimless crimes is based on the Assimilative Crimes Act and General Crimes
Act).
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permissibility of state jurisdiction over Indian lands. In Williams v.
Lee,8  the Court ruled that in the absence of a congressional act
conferring authority to the state, it would consider whether "the state
action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their
own laws and be ruled by them. 87  Using this test, the Court
determined that state courts had no authority over a civil suit by a
non-Indian against an Indian when the action arose in Indian
country.s By 1973, however, the Court had moved towards the
anomalous rule that states have certain powers over Indian country
unless federal laws or treaties preempt them.89
In the ensuing years, the Supreme Court made a series of
decisions" that contain some puzzling, and even contradictory
86. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
87. Id. at 220 (holding that a tribal court, not a state court, would have jurisdiction over a
case involving a non-Indian store owner on a Navajo Reservation trying to collect an unpaid
debt from a Navajo patron). The ruling set forth in Williams established the "infringement
test." See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 79, at 504 (noting that some state courts regard the
infringement test as justification for state jurisdiction over incidents in Indian country
presumed not to involve tribal self-government); POMMERSHEIM, supra note 18, at 145
(explaining the infringement test).
88. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 223. In so doing, the Supreme Court clarified that the states
could have jurisdiction only "where essential tribal relations ... [were] not involved and where
the rights of Indians would not bejeopardized." Id. at 219.
89. See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (holding that Arizona
could not collect state income tax from a Navajo tribal member whose earnings were generated
on the reservation). This ruling established the "preemption test." See POMMERSHEIM, supra
note 18, at 144 (suggesting that recent cases have abandoned the infringement and preemption
tests); see also Canby, supra note 29, at 11-15 (discussing the preemption test and tracing the
judicial evolution of state power in Indian country and concluding that inherent tribal
sovereignty has been replaced with a preemption analysis mandating a balance of state and
tribal interest-with the latter being narrowly viewed).
90. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 690 (1993) (holding that the tribe lost
exclusive zoning authority over an "open" part of the reservation that had a large non-Indian
population due to the prior excessive allotment); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation,
508 U.S. 114, 128 (1993) (holding that it is presumed that a state has no jurisdiction to tax
tribal members living and working in Indian country "[a]bsent explicit congressional
direction"); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408, 432-33 (1989) (applying the Montana test and deciding that tribal jurisdiction is exclusive
in the closed areas of the reservation-where non-members are not permitted without tribal
permission-and that tribal jurisdiction is concurrent with state jurisdiction in open areas);
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 191-93 (1989) (ruling that New Mexico
could impose a severance tax on the production of oil and gas by a non-Indian lessee on a
reservation); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 733-35 (1983) (allowing California to regulate the
sale of liquor on reservations); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 325
(1983) (affirming that New Mexico state laws on hunting and fishing are preempted by
federally approved tribal laws regulating hunting and fishing by Indians and non-Indians on
reservations); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981) (holding that tribes can
regulate activities of non-Indians on fee lands within the reservation if a consensual relationship
exists between the non-Indian and the tribe or member, or when the non-Indian "conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, economic security, or health or
welfare of the tribe"); Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160, 162-
63 (1980) (concluding that the state cannot tax non-Indian contractors engaged in business on
the reservation with the tribes); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 148-50
(1980) (prohibiting state taxation of a non-Indian company contracting with the tribe to cut
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themes and rules.' These cases reveal the highly fact-specific nature
of judicial assessments of jurisdiction, as well as the unpredictability
of outcomes along any firm, doctrinal lines. Recently, the Supreme
Court has decided several Indian law cases, in most instances finding
against the tribal interests asserted and in favor of the states'
interests. " Taken as a whole, these opinions seem to demonstrate
that this Court will not hesitate to nullify congressional action on
behalf of Indian tribes, disturb historical precedent favorable to
tribes, and minimize tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction. Apparently, this
Supreme Court has not been convinced of the "prominent position
of tribal governments in the federal system and [has] fail[ed] to
identify a constitutional framework for their authority and
jurisdiction."9'
4. The federal trust responsibility
Another distinct aspect of federal Indian law is the special trust
relationship' that exists between the Federal Government and Indian
tribes, which the Supreme Court first acknowledged in the 1831 case
of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia." This "unique obligation," known as
the federal Indian trust responsibility, has been continuously
acknowledged by courts, 7 Congress," and the executive branch of the
timber on the reservation because an existing federal regulation preempted the state action,
and noting that an inquiry into the nature of state, federal and tribal interests at stake must be
made); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 161
(1980) (noting that state taxation of non-member Indians did not intrude on the rights of tribal
self-governance since the subject of the tax was not a member of the tribe); Moe v.
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 468 (1976)
(determining that the state could tax cigarette sales made by an Indian store owner on a
reservation to non-members of the tribe).
91. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 18, at 144 (listing recent cases that seem doctrinally
incoherent).
92. See supra note 71 (discussing judicial disregard and lack of deference for tribal
sovereignty in the face of state interference).
93. Frank Pommersheim, Tibal Courts and the FederalJudiciary: Opportunities and Challenges
fora ConstitutionalDemocracy, 58 MONT. L. REV. 313, 330 (1997).
94. In allowing Indian allottees of forested land in the Quinault Reservation to sue the
United States for money damages resulting from the Department of the Interior's
mismanagement of its timber resources, the Court described the duty the government owed to
the tribes as a fiduciary one in which the trustee (the Indians) could sue for a breach of the
established trust. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) (finding that the
government's "elaborate control over forests and property belonging to Indians" creates a
fiduciary relationship).
95. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); see also Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the
Federal Trust Responsibility, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1213, 1215 (1975).
96. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974) (noting that "[o]n numerous occasions
this Court specifically has upheld legislation that singles out Indians for particular and special
treatment").
97. See, e.g., Aitchell, 463 U.S. at 228 (holding that the United States is liable for money
damages for breach of its trust responsibility to manage timber sources properly within the
Quinault Indian Reservation); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976) (noting that
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Federal Government.9 In Cherokee, the Court depicted Indians as in a
"state of pupilage," likened their relationship with the United States
to that of a "ward to his guardian," and asserted that "they look to our
government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power;
[and] appeal to it for relief to their wants."' ° Pursuant to the trust
responsibility, the United States should "preserve public safety for the
citizens of Indian country."'0 '
The trust responsibility that the United States has to protect Indian
nations and act in their best interest is an essential, but complex
aspect of Indian law. In theory, the trust responsibility should serve
as a check on the ability of Congress to enact laws that are destructive
to Indian tribes' self-government and the ability of the Executive to
act unjustifiably against tribal interests." In practice, tribes do not
appear to have successfully invoked the trust responsibility as a
judicially cognizable barrier to congressional or other federal actions
that would appear to breach the trust responsibility. 3 The following
analysis of Public Law 280 evokes the question of whether the statute
can, through any interpretation, be squared with the federal trust
responsibility.
0 4
"'Indians stand in a special relationship to the federal government'") (quoting Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 613-14 (1943) (Murphy, J., dissenting)); Seminole
Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942) (acknowledging "the distinctive obligation of
trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent and sometimes
exploited people").
98. See, e.g., Indian Tribal Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (1993) (codified
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3602, 3611-3614, 3621, 3631 (1994)) (stating that the United States has a
trust responsibility to each tribal government that includes the protection of their sovereignty).
99. See, e.g., Janet Reno, The Tribal-Federal Partnership, NATION TO NATION (Dep't of Justice,
Office of TribalJustice), Aug. 1996, at 1 (stating that the enhancement of tribal sovereignty was
necessary to fulfill the government's federal trust responsibility); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, AMERICAN INDIANS AND ALASKA NATIVES 13 (not dated) (on file with The American
University Law Review) [hereinafter INFORMATIONAL PAMPHLET] (stating that the trust
responsibility was "a legally enforceable fiduciary obligation ... to protect tribal lands, assets,
resources, and treaty rights").
100. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 2 (1831).
101. See Reno Statement, supra note 45, at 2, 6 (proposing solutions for increasing law
enforcement on Indian country).
102. The trust responsibility is shared by the Federal Government and actively protected
through the Executive. See INFORMATIONAL PAMPHLET, supra note 99, at 13 (stating that the
Department of the Interior has an "affirmative duty to protect tribal health and safety, to fulfill
all treaty and statutory obligations and to exercise utmost good faith in all dealings with the
tribes"); see also Department of Justice Policy on Indian Sovereignty and Government-to-
Government Relations with Indian Tribes, 61 Fed. Reg. 29,424 (1996) (defining the trust
responsibility in both a narrow and broad sense and reaffirming that the implementation of the
trust responsibility is committed to Congress and the executive branch). Felix Cohen also
asserted that the trust responsibility should govern all executive agencies, not just the BIA. See
COHEN, supra note 72, at 225.
103. See Chambers, supra note 95, at 1223-38 (speaking about guardianship status as a
source of plenary authority and the possibility that congressional actions are judicially
reviewable when such actions seem contrary to motivations behind the trust responsibility).
104. In many respects, the Federal Government's fulfillment of its trust responsibility seems
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B. Primary CriminalJurisdiction Statutes
Since Public Law 280 effectuated a partial transfer of the
jurisdiction exercised by the Federal Government to the mandatory
Public Law 280 states,'0 it is helpful to describe how the Federal
Government and tribes shared jurisdiction prior to the passage of
Public Law 280.
Criminal jurisdiction is one aspect of a tribe's inherent power of
self-government.' Nevertheless, consistent with its plenary power to
legislate on behalf of federally recognized tribes, Congress has been
held to have "undoubted constitutional power to prescribe a criminal
code applicable in Indian country."'"7 Prior to the 1953 passage of
Public Law 280, Congress enacted two statutes which collectively form
the primary basis for assertions of federal jurisdiction over crimes in
Indian country. These statutes are known as the General Crimes
Act05 and the Major Crimes Act of 1885.'0 Public Law 280 makes
inconsistent with the stated federal objectives of tribal self-government and self-determination
as promulgated by the executive and legislative branches. For example, it is a stated policy that
tribes should be enabled to assume the delivery of law enforcement, educational, judicial, and
health services to their communities through Public Law 638 in contracting and self-governance
compacting processes. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No.
93-638,88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-458h (1994)).
105. See id. § 450a (declaring Congress' commitment to recognize redirected self-
determination to Indian people).
106. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978) (asserting that the power of
tribal courts to enforce their own criminal laws is part of the tribes' self-governance).
107. See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 648 (1977) (stating that Congress has the
authority to dictate a criminal code in Indian territory).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994). The General Crimes Act is also known as the Indian Country
Crimes Act or the Federal Enclaves Act of 1834. Section 1152 provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United States as
to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the
Indian country.
This Section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person
or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian
country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by
treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to
the Indian tribes respectively.
Id.
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994). This section provides:
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or
other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter,
kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to
commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily
injury (as defined in section 1365 of this tide), an assault against an individual who has
not attained the age of 16 years, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section
661 of this tide within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and
penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
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explicit reference to both of these statutes in its criminal section,"0
which explains the allocation of jurisdictional authority in Indian
country."'
1. The General Crimes Act (18 U.S.C § 1152)
The General Crimes Act was enacted in 1817 to provide for federal
prosecutions of federally defined offenses committed within Indian
country.'12  The Act generally permits federal jurisdiction over
"interracial crimes" occurring in Indian country, where either (1) the
victim is an Indian and the offender is not; or (2) the offender is an
Indian and the victim is not and the crime is not an enumerated
major crime."3 In recognition of tribal sovereignty, the General
Crimes Act did not extend federal criminal jurisdiction in three
circumstances: (1) where an Indian committed a crime against
another Indian; (2) where an Indian defendant was already
prosecuted by the local law of the tribe; and (3) where the exclusive
jurisdiction of a particular offense was already granted to the tribe
through a prior treaty. 4 In all three circumstances, tribes retain
exclusive jurisdiction." 5
The General Crimes Act did not originally specify whether it
applied when both the victim and defendant were non-Indians."' In
1881, however, the Supreme Court in United States v. McBratney1
7
affirmed that in such a circumstance, federal jurisdiction would not
be applicable under the Act, and the state would adjudicate such
offenders."8
(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not defined and
punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States
shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such
offense was committed as are in force at the time of such offense.
Id.
110. Seel8U.S.C.§ 1162(c) (1994).
111. Another federal criminal statute not referred to in Public Law 280 or discussed in
detail throughout this Article is the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1994). This statute
is a law of general applicability, however, via the General Crimes Act it was made applicable to
Indian country. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 18, at 80. The Assimilative Crimes Act allows
federal prosecution of crimes prohibited by state laws when no applicable federal substantive
criminal law exists. See id.
112. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 324 (1978) (affirming
that "federal criminal jurisdiction was extended to crimes committed within Indian country by
'any Indian, or other person or persons'").
113. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152;POMMERSHEIM, supra note 18, at 80.
114. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152; supra note 108 (quoting relevant portion of 18 U.S.C. § 1152).
115. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152; ExparteWilson, 140 U.S. 575,578 (1891).
116. SeePOMMERSHEIM, supra note 18, at 80.
117. 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
118. See id. at 624 (declaring that the circuit court had no jurisdiction over a murder by one
"white man against another white man" on the Ute Reservation in Colorado).
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2. The Major Crimes Act (18 U.SC. § 1153)
Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act in 1885 as a direct
response to the public outcry to the Supreme Court decision in Ex
parte Kan-gi-shun-ca,"9 more commonly known as Ex parte Crow Dog or
simply Crow Dog's case.' In 1881, Crow Dog fatally shot a Brule
Sioux chief by the name of Sin-ta-ga-le-scka (Spotted Tail) because of
a personal, and perhaps political, disagreement. 2 ' The Supreme
Court reversed a Dakota territorial court's conviction that Crow Dog
should be hanged and ruled that the murder of one Indian at the
hands of another was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribe
pursuant to the General Crimes Act.' 2e In so doing, the Supreme
Court, while expressing some contempt for tribal justice
institutions,ss nonetheless deferred to the sovereign right of the
Brule Sioux tribe to determine the resolution of the killing under
Brule law and existing Brule dispute resolution mechanisms. Thus,
the efforts by the BIA and Justice Department to extend federal and
state law to the reservations and impose a death sentence on Crow
Dog failed.2 5
Many members of Congress expressed outrage 26 at the Supreme
Court's ruling and consequently enacted the Major Crimes Act to
ensure federal jurisdiction over murder and other serious offenses
committed by Indians. 7 Section 1153 (a) lists a series of major crimes
119. See WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND WHITE MAN'S LAW 170 (2d ed. 1995)
(explaining the effect Exparte Crow Dog had on the development of Indian courts).
120. 109 U.S. 556 (1883). The Supreme Court case itself noted the English name of Crow
Dog in its case title. See id.
121. One historical analysis disputes the sensationalization of Spotted Tail's murder as sinister
political in-fighting. See HARRING, supra note 55, at 108-09.
122. See Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557, 572.
123. See id. at 571 (noting the existence of "red man's revenge" and the "strongest
prejudices of their savage nature").
124. The means of resolving the killing under the dispute resolution mechanisms of Brule
law included adjudication by the tribal council and reconciliation through gifts of property. See
HARRING, supra note 55, at 104-05. In the Crow Dog case, both families met and following tribal
law, settled the matter for "$600, eight horses, and one blanket." See id. at 110.
125. See COHEN, supra note 72, at 236 (discussing the Federal Government's argument that
federal jurisdiction was established by an agreement with the Sioux Nation, which the Supreme
Court rejected).
126. See WASHBURN, supra note 119, at 170 (stating that Congress viewed the decision as
"outrageous" and as a result extended federal criminal jurisdiction to murder).
127. It is important to note that when federal criminal statutes, including Public Law 280,
speak of Indians they do not clarify whether the Indian must be a member of the tribe or simply
an Indian. In United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), the Court noted that a tribe acts as an
independent sovereign when it criminally punishes a member for a violation of tribal law. See
id. at 313. However, the meaning of the term "Indian" remained unclear. See Duro v. Reina,
495 U.S. 676, 682 (1990) (discussing the lower court's ruling that IWheelers reference to member
and nonmember Indians was "indiscriminate" and should be given "little weight"), superceded in
part by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1994). It was not until 1990 that the Court defined the term
"Indian" and definitively ruled that a tribe only had criminal jurisdiction over member-Indians.
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over which the federal courts have jurisdiction despite the prior tribal
exceptions listed in the General Crimes Act.
28
The Major Crimes Act, however, did not disturb tribal concurrent
jurisdiction over the enumerated offenses.'2 As a result, tribes may
prosecute major crimes and the federal courts have upheld their
right to do so."o To the extent there is any question about
concurrent tribal jurisdittion over major crimes,' the court rulings
regarding the Major Crimes Act and the Act's legislative history
clearly support the retention of tribal concurrent jurisdiction. For
instance, in United States v. Antelope, 32 the Supreme Court recognized
that tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses in Indian
country committed by enrolled Indians against other Indians "except
for the offenses enumerated in the Major Crimes Act."'33  In the
Court's detailed analysis of the Act and the tribe's jurisdiction, it
never held that the tribe lacked concurrent jurisdiction over these
See id. at 688-92 (holding that tribal jurisdiction over its members is consistent with a tribe's
inherent sovereign power to control its internal affairs and preserve its ways, whereas
jurisdiction of an "outsider" was not essential to the realization of this right).
This ruling presented a problem, because it left a jurisdictional gap. For example, if an
Oglala Sioux tribal member entered the Crow Indian Reservation and committed a non-major
crime against a Crow woman, the tribal court would have nojurisdiction. The federal court has
no jurisdiction under section 1153, and the state-having no jurisdiction over Indian parties-
also has no jurisdiction. Who prosecutes the defendant? Because of the potential for the
commission of crimes with impunity, Congress legislated an overturning of the Court's ruling in
Duroin 1991. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077, 104
Stat. 1856, 1892-93 (1990), (amended byAct of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Star. 646
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §1301 (1994)). Through this Act, Congress vested the tribes
with criminal jurisdiction over violations committed by non-member Indians in Indian country.
See id. See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v. Reina, 17 AN[.
INDIAN L. REV. 109 (1992) (discussing legislative action taken in response to Duro).
128. Since the statute was enacted, it has expanded from seven major crimes to fourteen.
The fourteen major crimes are: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under
Chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon,
assault resulting in serious bodily injury, assault against a person under sixteen years of age,
arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under Section 661. See 8 TRIBAL CT. REc. (Nat'l Indian
Justice Ctr., Petaluma, Cal.), Winter/Spring 1995, at 30 (on file with The American University Law
Review); supra notes 108, 114 and accompanying text (discussing exceptions to federal
jurisdiction enumerated in the General Crimes Act).
129. SeeMelton, supra note 53, at 129 (claiming that tribes have concurrentjurisdiction over
the felony crimes listed in the Act); Bradley Interviews, supra note 28 (explaining that he
interpreted the Act as providing for concurrent jurisdiction); Telephone Interview with Randy
Wurtz, Chief Prosecutor of Omaha Tribal Council (July 22, 1997) (explaining his belief that
there is concurrent tribal-state jurisdiction over major crimes and exclusive tribal jurisdiction
over minor offenses); see also infra note 162 (providing a chart depicting concurrent tribal
jurisdiction for the enumerated major crimes).
130. See Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 825-26 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a tribal court
conviction for manslaughter and noting concurrent jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act).
131. The text of section 1153 provides no express language clarifying whether the Federal
Government's assumption ofjurisdiction over major crimes is in lieu of tribal jurisdiction or in
addition to it. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994); see also supra note 109 (providing statutory text).
132. 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
133. See id. at 643 n.2.
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enumerated offenses, but only that its jurisdiction was no longer
exclusive.3 4  In fact, the Court characterized federal jurisdiction
under the Act as simply a "limited intrusion of federal power into the
otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribe."'"' The Major
Crimes Act would clearly not amount to a "limited intrusion" into
tribal jurisdiction if it terminated tribal jurisdiction altogether, rather
than merely enabling concurrent federal jurisdiction.'
The characterization of the Major Crimes Act as a "limited
intrusion" was reaffirmed in Ex parte Wi/son5 7 and again in United
States v. Wheeler "s The Wheeler Court specifically held that as both the
Navajo Tribe and the Federal Government were separate sovereigns,
the tribe was not barred by the double jeopardy clause to prosecute
the Indian defendant for the sexual assault of a minor even if first
prosecuted by the Federal Government 9 In Wheeler, under the
Major Crimes Act, the Federal Government prosecuted the
defendant for rape, 40 while the tribe was still permitted to prosecute
the defendant for the same offense. 4'
Further bolstering the argument for concurrent jurisdiction under
the Major Crimes Act, the Supreme Court observed that Congress'
original intent under the Act may have been to maintain concurrent
tribal jurisdiction. In Oliphant v. Squamish Indian Tribe,42 the
Supreme Court noted that the original text of the Major Crimes Act
stated that the enumerated crimes would be punished by the United
States "and not otherwise. '' '" The Court observed that during the
legislative debate on the Act, Congressman Budd moved to amend
and strike the phrase "and not otherwise,"'" arguing that preserving
concurrent jurisdiction with the tribal governments was consistent
134. See id.
135. See id. at 643 n.1 (quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 209 (1973)).
136. The effect of concurrent jurisdiction is not necessarily positive. Under the aegis of
concurrent jurisdiction, tribal authority may be undercut by state and federal governments. See
JohnJ. Harte, Validity of a State Court's Exercise of Concurrent Jurisdiction over Civil Actions Arising in
Indian Country: Application of the Indian Abstention Doctrine in State Court, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
63, 65 (1997) (asserting that concurrent state court jurisdiction questions the validity of the
tribal court systems and undermines the effect of tribal laws).
137. 140 U.S. 575, 578 (1891) (holding that when the Federal Government assumed
criminal jurisdiction in 1885 over offenses listed in the Major Crimes Act, the jurisdiction it
assumed was 'limited").
138. 435 U.S. 313, 325 (1978) (quoting Antelope, 430 U.S. at 643 n.1, and discussing
congressional treatment of the "Intra-Indian offense exception").
139. See id.
140. See id. at 315-16.
141. See id. at 329-30.
142. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
143. See id. at 203-04 & n.14 (discussing a statement by Rep. Budd, 16 CONG. REc. 934-35
(1885), and discussing the tribal court's lack ofjurisdiction over non-Indians).
144. See id.
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with the objectives of the Major Crimes Act.' 45  The Court finally
observed that although the issue was not resolved at that session, it
was seemingly resolved by the time the Act emerged in final form,
because the provision was enacted without the limiting phrase.'4"
Thus, concurrent, not exclusive, jurisdiction was authorized.'
47
More recently, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of concurrent
jurisdiction over major crimes committed by members of Indian
tribes. In Wetsit v. Stafne,"48 a tribal member was charged and
convicted of manslaughter in tribal court after having been acquitted
of the same crime in federal district court. 49 Relying heavily upon
United States v. Wheeler,50 the Ninth Circuit found that "[a] tribal
court, which is in compliance with the Indian Civil Rights Act is
competent to try a tribal member for a crime also prosecutable under
the Major Crimes Act."'5' In addition to cited decisions and
152
treatises, the Ninth Circuit asserted two logical bases for this
conclusion: first, the fact that federal jurisdiction is not always
assured (indeed, "virtually nonexistent")1 53 over crimes such as
burglary or robbery enumerated in the Major Crimes Act; and,
second, because lesser included offenses are prosecutable under the
Major Crimes Act,'5 4 exclusive federal jurisdiction would effectively
pre-empt a large portion of a tribe's criminal jurisdiction.55  As a
policy matter, the Ninth Circuit astutely observed that "[r] etention of
this [concurrent] jurisdiction by the tribes can only increase their
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See generally Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 59-60 (1934) (discussing the
retained tribal jurisdiction and stating that although the statute has been construed as
removing all tribal jurisdiction over the enumerated crimes, the statute might be interpreted as
conferring only concurrent jurisdiction because it never expressly terminated tribal
jurisdiction).
148. 44 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 1995).
149. See id. at 824.
150. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
151. 44 F.3d at 825.
152. The Ninth Circuit in Wetsit relied upon several "distinguished authorities" including
William C. Canby, see CANBY, supra note 42, at 35 (stating that the crime of theft is included in
the original Major Crimes Act), and David H. Getches, see GETCHES ET. AL., suprra note 40, at 403
(noting that the crime of theft on reservations was unchecked by federal law enforcement
authorities).
153. See Wesit, 44 F.3d at 825 (citing CANBY, supra note 42, at 135).
154. Defendants may be convicted of lesser included offenses, even though the government
could not have originally charged the lesser offense. See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205,
214 (1973) (discussing the scope of the Major Crimes Act); United States v. Walkingeagle, 974
F.2d 551, 556 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that the Act does not require that the defendant be
deprived of instruction on the lesser included offense); United States v.Johnson, 967 F.2d 1431,
1436 (10th Cir. 1992) (discussing the Assimilative Crimes Act and finding that the jury
instruction on the lesser included state offense of aggravated battery was properly given).
155. See Wetsit, 44 F.3d at 826 (insisting that jurisdiction in the instant case is proper and
that to disallow it would infringe on the tribe's criminal jurisdiction).
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responsibility for efficient and fairjustice.' ' s
Although the Major Crimes Act supports the existence of
concurrent tribal criminal jurisdiction, in practice, external factors
frequently deter and impede tribes from fully and effectively
exercising their criminal jurisdiction, particularly over major
crimes. For example, chronic underfunding of tribal justice
systems"'X and congressionally imposed limitations on tribal court
sentencing authority59 have severely impeded tribes in their ability to
deter meaningfully crime, compensate victims, and punish violators.
Although some tribes may currently lack the means to assert
concurrent jurisdiction over major crimes, or even minor crimes, the
existence of such jurisdiction is not diminished.' 6°
Criminal jurisdiction in Indian country generally, in the absence of
Public Law 280, is a "complex patchwork of federal, state, and tribal
law."" Navigating its jurisprudence requires careful consideration of
the location of the crime, the Indian or non-Indian status of the
actors, and the relative seriousness of the crime.'62 Because the
156. Id. at 826.
157. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 49, at 123 (describing how Supreme Court decisions have
limited the ability of tribes to maintain order on their lands).
158. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTs, THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, REPORT 40-41 (1992)
(compiling five years of hearings and investigations on tribal courts and justice systems and
concluding that a shortage of funds has handicapped the administration of justice in Indian
country).
159. See, e.g., Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994). Section 1302 provides:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall-... require excessive
bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual punishments, and in no event
impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment greater than
imprisonment for a term of one year and a fine of $5,000, or both....
Id. § 1302.
160. See United States ex reL Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695, 697 (D. Neb. 1879)
(No. 14,891) (holding that the power and authority ofjurisdiction do not cease to exist because
of non-use).
161. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680 (1990).
162. Given the complexity of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, the reader may find it
helpful to refer from time to time to the chart below:
Crimes by Parties Jurisdiction Statutory Authority
a. Crimes by Indians
against Indians:
i. "Major" crimes. Federal or tribal 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(concurrent)
ii. Other crimes. Tribal (exclusive)
b. Crimes by Indians
against non-
Indians:
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maintenance of law and order is so central to the assertion of self-
government and sovereignty, be it tribal, state, or federal, tensions
necessarily underlie the criminal justice paradigm in Indian country
and manifest themselves in cases involving criminal jurisdiction.
II. THE PASSAGE OF PUBLIC LAW 280
Although Congress has exercised its power to delegate Indian
country jurisdiction to the states in other contexts, Public Law 280
is clearly the most sweeping and significant of such delegations.'6 In
passing Public Law 280, Congress disrupted the traditional
distribution of power over Indian country principally shared by the
i. "Major" crimes. Federal or tribal 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(concurrent)
ii. Other crimes. Federal or tribal 18 U.S.C. § 1152
(concurrent)
c. Crimes by Indians Tribal (exclusive)
without Victims:
d. Crimes by non- Federal (exclusive) 18 U.S.C. § 1152
Indians against
Indians:
e. Crimes by non- State (exclusive)
Indians against
Non-Indians:
f. Crimes by non- State (exclusive)
Indians without
Victims:
CANBY, supra note 42, at 142 (noting that the chart in its original form actually referred to
U.S.CA rather than the U.S.C. as used here); see also PEVAR, supra note 20, at 132 (providing an
equally useful chart).
It should be noted that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent
congressional authorization. See Oliphant v. Squamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 197-99, 212
(1978) (declaring that the tribe has no jurisdiction over two non-Indian residents of Port
Madison Reservation unless Congress specifically authorizes such jurisdiction). The Court
reasoned that such jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the tribe's dependent status. See id.
at 199-208.
163. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 13, 1950, ch. 947, 64 Stat. 845 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 233 (1994)
(conferring jurisdiction to New York for civil actions between Indians or to which Indians are a
party); Act of July 2, 1948, ch. 809, 62 Stat. 1224 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 232 (1994)); Act of
June 30, 1948, ch. 759, 62 Stat. 1161 (granting Iowa jurisdiction over offenses committed by or
against Indians on Sac & Fox Indian Reservations); Act of May 31, 1946, ch. 279, 60 Stat. 229
(conferringjurisdiction to North Dakota over violations committed by or against Indians on the
Devils Lake Indian Reservation); Act ofJune 8, 1940, ch. 276, 54 Stat. 249 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 3243 (1994) (detailing jurisdiction of state of Kansas over crimes committed on
Indian reservations).
164. See COHEN, supra note 72, at 344 (discussing the scope of Public Law 280).
1998] PUBLIC LAW 280 1657
Federal Government and the tribes.
A. Public Law 280's Primary Provisions
Public Law 280 unilaterally transferred federal civil and criminal
jurisdiction "over offenses committed by or against Indians" within
Indian country to the six designated states of Alaska, 66 California,
Minnesota," 7 Nebraska, Oregon,"'* and Wisconsin./9 These six states
are commonly referred to as the "mandatory" Public Law 280 states.7
These states received no federal subsidies to ease the financial
burden of their new responsibilities, were precluded from taxing
reservation lands to raise their own revenues, and received
jurisdiction without tribal consent.' It was the lack of tribal consent
165. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 40, at 478 (noting that Public Law 280 is the principle
example of assimilationist policies that developed during the Termination Period).
166. The Annette Islands, or Metlakafla, were exempted from Public Law 280. The
application of Public Law 280 to Alaska has become increasingly complicated in light of
litigation regarding the status of Indian lands in Alaska. See Native Village of Venetie I.RA
Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 562 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alaska v.
Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. Ct. 948 (1998) (holding that Alaska must give full
faith and credit to the Native Village's child custody decision); see also infra note 321 and
accompanying text (discussing the Venetie decision).
167. The Red Lake Reservation was exempted from Public Law 280 when enacted. See 18
U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1994).
168. The Warm Spring Reservation was exempted in the passage of Public Law 280. See id.
169. The Menominee Reservation was initially exempted from Public Law 280. See
Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 471-73
(1979) (indicating that Wisconsin held jurisdiction over all Indian country in the state except
the Menominee Reservation); see also PEVAR, supra note 20, at 113 (noting the Menominee
Reservation as one of the three exceptions to the jurisdiction conferred to the six mandatory
states by Public Law 280); WASHBURN, supra note 119, at 87 (same).
170. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (referring to these states as such because they
had little choice in acceptance of the congressional delegation).
171. See Goldberg, supra note 56, at 538, 540, 546 (describing tribal discontent with Public
Law 280's affront to tribal autonomy, state displeasure with the government's tight rein on the
federal purse, and the Federal Government's deviation from past practices of engaging in
extensive consultations with affected states and tribes to assure greater consensus before
jurisdictional transfers were effectuated).
It should be noted, however, that the BIA did engage in some "consultations" with various
affected tribes and the states being considered for the mandatory and immediate transfers-
then California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Minnesota (note the
absence of Alaska). See S. REP. No. 83-699, at 6 (1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.CA.A.N. 2409,
2412-13 (noting that all states were agreeable to the transfer with exception of Nevada, which
was divided on the issue because of the statute's lack of accompanying federal assistance).
The term "consultation" appears in quotes to highlight the fact that these discussions were
clearly not intended to secure tribal permission for the transfers. Regardless of tribal approval,
the transfers would occur if the Federal Government so decided. For example, during these
discussions it became known that several tribes opposed the transfers: the Red Lake Band of
Chippewa Indians in Minnesota argued that state law would not benefit the tribe and suggested
the need for a tribal referendum on the issue; the Warm Springs Tribe in Oregon feared unfair
treatment of tribal members in state courts; the Colville and Yakima Tribes in Washington
feared discrimination in state courts and further loss of tribal rights; and the Menominee Tribe
in Wisconsin asserted that it was capable of maintaining order and lacked the readiness to
accede to state laws. See id. Despite the Menominee Tribes' objections, however, it was not one
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in particular that prompted President Eisenhower, on the day that he
signed the Act into law, to remark that he had "grave doubts as to the
wisdom of certain provisions" of Public Law 280.172
The Act further provided for a similar assumption ofjurisdiction by
the remaining states containing Indian country at some time in the
future. '7 Because of the discretionary language, these remaining
states are referred to as the "optional" states.' 4 Before "optional"
states could assume jurisdiction, however, they were required to
adopt affirmative legislation and where necessary, pass an
amendment to their constitutions.'7 '
B. Congressional Intent
The problems caused by Public Law 280 directly result from its
ambiguous legislative history, imprecise drafting, and lack of an
express statement of the statute's objective. The sparse legislative
history, however, does emphasize the need to improve law
enforcement and curb federal expenditures, and the historical
context of the statute reflects the then pervasive policy of
of the reservations exempt from the transfer. See supra notes 21-22 (providing the text of Public
Law 280's civil and criminal provisions illustrating absence of Menominee Tribe from exempt
reservations).
172. See Statement by the President upon Signing Bill Relating to State Jurisdiction over
Cases Arising on Indian Reservations, 165 PUB. PAPERS 564, 564-65 (Aug. 15, 1953) [hereinafter
Eisenhower Signing Statement] ("The failure to include in these provisions a requirement of
full consultation in order to ascertain the wishes and desires of the Indians and of final Federal
approval, was unfortunate."). In fact, in the same signing papers, the President actually
requested that the Act be amended to provide for such consultations during Congress' next
session. See id. at 565.
173. See 25 U.S.C. § 1324 (1994). It should be noted that while the original enactment did
not require states to obtain consent from the affected tribes, the 1968 amendments made tribal
consent a requirement for future assumptions ofjurisdiction and allowed states to assume only
partial jurisdiction. See Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1324 (1994)); see also infra Part III.D.2 (discussing subsequent
amendments to Public Law 280).
174. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 40, at 484 (detailing the extent to which Arizona,
Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington
have exercised this option).
175. See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S.
463, 474 (1979) (acknowledging that Public Law 280 authorized states "to amend where
necessary their state constitutions or existing statutes to remove any legal impediment to the
assumption of jurisdiction under the Act") (internal quotation omitted); Kennerly v. District
Court, 400 U.S. 423, 427 (1971) (holding that absent affirmative legislation, Montana could not
exercise jurisdiction over Indian country simply because a tribal law permitted it); see also 99
CONG. REc. 10,782 (1953) (statements of Reps. Case, Barret, and Thye) (explaining
constitutional impediments precluding the assumption ofjurisdiction for certain states).
Affirmative legislation was needed before an optional state could assume jurisdiction under
Public Law 280 because of the enabling acts issued by Congress when the states were first
admitted into the Union. See Deloria, supra note 76, at 301-02. As Vine Deloria, Jr. explains,
Congress had exclusionary clauses placed in the states' enabling acts to "exempt[] Indian
property and rights from state control." See id. at 302. Until these provisions were amended,
they were a constant bar to state jurisdiction.
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assimilation." In interpreting Public Law 280, the challenge
becomes how to give effect to congressional intent while
acknowledging significant subsequent shifts in policy.
1. Lawlessness
As noted above, Congress expressed three concerns when enacting
Public Law 280: lawlessness on reservations, the desire to assimilate
Indian tribes into the population at large, and a shrinking federal
budget for Indian affairs.7 Congress' primary goal was to deal with
the "lawlessness" on reservations and the "absence of adequate tribal
institutions for law enforcement."'7 8 In fact, the statute, as originally
introduced, was concerned with law enforcement problems in the
State of California exclusively.Y9 The Senate eventually decided to
extend the statute's coverage to the other "mandatory" states18
believed to share similar law enforcement problems. 8'
The Senate noted a serious jurisdictional problem in Indian
country resulting from the existing federal scheme of concurrent
tribal-federal jurisdiction. States were curtailed in exercising
authority over crimes in Indian country and the Federal
Government's authority was restricted by the Major Crimes Act to
176. See infra notes 195-215 and accompanying text (discussing the Termination Period and
its impact on Public Law 280).
177. See Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. at 488 (discussing
the concerns that motivated Congress to enact Public Law 280).
178. SeeBryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379 (1976); see also California v. Cabazon Band
of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 202 (1987) (ruling that Congress' principal goal was to
combat lawlessness"); Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. at 505
(holding that § 1963's assumption of partial jurisdiction "undermines an important purpose
behind Pub. L. 280"-the gap in law enforcement); Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v.
Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 560 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming congressional desire to "remedy" law
enforcement problems on "some" reservations), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alaska v. Native
Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. Ct. 948, 954 (1998) (noting examples of congressional
.protections" extended to "dependent Indian communities"); S. REP. No. 83-699, at 5 (1953),
reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.CAN. 2409, 2412 (recognizing that "a hiatus in law-enforcement
authority" existed that justified a transfer ofjurisdiction to states who were willing and able to
combat lawlessness on reservations); 99 CONG. REc. 10,783 (1953) (detailing letters received by
Senator Thye that indicate Minnesota's desire to have such jurisdiction to address law
enforcement problems on reservations); Goldberg, supra note 56, at 540-42 (explaining that it
was a congressional response to "lawlessness on the reservations and the accompanying threat
to Anglos living nearby").
179. See S. REP. No. 83-699, at 1-6 (noting that when presented as H.R. 1063, the Act
provided for California to extend its criminal laws over Indian country and have jurisdiction
over civil controversies in Indian country).
180. See supra note 20 (discussing mandatory states).
181. See infra note 178.
182. See S. REP. No. 83-699, at 5; see also Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 439 U.S. at 505-06 (affirming that the "hiatus in law-enforcement authority" on Indian
reservations was a result of the division of jurisdiction between federal, state and tribal
governments) (internal quotation omitted).
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serious offenses.8 3 In deciding to extend the breadth of the statute,
the Senate observed that "[t] he enforcement of law and order among
the Indians in the Indian country had been left largely to the Indian
groups... [and] tribes [were] not adequately organized to perform
that function.' ' 84  Interestingly, the Senate report containing the
justification for Public Law 280 never acknowledged some of the
central problems of Indian country law enforcement: the Federal
Government's continued reluctance to invest resources in reservation
law enforcement and to investigate adequately and prosecute crimes
in Indian country.8 5
The legislative history's emphasis on criminal jurisdiction and the
congressional desire to improve law enforcement, supports the view
that the statute's extension of civil jurisdiction to the states was not a
priority, but merely an "afterthought.',
86
In addition, Congress' focus on lawlessness supports the
interpretation that the statute provided for concurrent jurisdiction,
because improvement of law enforcement would more likely result if
Congress "supplemented' tribal jurisdiction with state jurisdiction,
rather than "supplanted' it. 87 Supplementing tribal jurisdiction would
augment jurisdiction and increase the prospects for adequate law
enforcement in Indian country. Supplanting tribal jurisdiction,
however, would merely replace the underfunded tribal justice systems
with similarly challenged state systems.
2. A need to decrease federal spending
With the enactment of Public Law 280, legislators withdrew a
significant aspect of the Federal Government's responsibility for law
183. See S. REP. No. 83-699, at 5 (commenting on the State's limited ability to prosecute
many offenses occurring in Indian country and the limited applicability of federal criminal laws
to the "so-called 10 major crimes").
184. See id. at 5; see also Bradley Interviews, supra note 28 (explaining that at the time of the
Act's passage there were no tribal courts in Nebraska).
185. See PEVAR, supra note 20, at 133 (explaining that to the Federal Government,
.reservation crime [is] a low priority"); Goldberg, supra note 56, at 541 (noting that federal
jurisdiction was "typically neither well-financed nor vigorous").
186. Santa Rosa Band of Mission Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 661 (9th Cir. 1975)
(observing that there is little in the legislative history of the Act that indicates a "congressional
rationale" for extending state civil jurisdiction over the tribes); see also Bryan v. Itasca County,
426 U.S. 373, 380-81 (1976) (acknowledging that section 1162 "was the central focus of Pub. L.
280" and the total absence of legislative history regarding Public Law 280's civil provision is
proof of this conclusion); Goldberg, supra note 56, at 543 (suggesting that civil jurisdiction was
added because it was "convenient and cheap" and in accord with assimilationist undertones).
187. Native Village of Venetie I.RA Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 560 (9th Cir. 1991)
(declaring that Public Law 280 did not divest tribes of their jurisdiction), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. Ct. 948 (1998).
188. For more information on the financial problems associated with the Public Law 280
transfer ofjurisdiction to the states, see supra Part II.B.2.
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enforcement in Indian country and took their financial support with
them. Unfortunately, Congress expressed little interest in ensuring
that the mandatory states could adequately fund their new
responsibilities.' 9  Instead, the Federal Government was more
concerned with relieving itself from the financial burdens of its trust
responsibility.'" In fact, during the debates prior to Public Law 280's
passage, one Representative made a point of noting that in the year
1800, Indian affairs cost the United States $31 while in 1951, the
annual expenditure had "expanded tremendously" to $74,707,320.19'
Although Congress stated as one of its "coordinate aims" the
"withdrawal of Federal responsibility for Indian affairs wherever
practicable, ''' 92 it was not a gesture intended simply to end Indian
wardship status and bestow Indians with a feeling of equality with
state citizens.9 The fundamental objective was to begin a process of
189. See Goldberg, supra note 56, at 551 (opining that Congress' "insensitivity" to the states'
financial worries was the result of the inherent conflict between its desire to improve law
enforcement while lacking the will to finance the initiative). Unlike the mandatory states, the
optional states were given the opportunity to refrain from assuming jurisdiction until they had
adequate finances. See Washington v. Confederate Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation,
439 U.S. 463, 505 (1979) (noting that the concerns of the states prompted Congress to give the
optional states time to decide when they were capable of assumptions).
The mandatory states were forced to assume jurisdiction without any promises or guarantees
of federal subsidies or the lifting of the tax exempt trust status of Indian lands. See Goldberg,
supra note 56, at 538. While Congress consulted with these affected states and learned of their
.agreeableness to the proposed transfer of jurisdiction," see S. REP. No. 83-699, at 6 (1953),
reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.CA-N. 2409, 2413, it appears that the agreeableness was with respect to
the jurisdiction, not to the lack of funds that would accompany it. Cf. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 381-83
(quoting Representative Young of Minnesota who expressed concern with the financial burden
that jurisdiction would have imposed on his state and that the Federal Government should
provide these states either with financial assistance or the means to obtain needed revenues
through additional taxation powers).
190. See 99 CONG. REC. 9263 (1953) (statement of Rep. Harrison) (noting that the total
expenditures from 1789 to 1951 would reach the two billion dollar mark and suggesting that
the time had come to enact legislation that would allow the BIA to "begin going out of business
in an orderly manner"); see also Bryan, 426 U.S. at 381-82 (noting the lack of any congressional
intent to grant states any financial assistance).
In Bryan, the Supreme Court recounted a key discussion between Representatives Sellery and
Young that encapsulates this issue. See id. at 381-83. In this discussion, Representative Young
inquired as to why the Federal Government did not feel its assistance should be required since
no taxation was permitted to offset the additional costs. See id. at 382-83. Representative Sellery
acknowledged the lack of revenue raising ability, but nevertheless stated: "federal financial
assistance or substitution of law enforcement activities among the Indians... might turn out to
be a rather costly program, and it is a problem which the States should deal with and accept
without Federal financial assistance .... " See id. at 382. Interestingly, prior to Public Law 280's
passage, Congress was informed that transfers of the federal services to the states would
ultimately decrease federal expenditures. The initial cuts, however, should be delayed while the
Federal Government assisted the states in their new role until the government permitted
additional state taxation of Indian income and lands. See COMM'N ON ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OF GOV'T, INDIAN AFFAIRS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, H.R. Doc. No. 81-129, at 75
(1949). Congress, however, ignored this recommendation.
191. See99 CONG. REc. 9263 (1953) (statement of Rep. Harrison).
192. S. REP. NO. 83-699, at 3.
193. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 382 (citing the statement of Representative Sellery that transfer
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terminating a costly federal responsibility. ' 9
3. Assimilation, not termination
Some commentators believe that Public Law 280 cannot be
reconciled with the period during which it was enacted unless it is
interpreted to provide for full divestiture of tribal jurisdiction.'9 No
interpretation of Public Law 280 can be persuasive unless it both
acknowledges and is reconciled with the fact that it was enacted
during a time in American history that is now referred to as the
"Termination Period."'9 6 Such an acknowledgment, however, does
not foreclose an interpretation of Public Law 280 that provides for
concurrent tribal and state jurisdiction.
To comprehend fully the conflict surrounding Public Law 280 and
its enactment history, it is necessary first to understand the
Termination Period itself. Spanning from roughly 1940 to 1962, the
period was marked by a distinctive philosophy and accompanied by
legislation designed to promote the termination of Indian tribes.9 7
During this time, Congress enacted legislation promoting (1) the
assimilation of Indians into the mainstream of society; (2) the
termination of federal supervision over Indian affairs, including the
protected trust status, the application of federal laws to Indian
territories and federal benefits and services; and (3) the eventual
relinquishment of federal control over Indian affairs to state and
will give Indians a "feeling of a conviction that they are in the same status and have access to the
same services, including the courts, as other citizens of the State that are not Indians"); H.RL
Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. 1 (1953) (declaring the congressional policy of terminating Indian
wardship status and granting "them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to American
citizenship").
194. On June 9, 1953, Congress set into motion a process by which Indian tribes and
individual members of tribes located in the states of California, Florida, Texas, New York, and
Iowa, and the Flathead Tribe of Montana, the Klamath Tribe of Oregon, the Menominee Tribe
of Wisconsin, the Osage Tribe of Oklahoma, the Potowatamie Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska,
and the Chippewa Tribal members located on the Turtle Mountain Reservation in North
Dakota, were to be "freed from Federal supervision and control and from all disabilities and
limitations specially applicable to Indians." See H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. 1-2. Once the
above entities were "freed" from federal control, the BIA and all of its offices serving these
tribes were to be abolished and the Secretary of the Interior was charged with the duty to
examine all existing legislation relating to these tribes and to advise Congress on further actions
to accomplish a complete relinquishment of federal responsibility. See id. at 2.
195. See Philip Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning and the Dynamic Nature of
Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1165 (1990) (explaining that some believe Public Law
280 reflects "a clear diminishment of tribal sovereignty"); see also CLINTON ET AL., supra note 79,
at 158 (stating that Public Law 280 gave states jurisdiction over Indian country previously
exercised by both the federal and tribal governments).
196. See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 79, at 155 (noting that this period lasted from 1940-
1962).
197. See Hauptman, supra note 75, at 321 (describing the philosophy as a movement to
encourage assimilation and bring forth a cessation of federal responsibilities).
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local authorities. 8
A significant impetus in the evolution of the termination policy was
the 1949 Hoover Commission Report on the state of Indian affairs.'"
In its report, the Commission offered several recommendations to
remedy the "Indian Problem. '' °  Its principal suggestion was to
promote the "gradual integration of all Indians into the general
population and economy."2 °  Although the Hoover Commission
report first recommended assimilation, it was the 1953 House
Concurrent Resolution 10822 that crystallized the Termination
Period's goals into official congressional policy and set the
assimilation process in motion.Y
Public Law 280 was enacted during the Termination Period,04
198. See id. at 329-30 (describing the existence of four general categories of termination laws
enacted during the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations that ended federal recognition of
109 Indian groups and affected over 1,365,801 acres of land); see also CLINTON ET AL., supra note
79, at 158 (explaining the "winding up" of affairs for select Indian tribes, termination of tribal
"eligibility for federal benefits, and from coverage under federal Indian laws," and eventual
transfer to state authority); WASHBURN, supra note 119, at 83-90 (postulating that congressional
acceptance of the termination policy was a result of many factors including, but not limited to, a
feeling of congressional guilt over the wrongs done to Indians, a desire to duplicate the
freedom movements of the Eastern Europe satellite countries, a misguided hope that passage of
Public Law 280 and House Concurrent Resolution 108 would make Indians self-reliant, and the
power of a few members of Congress with "dedicated philosophical convictions" over
.unconcern and ignorance of the majority").
199. See COMM'N ON ORG. OF THE EXEcuTIvE BRANCH OF THE GOV'T, INDIAN AFFAIRS, H.R.
Doc. No. 81-129, at 53 (1949).
200. See id. at 63. Based on the Commission's report, it seemed the "Indian Problem" was a
combination of the Indians' continued low socio-economic standard of living in the face of the
general prosperity of the nation as a whole, and federal inability-through the BIA-to make
advances in Indian welfare despite the enormous outlay of federal resources for Indian affairs.
See id. at 59-62. It appears that the Commission did not believe that the BIA was providing
Indians with a proportionate return on the Federal Government's investment in the "health,
welfare, and general vocational education" of Indian peoples. Id. at 73.
201. Id. at 60. To accomplish this integration, the report suggested several things,
including: transfer of federal social programs and federal medical service programs to the
states; termination of the tax exemption for Indian lands; an increase in Indian participation in
the political and civil life of the states; encouragement of young employable Indians to leave the
reservation and "set themselves up on the land or in business"; and eventual discontinuance of
all specialized federal activities serving Indians, including the dissolution of the BIA through
the transfer of all of its duties to a successor body called the Federal Security Agency. See id. at
66-67, 71.
202. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. 1 (1953). Resolution 108 provides in relevant part:
Whereas it is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within
the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled to the
same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United
States... [I]t is declared to be the sense of Congress that, at the earliest possible time,
all of the Indian tribes ... should be freed from Federal supervision and control and
from all disabilities and limitations specially applicable to Indians ....
Id.
203. See CLINTON Er AL., supra note 79, at 157 (suggesting that the policy "reach [ed] its peak
in 1953" with the resolution's passage).
204. See WASHBURN, supra note 119, at 86-87 (noting that Public Law 280 was passed just two
weeks after House Concurrent Resolution 108).
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which included the aim of assimilating s tribes into society at large.
Public Law 280 contains a strong assimilationist bent and there may
be language in the statute's legislative history that could support an
assimilationist agenda.
Although Public Law 280 bears the imprint of the Termination
Period, there is no reason to reach a divestiture interpretation as a
207result of this factor alone. By acknowledging the statute's provision
for state intrusion into tribal affairs and judicial recognition of tribes'
subjection to state jurisdiction, the original intent of Congress can be
inferred. By enacting Public Law 280, Congress disregarded the
historical trust relationship that existed between the Federal
Government and the Indian tribes. Indian country law enforcement
was predominantly a federal-tribal sphere only,28 but with Public Law
280, Congress ignored history and tradition and treated Indians like
any other citizens, removing their historic insulation from state
authority. The imprint of assimilationist policies should be
acknowledged, yet not made determinative.
While gradual assimilation of Public Law 280 tribes was set in
209motion by the statute, total assimilation and hence, total
termination of tribal justice systems was not provided for in the
statute. The Court has repeatedly ruled that Public Law 280 "was
plainly not meant to effect total assimilation . . . and nothing in its
205. Especially appealing to Congress was the fact that assimilation was much cheaper than
continuing the expensive obligations of the trust relationship. See Goldberg, supra note 56, at
536.
206. See S. REP. No. 83-699, at 3 (1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2409, 2409 (stating
the congressional aim of the "termination of subjection of the Indians to Federal laws
applicable to Indians as such"); id. at 5 (suggesting that Public Law 280 is "desirable" because
Indians had "reached a state of acculturation and development" that made them amenable to
these changes); see also Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 382 (1976) (expressing the desire
to place Indians on equal footing by giving them "same status and ... access to the same
services, including the courts, as other citizens of the State who are not Indians" (quoting Mr.
Sellery, Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Indian Affairs)); 99 CONG. REc. 9263 (1953) (statement
of Rep. Harrison) (postulating that some tribes were ready for "complete freedom from Federal
supervision and wardship" and that Public Law 280 would allow Indians to become "self-
supporting and ultimately free and equal citizens"). Despite language in the legislative history
indicating that tribes were ready for assimilation, the lack of any serious investigation into the
actual state of the "social development" of the tribes prior to Public Law 280's passage indicates
that Congress neither "knew or cared about the Indians' readiness for state jurisdiction." See
Goldberg, supra note 56, at 543.
207. See Santa Rosa Band of Mission Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 661-62 (9th Cir.
1975) (rejecting the county's argument that the court must find the broadest grant of
jurisdiction to the state because Public Law 280 is "assimilationist in tone" and was passed with
an "eye towards eventual termination of Federal supervision over Indian tribes and Indian trust
territory").
208. See Bradley Interviews, supra note 28 (explaining how Indians were accustomed to the
federal system of protection and not used to being subject to state and county courts where
prejudices against Indians were often encountered).
209. See supra notes 200-01 (describing the Hoover Commission's recommendations).
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legislative history suggests [otherwise] .", The reason why Congress
stopped short of total termination is because it had a competing and
overriding intent. Congress' "primary concern" in Public Law 280's
211enactment was not assimilation but "lawlessness" on reservations.
In fact, the very language of the Act affirms this hierarchy in
priorities. In section 1162(a), Congress expressly exempted several
tribal reservations from Public Law 280's provisions, two of which, the
Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians of Minnesota and the Warm
Springs Tribe of Oregon,21 2 were exempt because "each... ha[d] a
tribal law-and-order organization that function[ed] in a reasonably
satisfactory manner., 21 1 Congress' desire was to resolve specifically• 1 • 214
designated law enforcement inadequacies. As stated above, this
could best be achieved if Congress supplemented tribal jurisdiction with
state jurisdiction, rather than supplant it.215 Clearly, the better reading
of Public Law 280 gives effect both to the agenda of assimilation and
the overriding need to decrease lawlessness through the preservation
of tribal jurisdiction.
C. Criminal Versus Civil Provisions
Given that Public Law 280's purpose was primarily to address the
criminal problems within Indian country rather than its civil
216dilemmas,2  it is no surprise that its criminal provision is more
controversial. The questions that arise in relation to the criminal
210. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 387-89 (emphasis added) (arguing that the same Congress had
"enacted several termination statutes" so it most certainly knew how expressly to terminate
tribal jurisdiction rather than do what it did in Public Law 280); see also California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208-10 (1987) (reaffirming the Bryan position); Santa
Rosa Band of Mission Indians, 532 F.2d at 661 (ruling that "general statements of assimilationist
intent" are unpersuasive); Goldberg, supra note 56, at 537 (suggesting that Public Law 280,
rather than intending complete assimilation, was more of a "compromise between wholly
abandoning the Indians to the states and maintaining them as federally protected wards").
211. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 379.
212. For discussion on the exemption of the Metlakatia community that came after the
statute's original enactment, see infra note 282 and accompanying text.
213. See S. REP. No. 83-699, at 6-7 (1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2409, 2413-14
(citing letter from Assistant Secretary of the Interior Orme Lewis). Secretary Lewis' letter also
discusses the exemption of the Colville and Yakima Tribes of Washington, but, as noted, a bill
for the transfer ofjurisdiction was not before Congress at that particular time. See Eisenhower
Signing Statement, supra note 172, at 565 (detailing President Eisenhower's statement that the
Red Lake Band of Chippewa, Warm Springs Tribe, and Menominee Tribe "have effective law
and order organizations of their own" and would therefore be exempted from the bill). The
Menominee Tribe was eventually not excluded.
214. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 385-86 & n.12 (determining that Congress only meant Public Law
280 to give state courts the ability to decide civil and criminal matters arising on reservations
that were "not so organized"-referring to the adequacy of exempt reservations).
215. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (detailing how civil jurisdiction was merely
an afterthought).
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sections are fueled by the textual differences between the criminal
and civil sections and the Supreme Court's interpretative rulings on
both.
The continued existence of tribal civil jurisdiction is more
apparent from textual support in the statute than tribal criminal
jurisdiction.1 The civil section, section 1360, "contemplates the
continued vitality and operation of the tribal government '218 by
recognizing that tribal ordinances or customs will still be given "full
force and effect in the determination of civil causes of action" when
they are not inconsistent with any applicable state law.2 "9  The
wording of section 1360 should not only be understood as an express
recognition of continued tribal authority, but also as a recognition of
the application of tribal laws in state courts °20 Unfortunately, unlike
its civil counterpart, there is no language in the criminal provision
that expressly recognizes a parallel residual tribal authority over
criminal matters2l' To further complicate the analysis, the Supreme
Court has declared that while Public Law 280 prohibits the state from
imposing its "civil/regulatory" laws over tribal lands, the statute does
permit the state to enforce its "criminal/prohibitory" laws on tribal
lands.s
In addition, the criminal provision, section 1162, contains
controversial language in subsection (c) that is not found in the civil
provision. A 1970 amendment to Public Law 280 added language to
section 1162 (c) that makes reference to "areas over which the several
states have exclusive jurisdiction., 223 As outlined, the term "exclusive"
is problematic because it could signify that the state's jurisdiction
217. Criminal jurisdiction was specifically transferred to the states by 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1994), while civil jurisdiction was conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994).
218. Santa Rosa Band of Mission Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 663 (9th Cir. 1975).
219. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(c) (1994).
220. See COHEN, supra note 72, at 344. In fact, in 1976, the Supreme Court clarified that
section 1360 conferred state jurisdiction over "private civil controversies" involving Indians in
state court, but did not extend general state civil regulatory power over Indian country. See
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208-10 (1987) (reaffirming
Court's ruling in Bryan); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 385 (1976) (deciding that
Minnesota could not impose a personal property tax on a mobile home owned by a Minnesota
Chippewa tribal member and situated on tribal trust land); see also Santa Rosa Band of Mission
Indians, 532 F.2d at 661 (extending Bryan ruling to bar local county civil regulations).
221. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1360(c) (1994) (stating that any tribal ordinance or custom
adopted before or after by an Indian tribe, band, or community shall be given full force and
effect in the determination of any civil causes of action, as long as it is not inconsistent with any
applicable civil law of the state), with 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994) (containing no similar provision).
222. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209 (stating that Public Law 280 granted California "criminal
jurisdiction").
223. See Act of Nov. 25, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-523, 84 Stat. 1358 (codified as amended at 25




over criminal matters is exclusive of both federal and tribal
jurisdiction rather than just federal jurisdiction.24 To summarize, the
interpretation of section 1162 is even more complex than its civil
counterpart for three reasons: (1) the absence of express language
recognizing residual jurisdiction; (2) the permitted state application
of criminal laws to Indian lands; and (3) the 1970 "exclusive"
amendment.
III. NOT A DIVESTITURE STATUTE
Public Law 280 should be read narrowly to affirm that tribes were
never divested of their criminal and civil jurisdiction, and also that
the states merely stepped into the shoes of the Federal Government
by only assuming the jurisdictional authority of the Federal
Government and not that of the tribes. Such an interpretation of
Public Law 280 derives from the continued recognition of tribal civil
and criminal jurisdiction over hunting, fishing, water, and treaty
rights; the absence of language expressly divesting tribes of
jurisdiction; the application of statutory construction canons in favor
of Indians; the fact that section 1162(c) could not terminate tribal
jurisdiction where the Major Crimes Act or General Crimes Act did
not; and subsequent Supreme Court rulings and congressional
legislation clarifying that the Act did not terminate tribal jurisdiction.
A. Residual Hunting and Fishing Rights
Although questions arise over what jurisdiction tribes may have lost
under Public Law 280 and what states allegedly may have gained,
there is no textual justification for the position that Public Law 280
divested tribes of all of their jurisdiction. It is well understood that
tribes can still exercise authority over areas from which the states
have traditionally been excluded, such as the regulation of hunting,
trapping, and fishing rights guaranteed to tribes by statute or treaty.2 2 5
The criminal section of Public Law 280 specifically states that nothing
in the statute
shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance or taxation of any real
or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any
Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust
by the United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation
224. See generally infra Part III.C (discussing exclusive state jurisdiction).
225. See Criminal Jurisdiction of Utah over Non-Indians Hunting on the Uintah and Ouray
Reservation in Violation of State Law, 78 Interior Dec. 101, 101 (1971); see also WASHBURN,
supra note 119, at 195 (asserting that nothing in Public Law 280 speaks of depriving Indians of
hunting, fishing, and trapping rights secured to them by federal treaties).
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imposed by the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the
use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal
Treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant
thereto; or shall deprive any Indian tribe, band, or community of
any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty,
agreement, or statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing
or the control, licensing, or regulation thereof.22
In the process of expressly detailing all the areas over which the
states could not extend their newly acquired criminal jurisdiction,
Congress never placed any limits, express or implied under Public
Law 280, on the jurisdictional rights that tribes retained over these
enumerated areas.227 Therefore, a tribe in a mandatory state may not
only continue to regulate and protect its hunting, fishing and
trapping rights through its governmental processes and authority,
civil or criminal, but should also be eligible for federal assistance to
achieve meaningful enforcement and regulation of these rights. The
consequence of broadly interpreting state jurisdiction under Public
Law 280 is that Public Law 280 tribes could be denied access to
federal programs intended to provide direct assistance to tribes
because the administrators of the programs could deem such
assistance unnecessary if the tribe's entire law enforcement is
exclusively handled by the state.228
226. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b). The companion civil section reads verbatim until "thereto" and
does not specifically refer to the "hunting, trapping, or fishing." See 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b).
However, when read together with its provision that recognizes the "full force and effect" of
"tribal ordinances and customs," 28 U.S.C. § 1360(c), it is apparent that tribal jurisdiction over
these rights is equally respected by the civil section.
227. When a reservation is established by treaty, statute, or agreement there is an implied
right to hunt and fish on that land absent state regulation. See Menominee Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968). While it is presumed that Congress can amend or repeal a
statute, Congress can also abrogate treaties with Indians. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
553, 566 (1903) (ruling that a challenged federal allotment statute abrogated a prior treaty with
the tribe requiring consent of three-fourths of the tribal members before reservation
allotment); Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1871) (permitting federal taxation
of tobacco sold on the reservation despite an existing treaty exempting the tribe from the
same). Such abrogations can only be accomplished, however, when Congress' intention to do
so is "clear and plain." See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986) (discussing the
effects of the Endangered Species Act on hunting and fishing rights of the Yankton Sioux
Tribe). Where legislative intent is unclear, as in Public Law 280, abrogation "is not to be lightly
imputed to the Congress." Menominee Tribe of Indians, 391 U.S. at 413 (ruling that federal
supervision ended and state laws became applicable after the Termination Act of 1954 became
effective).
228. See Bradley Interviews, supra note 28 (explaining that once the Omaha and Winnebago
Tribes in Nebraska came under Public Law 280, the tribes ceased to receive federal funds
directed at law enforcement). One law enforcement program that has been available to tribes
regardless of Public Law 280 is the Department of Justice's Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services ("COPS"), which was established under the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994. See Public Safety Partnership and Community Policing Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Star. 1808 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796dd-1 to 8 (1994)). Through
its programs, COPS helps tribes control crime by providing federal funds to assist in the hiring
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B. Express Language and the Canons of Indian Legislation
The Supreme Court has ruled that when the provisions of a piece
of legislation are "clear and explicit," the Court must uphold the
express meaning in its interpretation.2 When a treaty or statute's
text is ambiguous, the Court looks to the legislative history and
surrounding circumstances for clarification.2" In the instant case,
neither the text of the statute nor the legislative history provide an
unequivocal explanation. In such circumstances, the Court must
balance the words of various congressmen against an infinite number
of contradicting canons of construction that our courts have
established over time.23 In other words, for every traditional canon
of statutory interpretation that favors divestiture, there seems to be
another canon mandating a contrary approach that favors tribal
sovereignty.23
As a result, the continuation of residual tribal jurisdiction must be
anchored in principles that have proven to be both immutable and
without contra-interpretations. In the context of federal Indian law
there are two such principles: (1) the need for express language to
divest tribes of sovereign powers; and (2) the application of specific
canons of construction that have been fashioned solely for use with
of more police and the expansion of their law enforcement systems. See Grants and Funding,
NATION TO NATION, 1 (Dep't ofJustice, Office of TribalJustice), Aug. 1996, at 10.
229. See Dion, 476 U.S. at 738 (discussing the need for language in a statute to be express if
it is to effectuate abrogation of treaty rights).
230. See Frickey, supra note 195, at 1143 (stating that legislative history and the general
historical context in which Congress has acted are used to determine congressional intent).
231. See generaUy KARL N. LLEULLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION DECIDING APPEALS 522
app. (1960) (Canons on Statutes) (providing a detailed list of over 45 canons of statutory
construction and citing for each of these canons a corresponding canon that effectively states
the opposite).
232. See id. Karl Llewellyn provides the following four examples of canons that contradict
each other.
"There is no need to refer to the legislative history where the statutory language is
clear" versus "But words are inexact tools at best, and for that reason there is wisely no
rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory legislative history no matter how clear the
words may appear on superficial examination."
"The heading of a statute, or a section thereof, may not be used to .... restrict the
language of the statute itself" versus "The heading here considered is part of the
context of the statute"
"The meaning of a word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words
associated with it" versus "A word may have a character of its own not to be submerged
by its association"
"Words are to be interpreted according to the proper grammatical effect of their
arrangement within the statute" versus "Rules of grammar will be disregarded where
strict adherence would defeat purpose"
Id. (citations omitted).
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statutes dealing with Indian matters.
1. Congress'failure to use express language in Public Law 280
Although Congress has the sole power to limit tribal sovereignty, 13
Public Law 280 does not contain the express language required to
accomplish that end. As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court
has made it clear that in order to interfere with the inherent powers
of tribes, Congress must do so expressly.2m This requirement affirms
the Court's respect for tribal sovereignty and its reluctance to infer
the abrogation of tribal sovereignty by mere implication in an
235ambiguous statute.
As Public Law 280 did not use express and clear language to
abrogate tribal sovereignty in the area of civil and criminal
jurisdiction, tribal sovereignty should have remained intact.2 For
instance, in subsection (b) of the criminal section, section 1162,
Congress lists the activities with which the state should not
interfere.3 7 Congress could also have included in this section, "tribal
criminal jurisdiction is hereby [extinguished or limited]." Congress
is more than capable of writing express language terminating tribes
and their rights.2 3 8 However, it did not include such express language
233. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (recognizing that tribal
sovereignty "exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance").
234. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
235. See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 719-20 (1983) (sanctioning the imposition of a
California liquor licensing regulation upon an Indian general store owner because the Court
found no evidence of tribal self-governance in this area); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373,
387-93 & nn.13-14 (1976) (recognizing Public Law 280 as ambiguous, and ruling that absent
clear language in the statute or legislative history, the Court will not imply termination,
destruction of tribal self-governance, or waiver of tribal taxation immunity); cf. United States v.
Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738-39 (1986) (affirming the need for "clear and plain" language to
abrogate treaty rights); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968) (stating
that abrogation or modification of Indian treaty rights is "not to be lightly imputed to the
Congress" by the Court, nor will Congress be able to accomplish the same through a
"backhanded way" absent explicit statements to do so) (citation omitted).
236. See Walker v. Rushing, 898 F.2d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that divestiture did
not occur because the court found "no such clear expression of congressional intent in Public
Law 280").
237. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1994); supra note 21 (providing full statutory text).
238. See, e.g., Bryan, 426 U.S. at 389 & n.15 (ruling that the same Congress which enacted
several termination acts also wrote Public Law 280 and that it "knew well how to express its
intent directly"). For examples of express termination language see Klamath Termination Act
of Aug. 13, 1954, ch. 732, 68 Stat. 718 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 564 to 564w-2 (1994)) (ending
special trust relationship with the Federal Government and transferring tribal lands over to the
state); Act of Sept. 1, 1954, ch. 1207, 68 Stat. 1099 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 741-60 (1994))
(terminating Paiute Indians of Utah); Act of Aug. 23, 1954, ch. 831, 68 Stat. 768 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 721-728 (1994)) (terminating Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of Texas); Menominee
Indian Termination Act of Jun. 17, 1954, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 891-902) (1994)) (terminating Menominee Tribe);
It should be noted that each of the tribes listed above were later restored to their previous
relationship with the Federal Government. See Act of Aug. 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-398, 100
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in Public Law 280 and declined to do so during subsequent
amending processes.239 In fact, "nothing in the wording of either the
civil or criminal provisions of Public Law 280 or its legislative history
precludes concurrent tribal court authority.'2 , 241
Tribal courts are essential institutions of tribal self-governance
and their disestablishment would have grave consequences.242 For
these reasons the termination of a tribe's sovereign right of
jurisdiction should not be implied from ambiguous language and a
conjectural supposition of congressional intent. Instead, it should be
presumed to exist until Congress uses the required express language
to remove it.2 13 Congress did not use such language in Public Law 280
and therefore tribal jurisdiction survives Public Law 280.
2. Applicability of canons
Once a court determines that a particular statute affects Indian
tribes or individuals, it should apply canons of construction favoring
the creation and preservation of tribal rights. 4 While statutory
interpretation may involve contradictory and numerous interpretive
maxims described above,4 5 the Supreme Court has established a set
of specific and limited canons of construction for matters of Indian
Stat. 849 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 566-566h (1994)) (restoring the Klamath Tribe);
Act of Aug. 18, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-89, 101 Stat. 669 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 731-737 (1994))
(restoring the Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of Texas); Act of Apr. 3, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-227,
94 Stat. 317 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1994)) (restoring the Paiute Indians of Utah);
Act of Dec. 22, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-197, 87 Stat. 770 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 903-903f (1994))
(restoring the Menominee Tribe).
239. See supra note 16 (listing subsequent amendments to Public Law 280).
240. COHEN, supra note 72, at 344.
241. See Indian Tribal Justice Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-176, § 2, 107 Stat. 2004, 2004
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3601(5) (1994)) (recognizing that "tribal justice systems are an essential
part of tribal governments and serve as important forums for ensuring public health and safety
and the political integrity of tribal governments"); O'Connor Address, supra note 48, at 3
(explaining that the "effective operation" of tribal courts is essential to the realization of tribal
sovereignty and self-governance); Reno, supra note 44, at 113 (stating that the Department of
Justice believes that the promotion of tribal self-governance means support for tribal justice
systems).
242. As the Supreme Court has observed, the stripping of a "tribe's jurisdiction to punish its
members for infractions of tribal law would detract substantially from tribal self-government,"
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 332 (1978), and "result in the destruction of tribal
institutions and values." California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208
(1987); see also Hon. William C. CanbyJr., Tribal Courts, Viewed from a FederalJudge's Perspective, 9
TRIBAL CT. REc. (Nat'l Indian Justice Ctr., Petaluma, Cal.), Spring/Summer 1996, at 15, 16 (on
file with The American University Law Review) (explaining that "the disappearance of the tribal
court system would be ajudicial disaster" for tribes and our national system ofjustice).
243. See Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 19 (1934) (affirming that "acts of
Congress which appear to limit the powers of an Indian tribe are not to be unduly extended by
doubtful inference").
244. See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 79, at 230.
245. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (detailing examples of contradictory canons
of construction).
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law. These canons form "a system of background norms and
conventions against which the Court will read statutes.""24 ' When
these interpretative rules are applied, one concludes that Public Law
280 could not divest tribal jurisdictional authority.
The Supreme Court has ruled that statutes passed for the benefit of
Indians should be liberally construed, with doubtful expressions
resolved in favor of the Indians.47 Furthermore, statutes should be
construed not "according to their technical meaning,"2 48 but as the
Indians would have understood them.2 9 Application of these canons
of statutory construction has also been extended to treaties with
Indian tribes. °
The Supreme Court established these tenets to ensure that
Congress exercised its power in a manner most consistent with the
trust responsibility it owed the Indians. 25' Derived from the trust
responsibility is the presumption that Congress' intentions toward
tribes are beneficial to and protective of Indian tribes. 2 Accordingly,
the canons promote narrow constructions that prevent intrusion
upon Indian interestse 3 and provide an extra defense for Indians
246. SeeWilliam N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV.
L. REv. 26, 65-66 (1994) (describing the contributions that such an "interpretive regime" can
provide while cautioning against its use as a result of Karl Llewellyn's criticisms that "'there are
two opposing canons on almost every point of statutory interpretation").
247. See Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918) (holding that an
Alaskan statute creating a reservation for Metlakatla Indians included adjacent waters and
submerged land to protect Indian fishing supply); see also Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort
Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138, 149-50 (1984) (applying the canon to the
interpretation of Public Law 280's provision for optional states); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426
U.S. 373, 392 (1976) (quoting and affirming Alaska Pacific Fisheries); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S.
363, 367 (1930) (stating that the canon should be applied to protect "the weak and defenseless
people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith");
CLINTON ET AL., supra note 79, at 231 (stating that ambiguities in statutes dealing with Indian
matters are resolved in favor of Indians).
248. See Carpenter, 280 U.S. at 367 (discussing the need to protect Indians because they are
.wards of the nation");Jones v. Meehan 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899) ("[The] treaty must therefore be
construed not according to the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers.").
249. See Carpenter, 280 U.S. at 367 (explaining the courts' preference for the plain meaning
of the words as naturally construed by Indians).
250. See Oliphant v. Squamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 n.17 (1978) (deciding
whether a treaty with Washington tribes gave the tribe jurisdiction over non-Indians);
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1973) (applying the canon
together with the principle of "Indian independence" and concluding that a Navajo treaty of
1868 precluded extension of state law to the Navajo Reservation).
251. See Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 1975)
("[The principle ] is an interpretive device, early framed byJohn Marshall's legal conscience for
ensuring the discharge of the nation's obligations to the conquered Indian tribes.").
252. See COHEN, supra note 72, at 221 (stating that the trust responsibility also led to the
development of the canon of construction that federal laws should be read as protecting
Indians).
253. See Frickey, supra note 195, at 1141 (describing courts' desire to prevent invasion of
Indian interests).
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against the plenary power of Congress.2
Because Public Law 280 is ambiguous, and because the "sparse
legislative history"2 does not clarify Public Law 280's effect on tribal
justice systems, the interpretive canons of Indian law should be
applied.2" In the context of Public Law 280, the Supreme Court has
already begun to apply these canons. 7 As the Court has held, the
canons require a reading of the statute's ambiguous language in the
light most favorable to the Indians. In so doing, it is significant that
tribal justice systems "preserve tribal culture and customs" and ensure
"public health and safety and the political integrity of tribal
governments."5 A statutory interpretation that divests tribal
jurisdiction would not just be unfavorable to Indians, but would
instead "result in the destruction of tribal institutions and values."2
9
It is clear that these canons were specifically intended to prevent such
260
impacts on tribes. Consequently, the application of the canons
yields only one reasonable conclusion: the ambiguous language of
Public Law 280 is not enough to justify the abrogation of tribal
jurisdiction, a critical attribute of tribal sovereignty." '
C. No Grant of Exclusive State Jurisdiction in Section 1162
In 1970, subsection (c) of the criminal provision, section 1162, was
254. See id. (asserting that canons of interpretation encourage broad interpretation, thereby
limiting congressional power).
255. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373,383 (1976).
256. It has been argued, however, that Public Law 280 is not beneficial to the tribes and
therefore the canons should not apply. See Frickey, supra note 195, at 1167-68 (stating that
Public Law 280 is "designed to undermine, not enhance, the authority of tribes"). This
argument is tenuous at best because the Supreme Court has never determined how it decides
what legislation is beneficial to Indians. Is it based on Congress' alleged intent, the Indian's
perception of the legislation, or its effect? Congress stated that Public Law 280 would help
Indians by giving them equal status with other U.S. citizens. See supra note 193 and
accompanying text. Others assert that Public Law 280 deprived tribal courts of their
jurisdiction. See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 79, at 158 (stating that Public Law 280 gave states
both federal and tribal jurisdiction over crimes and civil causes of action).
257. See Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S.
138, 149-50 (1984) (recognizing the canon when discussing the ambiguity of North Dakota's
Enabling Act); Bryan, 426 U.S. at 392 (asserting that canons are applicable to congressional
statutes that are detrimental to tribes, such as those that "abolish ... Indian tax immunities").
258. See Reno, supra note 44, at 113-14 (discussing why tribal courts are the most
appropriate institutions to maintain order in tribal communities); see also United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 332 (1978) (explaining that stripping "a tribe'sjurisdiction to punish its
members for infractions of tribal law detracts substantially from tribal self-government").
259. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208 (1987)
(construing § 1360 and its implication for the extension of state civil regulatory laws over Indian
country).
260. See COHEN, supra note 72, at 221-25 (discussing protections of tribal treaty rights and
self-governance and the use of canons to implement the trust relationship).
261. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 375 (holding that canons cannot support the eradication of tribal
tax immunities under Public Law 280).
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amended to read "[t]he provisions of section 1152 and 1153 of this
chapter shall not be applicable within the areas of Indian country
listed in subsection (a) of this section as areas over which the several
States have exclusive jurisdiction.''262  The presence of the term
"exclusive" in the criminal statute does not reflect a congressional
intent to leave the states as the only sovereigns with jurisdiction over
criminal matters in Indian country. This conclusion is supported by
the fact that: (1) Public Law 280 could not accomplish a divestiture
of tribal jurisdiction when the related statutes of the General Crimes
Act (18 U.S.C. § 1152) and the Major Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. § 1153)
did not; (2) the legislative history surrounding the term's inclusion
does not expressly or implicitly suggest a divestiture interpretation;
and (3) the term is ambiguous and not explicit as required for
abrogations or limitations of tribal powers.
1. Prior use of the "exclusive" term
Section 1162(c) of Public Law 280 refers to both the Major Crimes
Act and the General Crimes Act.23 Each of these statutes uses the
term "exclusive" to modify the jurisdiction of the United States.21 By
analogy, a determination as to the term's resulting effect on tribal
jurisdiction can provide insight into the meaning of Public Law 280. '
Despite the use of the "exclusive" term neither act terminated tribal
jurisdiction, and by analogy, Public Law 280 should not have
terminated tribal jurisdiction either.
Felix S. Cohen, author of the definitive treatise on federal Indian
law, stated that "[t]he basic intent of the criminal law section [of
Public Law 280] was to substitute state for federal jurisdiction under
262. Act of Nov. 25, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-523, 84 Stat. 1358 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(c)
(1994)) (italics representing the added phrase); see also supra note 21 (providing the complete
language of section 1162). Section 1152 is the General Crimes Act, or Indian Country Crimes
Act, and Section 1153 is the Indian Major Crimes Act. See supra Part I.B (discussing both acts).
263. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(c) (1994) ("The provisions of section 1152 and 1153 of this
chapter shall not be applicable within the areas of Indian country listed in subsection (a) of this
section as areas over which the several States have exclusive jurisdiction.").
264. The General Crimes Act refers specifically to the "sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States." 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994). Similarly, the Major Crimes Act speaks of the
"[flederal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(1994) (emphasis added); see also supra notes 108-09 (providing full text of both statutes).
265. When a particular word is used consistently in related statutes, the term should be read
similarly unless an alternative definition is provided. Cf. Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486
U.S. 174, 184-85 (1988) (asserting that the Court "generally presumets] that Congress is
knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to the new legislation it enacts"); NLRB v. Amax
Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981) (recognizing that when Congress uses a word with a settled
meaning, courts should infer that such meaning is meant by Congress unless the statute says
otherwise); ICC v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 65 (1945) (recognizing that when an amendment of an




the Indian Country Crimes Act [or General Crimes Act] and the
Indian Major Crimes Act.''24 The argument follows that since these
statutes provided for concurrent jurisdiction between the Federal
Government and the tribes, the Federal Government could only
transfer to the states that part of the concurrent jurisdiction that it
possessed and not the tribes' jurisdiction as well.26 7 As a result, the
better reading of Public Law 280 is that it could not divest tribes in
the mandatory states of their criminal jurisdiction anymore than
either the Major Crimes Act or General Crimes Act did.r
The Supreme Court has examined the significance of the term
"exclusive" in the context of the Major Crimes Act and the General
Crimes Act. The Major Crimes Act specifically refers to "[f] ederal law
in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. ''20 In
United States v. Wheeler,27° the Supreme Court interpreted the Major
Crimes Act and found that the statute provides for federal
jurisdiction over enumerated crimes to the exclusion of state
jurisdiction.21 However, the statute does not expressly provide for
federal jurisdiction to the exclusion of tribal jurisdiction. In fact, it is
logical that the Major Crimes Act provides for retained exclusive
tribal jurisdiction over the non-enumerated crimes and more than
likely, concurrent tribal jurisdiction over the enumerated major
266. COHEN, supra note 72, at 344; see also United States v. Pemberton, 121 F.3d 1157, 1164
(8th Cir. 1997) ("Public Law 280 transfers from the federal government to the state of
Minnesota jurisdiction over only those crimes encompassed by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153.");
United States v. Stone, 112 F.3d 971, 973 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Section 1162 transferred the federal
jurisdiction provided in sections 1152 and 1153 to ... [the mandatory states]."); Anderson v.
C.T. Gladden, 293 F.2d 463, 466 (9th Cir. 1961) (ruling that "Public Law 280 withdrew federal
jurisdiction" from mandatory states and replaced it with state jurisdiction); cf UTTER, supra note
23, at 155 ("When Public Law 280 was applied ... the General Crimes Act and the Indian Major
Crimes Act, specifically, and the Assimilative Crimes Act, by default, no longer applied to Indian
country within the states-except for the [exempted] reservations...."). In other words, the
statutes authorized the Federal Government to take jurisdiction in certain situations, but after
Public Law 280, the states would assume such jurisdiction.
267. See Aschenbrenner Memorandum, supra note 28, at 3 ("[The Federal government]
could not transfer more than what it had, that is, it could not transfer tribal jurisdiction to the
states.").
268. While the general understanding is that federal jurisdiction was partially withdrawn
within the Public Law 280 mandatory states, there is speculation as to whether it was equally
withdrawn in the optional states. An Eighth Circuit case ruled that sections 1152 and 1153 are
still in force in states which voluntarily assumed jurisdiction under Public Law 280. See United
States v. High Elk, 902 F.2d 660, 661 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that in optional states federal
courts still have jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act to prosecute a defendant for
manslaughter). The High Elk court made this ruling despite the fact that it later concluded that
the state in question, South Dakota, had not successfully become an optional state. See id.
269. 18 U.S.C. § 1152(b) (1994).
270. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
271. See id. at 332; see also Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary, 368
U.S. 351, 359 (1962) (ruling that Washington State was barred from trying an Indian charged
with burglary committed within reservation bounds).
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crimes.2 72 In short, tribal jurisdiction was not foreclosed by the Major
Crimes Act.
The General Crimes Act also provides for residual, concurrent
tribal jurisdiction. Through this Act, Congress extended to Indian
country "the general laws of the United States as to the punishment
of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States."273 However, as early as 1891, the
Supreme Court, in Ex parte Wilson,274 ruled that this phrase did not
signify that the Federal Government possessed sole jurisdiction over
crimes in Indian country, because the paragraph immediately
following this language specifically provided for three exceptions
where residual tribal criminal jurisdiction would prevail over federal
jurisdiction.2 7 5
The above discussion supports the conclusion that the "sole and
exclusive jurisdiction" language of the General Crimes Act did not
represent a divestiture of tribal criminal jurisdiction,276 nor did the
Major Crimes Act's reference to "exclusive jurisdiction." It follows,
then, that Public Law 280's use of the "exclusive" language in section
1162 (c) similarly could not effectuate a divestiture.
2. The amendment's legislative history
In addition to the prior use of the term "exclusive" in criminal
jurisdiction statutes, a close examination of legislative history
surrounding the 1970 insertion of the "exclusive" language clarifies
that it was not added to the statute to effectuate a divestiture of tribal
criminal jurisdiction. For instance, in an effort to clarify the purpose
of the added phrase, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Harrison
Loesch, stated:
[The] new language... [was] not intended.., to have any bearing
on actual or potential arrangements between States and the tribes
which [sic] respect to the allocation of law enforcement
responsibility between them... [and] no effect on whatever
inherent jurisdiction particular tribes may have retained in states
which were given or have assumed jurisdiction pursuant to...
[Public Law 280] as amended.
272. See supra Part I.B.2 (describing the breadth of the Act's implications).
273. SeeI8U.S.C.§ 1152.
274. 140 U.S. 575 (1891).
275. See id. at 576-79 (holding that the Federal Government had jurisdiction over a murder
committed on White Mountain Indian Reservation by a non-Indian against a non-Indian); see
also supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text (describing three instances of residual
tribal jurisdiction).
277. 116 CONG. REc. 37,353, 37,355 (1970)
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Similar sentiments were echoed by others in the Congressional
Record.2 7' These congressional statements indicate that Congress
recognized that the amendment did not divest tribes of their
inherent jurisdiction or confirm that such divestiture had already
been effectuated by Public Law 280, but that the amendment was
simply meant to clarify, not alter, the intent of the original text.29
According to Assistant Secretary of the Interior Loesch, the
amendment was a clarification that should have been made earlier in
the legislative process.8 ° Since listed areas of Indian country in
section 1162 (a) included areas that were both under state jurisdiction
and not under state jurisdiction (i.e., the exempted reservations such
as Red Lake and Warm Springs Reservation), this amendment was
supposed to emphasize that the General Crimes Act and the Major
Crimes Act were only applicable to the exempted reservations. 281 The
need for clarification was the only reason for this particular 1970
amendment.
28 2
278. See id. at 37,354-55 (statement of Senators Stevens, Gravel, and Ervin) ("The additional
language is not intended to have any bearing on actual or potential arguments between states
and the tribes with respect to allocation of law enforcement responsibility between them.").
279. See id.
280. See id. at 37,355 (commenting that a later amendment "is perhaps not as persuasive").
281. See id. This reasoning follows logically from the fact that both Acts described a federal-
tribal responsibility to Indian country law enforcement, while Public Law 280, where it applied,
focused mainly on a state-tribal responsibility.
282. At the time of the 1970 amendment to section 1162(c), section 1162(a) was also
amended. SeeAct of Nov. 25, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-523, §§ 1, 2, 84 Stat. 1358, 1358 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1162(a)-(c) (1994), 25 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1994)). The two amendments were
enacted by the same bill, House Report 6782 and Senate Bill 902. See 116 CONG. REc. 37,353
(1970). As a result, they share the same legislative history. Because of this, the reasoning for
each amendment is often intertwined. A careful reading of that history, however, demonstrates
that the congressional intentions behind each amendment were quite independent of each
other.
The amendment to subsection (a) is worth discussing because it includes an implication that
Public Law 280 did divest tribes of jurisdiction. See COHEN, supra note 72, at 345 ("A 1970
amendment to the criminal law section of Public Law 280 may support an inference that the
amending Congress assumed that the original transfer to state jurisdiction was exclusive of all
other jurisdiction, including tribal."). The purpose of the amendment to subsection (a),
however, was to add the Annette Islands of Alaska-home of the Metlakatla Community-to the
list of Indian country that would not be effected by Public Law 280. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1545,
at 4-5 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4786-87. As described in the House Report, section
1162(a) read:
All Indian country within the [state of Alaska], except that on the Annette Islands the
Metlakatla Indian community may exercise jurisdiction over the offenses committed
by Indians in the same manner in which such jurisdiction may be exercised by Indian
tribes in Indian country over which State jurisdiction has not been extended ....
Id. at 5.
The potential problem is that despite their mutual exclusivity, there is a tendency to apply
the legislative statements pertaining to the Metlakatla amendment as additional reasoning for
the addition of the "exclusive" language to subsection (c). See COHEN, supra note 72, at 345
(arguing that while there is some indication that the exclusive language of section 1162(c) was
only meant to mean exclusion of federal jurisdiction, it may also have been added to clarify
confusion over whether Annette Islands Reserve was Indian country); see also 116 CONG. REc.
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3. Not an express term
Finally, in considering the meaning of the word "exclusive," it is
necessary to remember the requirement of express language when
dealing with the abrogation of tribal sovereign powers.2 3 The term
"exclusive," without more, does not effectuate a divestiture of tribal
37,354 (1970) (statement of Senators Stevens, Gravel and Ervin) (providing an example of how
the wording of the Senators' statements could lead one to believe that the amendments shared
the same reasoning and explanations).
The legislative statements surrounding the Metlakatla amendments stand alone and in stark
contrast to all the other legislative history surrounding Public Law 280 because, for the first
time since 1953, there are congressional statements clearly supporting a divestiture
interpretation of Public Law 280. In one instance, the legislative history states that if a tribe
does not have an exempted status, the communities' police and courts are powerless. See H.R.
REP. No. 91-1545, at 3. It further implies that only the exempted communities (Warm Springs
Reservation and Red Lake Reservation) may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over minor
offenses with the state. See id. at 2-3.
Under the circumstances, these statements should not be confused with what Congress had
already made abundantly clear was the reason for the addition of the "exclusive" language to
subsection (c)-lawlessness. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing Congress' failure to use express
language and the primary reason for the addition of the "exclusive" language to section
1162(c)). However, the potential impact of negative legislative statements surrounding the
Metlakatla amendments must be accounted for in some fashion. The Metlakathla amendments
should not be given considerable weight for two reasons. First, in 1986, the Supreme Court
noted that when neither the statute nor contemporary legislation support the words of an
official, such "statements by individual legislators should not be given controlling effect." See
Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 263 (1986) (stressing that statements by an official
consistent with statutory language provide evidence of congressional intent). As previously
noted, no express language of divestiture can be found in Public Law 280. See supra Part III.B.I.
In fact, Congress had the opportunity to clarify the existence of concurrent tribal jurisdiction
either in the amendment itself or the accompanying legislative statements. Congress exercised
neither option. The contemporary legislation of the period-specifically the 1968 Indian Civil
Rights Act and the amendments it made to Public Law 280-supported tribal self-governance
and autonomy, and not divestiture.
Second, the circumstances surrounding the Metlakatla Indian community are so distinct
from the other Indian communities affected by Public Law 280 that the legislative statements
surrounding the amendment should not be read too broadly. See COHEN, supra note 72, at 345
("The matter may be unique because of the peculiar history of the Metlakatla Reservation.").
The Metlakatla Indian community was not like other traditional Native American tribes in that
it was not originally from Alaska. See 116 CONG. REc. 37,354 (1970). The community was
invited by President Cleveland in 1887 to move to the Annette Islands which the United States
would set apart as a reservation for the community and any other Alaskan Natives that would
join them. See id. The community has a federally recognized government and its own local
authorities and police to enforce its laws. See id. It appears that the Under Secretary of the
Interior suggested that the amendment was necessary to accomplish what the Alaska legislature
previously tried to do. The legislature, reasoning that the Annette Islands were not Indian
country within the meaning of Public Law 280, attempted to pass a bill to retrocede criminal
jurisdiction over the Annette Islands to the Federal Government. The Governor vetoed it. See
id. (statement of FredJ. Russell, Under Secretary of the Interior); COHEN, supra note 72, at 345
n.138 (noting that the Department of the Interior advised that the amendment was necessary
based in part on Alaska's belief that the Annette Islands Reserve was not Indian country).
In other words, the crux of this amendment does not clarify the intent of Public Law 280
generally, but deals with the unique situation of Alaska's Native Villages and Indian country or
lack thereof. Therefore, the amendment's application to the Public Law 280 interpretative
process should be limited.
283. See Part III.B.1 (discussing how Congress must provide language that expressly
abrogates tribal sovereign powers).
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jurisdiction. For this reason, the more logical interpretation of the
statute recognizes concurrent state and tribal jurisdiction.2 4 Thus,
the prior use of the term, the legislative history, and the lack of
express language mandates a narrow interpretation of Public Law 280
that acknowledges the continuance of tribal jurisdiction.
D. Changing Times, Changing Intent?
As discussed in Part II.B.3, complicating the Public Law 280
analysis is the fact that the statute was enacted in a period where
national policy was hostile toward Indians,' yet the courts are
currently called upon to interpret Public Law 280 in the context of a
contemporary national policy that rejects the philosophy of 1953 and
promotes tribal sovereignty, self-governance, and self-
determination. 2 * This dynamic is a pervasive problem of statutory
construction that often arises in federal Indian law.287 The Public Law
280 analysis raises the question as to whether it is the role of the
courts to interpret Public Law 280 based solely on the intent and
policies of the enacting Congress in 1953,26 or in light of subsequent
shifts in federal Indian policy that reflect Indian self-governance and
self-sufficiency rather than assimilation.8 9
284. If Congress' intention was to improve law enforcement, it would have made little sense
to reduce the number of sovereigns responsible for Indian country and pretend that the states
alone could carry the full burden. As previously mentioned, the more sound method would be
to supplement tribal jurisdiction, not supplant it. See Native Village of Venetie I.RA Council v.
Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 560 (9th Cir. 1991) (declaring that Public Law 280 did not divest tribes of
theirjuisdiction), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't,
118 S. Ct. 948 (1998).
285. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Termination Period and an era of general hostility
toward Indians).
286. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.
93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-558h (1994)) (recognizing that
tribal well-being would be better served if tribes assumed responsibility for the administration of
federal Indian programs); Indian Tribal Justice Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994)) (affirming congressional recognition of tribal "self-
determination, self-reliance" and Indian tribes' "inherent authority to establish their own form
of government, including tribal justice systems").
287. See generally Frickey, supra note 195 (explaining that although the courts' role is usually
to defer to and respect Congress' original intent in interpretation of statutes, in the field of
federal Indian law this canon has been subordinated in favor of an approach that considers the
tenuous sources of plenary power, drastic changes in national policy toward Indians, greater
assertions and support for tribal self-governance, and the ongoing process of decolonization).
288. SeeCarpenterv. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930) (noting that the original meaning of a
tax exemption clause could not later "be narrowed by any subsequently declared intention of
Congress").
289. See Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 663 (9th Cir. 1975)
(stating that the court will not "strain to implement a policy Congress has now rejected");
CLINTON ET AL., supra note 79, at 164 (postulating that while the Supreme Court in Bryan v.
Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976), interpreted Public Law 280 in light of current congressional
statements and policies of self-determination, in Washington Confederated v. Bands & Tribes of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 488 (1979), the Court acknowledged policy shifts but still
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The following review of cases and opinions relating to Public Law
280 reveals that the courts have found concurrent tribal jurisdiction
under Public Law 280. These cases and opinions neither reflect a
rejection of the original intent of Public Law 280's enacting Congress
nor a wholesale disregard for the assimilation motives of its
legislators. They merely reflect a clarification that while tribes were
in fact assimilated to the extent that they became partially subject to
state laws and courts like non-Indians, they were not totally
assimilated2 ° Congress' primary intention to decrease lawlessness in
Indian country required the continued assistance of tribal justice
systems, not the termination of those systems. Moreover, subsequent
amendments and post-enactment factors reaffirm the need to
interpret Public Law 280 narrowly to preserve concurrent state and
tribal jurisdiction.
1. Public Law 280 cases and opinions
As previously noted, no case has yet been considered by the
Supreme Court to define specifically the effect of Public Law 280 on
tribal jurisdiction. There are two cases, however, Bryan v. Itasca
County and California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, that are
predominantly viewed as representing the Supreme Court's support
of a non-divestiture interpretation of Public Law 280.Y9 In both of
these cases, the Court was asked to define the scope of the mandatory
states' jurisdictional grant2 4 Interestingly, while each case provided
an appropriate setting to conclude otherwise, the Court declined to
limit tribal jurisdiction or find it preempted by the states' authority.
On the contrary, the Court demonstrated a notable respect for tribal
looked to original intent); see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 246, at 56 (noting that some
legislators may even prefer that courts adapt statutes to changes in circumstances to avoid
"frustrating statutory purposes" and that "erosion in allegiance to the enacting Congress is
coupled with a second role for the Court: applying statutes to new circumstances").
290. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the impact of the Termination Period on Public Law
280's interpretation).
291. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
292. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
293. See Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 560 (9th Cir. 1991)
(ruling that through Cabazon and Bryan the Supreme Court adopted the view that Public Law
280 is not a divestiture statute), reu'd on other grounds sub nom. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Gov't, 118 S. Ct. 948 (1998); see also Herbert A. Becker, then Director, Department of
Justice, Office of Tribal Justice, Tribal Sovereignty and Jurisdiction in Indian Country,
Presentation at Native American Issues Seminar 15 (June 13-16, 1996) (on file with authors)
(citing Cabazon and stating that Public Law 280 did not divest tribes of their civil and criminal
jurisdiction).
294. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 205, 205-06 (1987)
(deciding whether Public Law 280 permits a state to apply provisions of its penal code and two
gaming ordinances to the tribe); Bryan, 426 U.S. at 375 (deciding whether Public Law 280 gave
state authority to impose personal property taxes on reservation lands).
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sovereignty. A discussion of each case and subsequent support for
their rulings follows.
a. Bryan v. Itasca County
In Bryan,2 the Supreme Court ruled that under Public Law 280
Minnesota lacked the authority to impose a personal property tax on
a mobile home located on tribal trust land and owned by an enrolled
member of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe!" Upon review of the
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a),O7 the Court held that under Public
Law 280, states did not possess general civil regulatory power over the
tribe, but only adjudicatory power over private civil litigation!" In so
holding, the Court never concluded that giving Indians access to state
courts for causes of actions preempted the right of a tribal court to
hear the same case.2 However, while concurrent state and tribal
jurisdiction in civil matters were not specifically defined, the Court
went out of its way not only to reject any significant effect the
assimilationist period may have had on the statute's true purpose, °
but also to affirm its reading that tribal sovereignty was not altered. °'
For example, the Court stated:
[N]othing in its [Public Law 280] legislative history remotely
suggests that Congress meant the Act's extension of civil
jurisdiction to the States should result in the undermining or
destruction of such tribal governments as did exist and a
conversion of the affected tribes into little more than 'private,
voluntary organizations' .....
Moreover, the Court affirmed that the "sparse legislative history"
demonstrates that Congress' "primary concern" in Public Law 280's
enactment was not assimilation but "lawlessness" on reservations.3 0 1 It
further ruled that Public Law 280 "was plainly not meant to effect
total assimilation," and that nothing in its legislative history suggests
295. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
296. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 375,393.
297. Note that in Bryan, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 is primarily referred to as section 4 of Public Law
280, and 18 U.S.C. § 1162 is referred to as section 2 of Public Law 280. See id.
298. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 384-85.
299. Cf Robert B. Porter, Note, TheJurisdirtional Relationship Between the Iroquois and New York
State: An Analysis of 25 U.S.C. §§ 232, 233,27 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 497,536-38 (1990) (comparing
the federal statute transferring civil jurisdiction over Indian country to New York state to Public
Law 280, and citing the Bryan interpretation as reason to conclude that the New York statute
did not impede previous functions of the Iroquois Government and its tribal laws).
300. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 387 (stating that Public Law 280 was not intended to effect total
assimilation).
301. Seeid.at388.
302. Id. at 388 (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544,577 (1975)).
303. See id. at 379.
1998] 1681
1682 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSnYLAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1627
otherwise. 4
b. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians
In Cabazon,°5 the Court expanded on its ruling in Bryan. The
Court ruled that the attempt by Riverside County in California to
enforce a penal code section that would regulate bingo and prohibit
the playing of draw poker inside reservation boundaries was an
unauthorized extension of state civil regulatory power not granted
under Public Law 280.306 In so holding, it declared that when a state
tries to enforce one of its laws in Indian country, it must first
determine if the law is civil/regulatory or criminal/prohibitory in
nature.0 7 If the law is criminal/prohibitory, it is enforceable under
Public Law 280.308 If it is civil/regulatory, as in the Cabazon case, the
state law is unenforceable.3 "
California asserted that it was merely trying to prevent the
proliferation of organized crime.3 0 However, despite the Court's
determination that Public Law 280's main purpose was to combat
lawlessness, the Court declined to subordinate tribal self-governance
to the state's interest.31 As in Bryan, the Court in Cabazon further
defined the parameters of the state's jurisdiction 3 2 but never stated
that this authority preempted tribal criminal jurisdiction. Instead the
Court reaffirmed Bryan's position that total assimilation was not the
statute's purpose 31  and stressed tribal self-governance and the
304. See id. at 387 (emphasis added).
305. 480 U.S. 205, 212 (1987).
306. See id. at 202.
307. See id. at 208. Cabazon also clarified two other points raised by Bryan: (1) that "an
otherwise regulatory law" enforceable both by criminal and civil means "is not necessarily
convert[ed] into a criminal law within the meaning of Pub. Law 280"; and (2) that Public Law
280 was not meant to "authorize[] the application of any local laws to the reservations" given
the statute's specific reference to "state" not county or province. See id. at 211-12 & n.1 1.
308. See id. at 208.
309. See id. at 209 (explaining that, in this case, the penal code that the state sought to
impose on the Cabazon and Morongo Indian Reservations was only "regulating" the practice of
bingo, a practice which is permitted by California's Riverside County and therefore its
enforcement is not authorized by Public Law 280).
310. Seeid.at211.
311. See Monette, supra note 63, at 277 (stating that in its "federal preemption analysis" the
Cabazon Court gave greater weight to the federal policy to promote Indian self-determination
than to states' interest in curbing organized crime). In Cabazon, the Court seemed to agree
with the tribes that there is no express congressional grant of authority to the state or county,
and therefore the approval of this authority entails a determination of whether the states'
interest in the law's application would be incompatible with federal or tribal interests. See
Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 214-17. In this case, "the congressional goal of self-government" and "tribal
self-sufficiency and economic development" were not only "parallel" to the tribal interest, but
also superior to the state's interest. See id. at 216-19.
312. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 208 (permitting the enforcement of criminal/prohibitory laws
on Indian reservations).
313. See id. (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 387 (1976), stating "[t]he Act
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protection of tribal interests, 4 such as encouraging tribal "self-
sufficiency and economic development."'
c. Subsequent support for Cabazon and Bryan
Cases following Cabazon and Bryan further support the argument
that Public Law 280 was purely a jurisdictional transfer between the
state and the Federal Government, with no effect on existing tribal
jurisdiction. For instance, in 1978 (twenty-five years after Public Law
280's enactment), the Supreme Court reviewed statutes establishing
federal criminal jurisdiction over crimes involving Indians and
admitted that "far from depriving Indian tribes of their sovereign
power to punish offenses against tribal law by members of a tribe,
Congress has repeatedly recognized that power and declined to
disturb it.'"'1 In 1986, the Court reaffirmed in Three Affiliated Tribes of
the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering,7 that it has never
"found Pub. L. 280 to represent an abandonment of the federal
interest in guarding Indian self-governance."3 " In 1987, apparently
undeterred by Public Law 280, Justice Thurgood Marshall
acknowledged that "[t]ribal courts play a vital role in tribal self-
government.., and the Federal Government has consistently
encouraged their development.
31 9
Further support can be found in federal courts of appeals cases. In
1990, the Eighth Circuit ruled that "Public Law 280 did not itself
divest Indian tribes of their sovereign power to punish their own
members for violations of tribal law. Nothing in the wording of
Public Law 280 or its legislative history precludes concurrent tribal
authority.""" The following year, the Ninth Circuit held that Alaska
must give full faith and credit to the child-custody determinations
made by the Alaskan Native Village's governing bodies because
neither the Indian Child Welfare Act nor Public Law 280 prevented
plainly was not intended to effect total assimilation of Indian tribes into mainstream American
society").
314. Set id. at 216 n.19 (citing the Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act
of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1982), as an example of the federal commitment to these goals).
315. See id. at 216.
316. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 325 (1978) (footnote omitted). Although the
Wherder Court did not specifically address Public Law 280, the fact that it made this statement
while analyzing statutes that were enacted as far back as 1790, certainly affirms the idea that the
Court believed it had not yet seen any express legislation that abrogated tribal criminal
jurisdiction.
317. 476 U.S. 877 (1986).
318. Id. at 892.
319. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14-15 (1987) (footnote omitted).
320. Walker v. Rushing, 898 F.2d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1990) (ruling that Public Law 280 did
not divest tribes of their power to prosecute a tribal member who killed two other members).
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the Native Villages from exercising concurrent jurisdiction over such
matters.32'
There is also evidence that even the mandatory states themselves
continue to recognize tribal jurisdiction. In 1981, the Attorney
General of Wisconsin stated that "[f]or nonregulatory proceedings,
such as voluntary termination of parental rights, the tribal courts and
state courts pursuant to Pub. L. No. 280, have concurrent
jurisdiction.3 2 In 1985, the Attorney General of Nebraska declared
that Public Law 280's grant of jurisdiction to the states "extended
only to matters over which the federal government had earlier had
authority and that it was not meant to detract from tribal jurisdiction
as it existed."32 3  Accordingly, he concluded that tribal jurisdiction
remained intact and that the states shared jurisdiction with them in
the same manner that the tribes once shared the jurisdiction with the
Federal Government.
24
The sentiments of the Wisconsin and Nebraska Attorneys General
were also consistent in a 1976 memorandum from Lawrence A.
Aschenbrenner, Acting Associate Solicitor of the Division of Indian
325Affairs. In the memorandum, Aschenbrenner stated that "P.L. 280
gives the states concurrent and not exclusive jurisdiction over Indian
country therein. The tribes retain the other part of the concurrent
jurisdiction."3 26  Moreover, in 1978, then-Assistant Attorney General
321. See Native Village of Venetie I.RA Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 562 (9th Cir. 1991),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. Ct. 948
(1998). In fact, the court explained that "[b]roadly put, Public Law 280 gave to certain
enumerated states concurrent jurisdiction over criminal and civil matters involving Indians,
where jurisdiction had previously vested only in federal and tribal courts." Id. at 555 n.8.
322. See 70 Op. Att'y Gen. Wisc. 237, 243 (1981), available at 1981 WL 157271 (Wisc. A.G.)
(responding to a letter of inquiry from the Secretary of the Department of Health and Social
Services regarding an interpretation ofjurisdictional provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, § 2, 92 Star. 3069, 3069 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1994))).
323. See Op. Att'y Gen. Neb. No. 48 (1985), available at 1985 WL 168524, at *2 (Neb. A.G.)
(responding to Senator Goll's request for an explanation of the effects of retrocession on the
Winnebago Reservation as permitted by a 1968 amendment to Public Law 280).
324. See id.
325. See Aschenbrenner Memorandum, supra note 28, at 3 (asserting that through Public
Law 280 the Federal Government only transferred to mandatory states jurisdiction that the
Federal Government previously held).
326. Id. at 5; see also supra note 28 and accompanying text (explaining Aschenbrenner's
reasoning and comments in greater detail). It should be noted that the Supreme Court has
ruled that "considerable weight" and "deference" should be given to an administrative agency's
construction of a statute when that agency is charged with the administration of that particular
act. See Chevron U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(holding that an agency's interpretation of a statute should be accepted because Congress
delegated power to interpret the statute to an agency). The Department of the Interior is
vested with the responsibility to manage all matters dealing with Indian affairs or arising out of
Indian affairs. See 25 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). While Acting Associate Solicitor Aschenbrenner's
opinion is not the equivalent of an official decision of the Department of the Interior, given
Public Law 280's ambiguity and the Supreme Court's ruling in Chevron, it is quite reasonable to
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for Legislative Affairs, Patricia M. Wald made statements affirming
that the Department ofJustice viewed Public Law 280 as providing for
concurrentjurisdiction between the states and tribes.2 7
2. Subsequent amendments
The opinions described above clearly illustrate that a narrower
interpretation of Public Law 280, one that permits tribal residual
jurisdiction, is the operative trend. These rulings and opinions,
however, do not negate the statute's assimilationist undertones. 3
They merely stand for the premise that the assimilationist notions of
years past cannot justify a divestiture interpretation when (1) the
Supreme Court has clearly determined that total assimilation was
never the primary intent of Congress; ' and (2) the courts' task is not
only to give effect to Congress' original intent, but also to new
congressional purposes that have become part of the statute through
subsequent amendments.'
The courts have appropriately recognized that more than the
national Indian policy has changed in the past twenty-three years; the
statute itself has changed.3  In fact, one could argue that the original
Public Law 280 statute of 1953 has been substantially superceded.
When Congress amended the statute in 1968, it created a "new Act
32
that carried with it a new congressional intent, one that was still
committed to improving law enforcement, but now also committed to
supporting tribal sovereignty, self-governance, and self-
place significant weight on its interpretation.
327. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 35 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7558. In a
letter to the Honorable Morris K. Udall, Assistant Attorney General Patricia Wald stated:
As you may be aware, the courts have consistently recognized that tribal governments
have exclusive jurisdiction over the domestic relationships of tribal members located
on reservations, unless a State has assumed concurrent jurisdiction pursuant to
Federal legislation such as Public Law 83-280.
Id.
328. See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S.
463, 488 (1979) (acknowledging the assimilationist imprint upon Public Law 280, but failing to
conclude that congressional policy invalidated tribal justice systems).
329. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text (discussing Bryan's ruling).
330. Cf Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 663 (9th Cir. 1975)
(recognizing the importance of original intent in its analysis of Public Law 280, yet refusing to
.strain" to interpret an ambiguous statute to reflect a rejected assimilation policy "where to do
so will interfere with the present congressional approach to what is, after all, an ongoing
relationship").
331. Public Law 280 was amended on several occasions. SeeAct ofJuly 10, 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, 98 Stat. 342; Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2668; Act of Nov. 25, 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-523, 84 Stat. 1358; Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Star. 73; Act of
Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, § 2, 72 Stat. 545; Act of Aug. 24, 1954, ch. 910, § 2, 68 Stat.
795.
332. See Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 429 (1971) (observing that the 1968
amendments made Public Law 280 a "new Act").
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determination.
In 1968, Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act ("ICRA"). ""
The Act essentially made many, but not all of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights, applicable to tribes. 3 As part of the Act, amendments
were made to Public Law 280. As previously mentioned, at the time
of Public Law 280's enactment, tribes had criticized the law for
permitting states unilaterally to assume jurisdiction over Indian
country without tribal consent.335 By doing so, it set a tone of
disregard for tribal sovereignty.
3 6  Under Title 1V of the ICRA,
3 7
Public Law 280 was amended to make tribal consent a prerequisite
for future assumptions of jurisdiction.39  The amendment also
permitted states in the future to assume only partial jurisdiction over
certain subject matter.340
The ICRA amendments to Public Law 280 also permit the states to
retrocede any jurisdiction previously acquired under Public Law 280
333. SeeAct of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 201, 82 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994)).
334. See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 79, at 384; see also Act of Apr. 11, 1968 § 202, 82 Stat. at
77 (including such rights as freedom of speech, press, religion and right to counsel, but
omitting prohibitions on establishment of religion and the government's obligation to provide
and pay for counsel).
335. See WASHBURN, supra note 119, at 87 (noting that President Eisenhower approved
Public Law 280, while chastising it for its lack of required tribal consultation).
336. See Goldberg, supra note 56, at 545 (citation omitted) (noting that Indians felt their
lack of consent to Public Law 280 was a "deliberate slight" to tribal sovereignty).
337. Act of Apr. 11, 1968 § 401, 82 Stat. at 78 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (1994)).
338. Tribal consent means a "majority vote of the enrolled Indians within the affected area
of Indian country." SeeKennerlyv. District Court, 400 U.S. 423,429 (1971) (footnote omitted).
339. SeeAct of Apr. 11, 1968, §§ 401-03, 82 Stat. At 78 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322
(1994)). Section 1321 provided the tribal consent requirement for the criminal provision,
while section 1322 made tribal consent a prerequisite for future state assumptions of
jurisdiction under the civil provision, and section 1326 provided the definition of tribal
consent.
The 1968 Tribal consent provision, however, was not made retroactive so it did not "displace
jurisdiction previously assumed." See Three Affiliated Tribes of the Berthold Reservation v.
Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138, 150-51 (1984). It should be noted, however, that since the creation
of the consent amendment, no tribe has given such consent. See GErCHES ET AL., supra note 40,
at 482 n.81.
340. See 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (a) (providing that states can assume criminal jurisdiction "over
any or all of such offenses committed within such Indian country or any part thereof as may be
determined by such State"); 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (providing that the assumption of civil
jurisdiction could be made over "any or all such civil causes of action arising within such Indian
country or any part thereof as may be determined by such State").
It has been noted, however, that even before the assumption of partial jurisdiction was
permitted by 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322, some of the optional states had already chosen to limit
their assumptions ofjurisdiction to: "(1) less than all the Indian reservations in the state, (2)
less than all the geographic areas within an Indian reservation, or (3) less than all subject
matters of the law." See PEVAR, supra note 20, at 115 (describing partial jurisdictional
assumptions of Montana, Arizona, Idaho, and Washington and the approval of this practice by
the Supreme Court in 1979); see also Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima
Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 499 (1979) (stating that the voluntary system of partial jurisdiction
attempts to respond to the needs of both Indians and non-Indians within a reservation).
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back to the Federal Government.3 4' This provision clarifies that even
if Congress' original intentions included eventual termination of
tribal jurisdiction, this intention was superceded by the intent to
promote self-governance in 1968. As the Supreme Court has
recognized, "the 1968 amendments to Pub. L. 280 pointedly illustrate
the continuing congressional concern over tribal sovereignty." 342
While the imprint of the period's assimilation policy can still be
observed throughout Public Law 280, the 1968 ICRA amendments
also imprinted the prevailing national policy upon Public Law 280-a
policy that rejects termination in favor of self-government. This
policy must also be given effect.
3. Post-enactment factors
"As statutes evolve, the text loses some of its focal power, and other
considerations become increasingly important in statutory
interpretation-the purpose of the law, the surrounding legal terrain,
and statutory precedents. 3 43  In the case of Public Law 280, post-
enactment factors such as subsequent legislation and a changing
national policy toward Indian tribes not only suggest that the statute
does not effectuate a divestiture of tribal jurisdiction, but they also
provide the courts with more justifications for narrowly interpreting
Public Law 280.
In the early 1960's, support for the termination policies had
deteriorated significantly 44 and a new national Indian policy was
articulated, ushering in the "Self-Determination" era, which
continues through the present.145 Under this current national policy,
341. SeeAct of Apr. 11, 1968 § 403, 82 Stat. at 79. Section 1323(a) requires states that are
interested in retrocession to send a resolution to the Secretary of the Interior requesting such
action. The Secretary then has the opportunity to accept or deny the request. See Goldberg,
supra note 56, at 558 (noting that the states' financial dilemmas with Public Law 280
implementation made this retrocession provision necessary). While regretfully the retrocession
is left to the unilateral decisions of the states, the Federal Government is unlikely to accept
retrocession if an affected tribe does not approve. See PEVAR, supra note 20, at 117 (explaining
that states did not have power to force their will upon tribes).
342. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 476 U.S. at 892.
343. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 246, at 62.
344. See CLINTON Er AL., supra note 79, at 158-59 (statement of Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of
the Interior) (noting that the cornerstone of the termination policy, House Concurrent
Resolution 108, "died with the 83rd Congress and is of no legal effect at the present time"); see
also supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text (discussing the resolution's impact on the
Termination Period).
345. A turning point for the initiation of this policy came in 1970 when President Nixon
declared the termination policy a failure and informed Congress that from that day forward, he
would push a policy directed at strengthening tribal self-governance. See Richard Nixon,
Special Message to Congress on Indian Affairs, 1970 PuB. PAPERS 564 (July 8, 1970) (providing
the complete text of President Nixon's message to Congress); see also Endreson, supra note 45,
at 142 (stating that the Self-Determination policy introduced by President Nixon changed the
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the Federal Government supports and promotes tribal self-
governance and makes efforts toward establishing greater tribal
economic self-sufficiency and self-determination s.34  Relevant to the
Public Law 280 analysis is the fact that Congress enacted legislation
pursuant to this new policy and initiated new federal programs
otherwise inconsistent with Public Law 280 if interpreted to include
the divestiture of tribal jurisdiction.34' The mere fact that Congress
did not declare Public Law 280 an obstacle or seek to repeal it,
supports an argument that Congress itself did not interpret Public
Law 280 to divest tribes of their criminal and civil jurisdiction.348 For
instance, Congress did not find Public Law 280 inconsistent with the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975,4 9
cycle of Indian policy).
346. See Endreson, supra note 45, at 1 (discussing the fact that tribes can accomplish these
ends when their resources and time are not devoted solely to defense of their existence).
347. See supra notes 98 & 286 and infra notes 349-55 and accompanying text (describing the
Indian Tribal Justice Act and the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act).
348. See Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 184-85 (1988) (stating that it is
generally presumed that Congress is aware of existing law that may be relevant to any new
legislation it enacts). Any Congressional declaration that Public Law 280's "divestiture" was a
serious impediment to the realization of its new goals is notably absent.
Though not discussed at length in this Article, it should be noted that Congress' continued
reluctance to clarify how a new act should be implemented in light of Public Law 280 is also
problematic. For instance, in the case of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 ("ICWA"), Pub.
L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1902, 1911-1923, 1931-1934, 1951-
1952, 1961-1963 (1994)), section 1911(a) states that "[a]n Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction
exclusive as to any State over child custody proceedings involving an Indian child who resides or
is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise
vested in the State by existing Federal law." See id. § 1911(a). The section could implicate a
Public Law 280 question as to whether a tribe under Public Law 280 would maintain concurrent
jurisdiction. See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 79, at 660 (discussing Native Village of Venetie I.R.A.
Council v. Alaska, 687 F. Supp. 1380 (D. Alaska 1988), which held that there was no concurrent
jurisdiction and that the tribe could only regain exclusive jurisdiction if retrocession occurred).
The district court's holding in Venetie regarding the lack of concurrent jurisdiction was reversed
by the Ninth Circuit. See Native Village of Venetie I.RA Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 559-62
(9th Cir. 1991) (holding that Public Law 280 did not divest tribes ofjurisdiction and that under
the ICWA, Alaskan Native Villages could exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the state over
child custody issues), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Gov't, 118 S. Ct. 948 (1998).
When enacting the ICWA, Congress likely recognized that Public Law 280 provided
concurrent tribal and state jurisdiction. See H.R REP. No. 95-1386 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.CAN. 7558 (including a Department of Justice letter acknowledging exclusive tribal
jurisdiction over domestic relations "unless a state has assumed concurrent jurisdiction
pursuant to Federal legislation such as Public Law 83-280").
The United States appears to have found this aspect of ICWA's legislative history persuasive.
See U.S. Brief, John v. Baker, supra note 28, at 25 (noting that the legislative history of ICWA
indicates that "Congress understood Public Law 280 as providing for concurrent jurisdiction
among state and tribal courts). Because the tribes encountered difficulty asserting jurisdiction
under the ICWA as a result of this provision, the National Congress of American Indians
resolved to work with experts in the field to explore potential amendments to ICWA that would
clarify the language and its implementation in conjunction with Public Law 280. See Protection of
Public Law 280 Tribe Regarding Amendments to the Indian Child Welfare Act, National Congress of
American Indian Res. TLS-96-007B (June 3-5, 1996).
349. See Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-458h
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although Congress clearly recognized that tribes were unlikely to
relinquish control over their members and territory to another
sovereign."'
Congress also did not perceive that Public Law 280 was inconsistent
with the goals of the Indian Tribal Justice Act of 1993351 which was
enacted to promote "the expansion and effective use of tribal courts
by making federal funding available for facilities, libraries, and
publications," without regard to whether tribes were in Public Law
280 jurisdictions."2
Under this particular Act, Congress reaffirmed the legitimacy of
tribal justice systems," 3 acknowledged the importance of those
systems to Indian self-governance,5 4 and, most notably, stated that
"Congress and the Federal courts have repeatedly recognized tribal
justice systems as the appropriate forums for the adjudication of
disputes affecting personal and property rights."3 5 Certainly, if
Congress believed that Public Law 280 actually terminated tribal
jurisdiction in the mandatory states, or any of the optional states for
that matter, these policy statements would be meaningless.
Furthermore, in April of 1994, President Clinton issued his
Executive Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relations
between the United States and Indian Tribes, affirming the Federal
Government's respect for tribal sovereignty and its unique
relationship with Indian tribes. Shortly thereafter, the Office of
(1994)) (noting that Indians were the most qualified to assume responsibility for the planning
and administration of federal programs designed and provided for their benefit).
350. See 25 U.S.C. § 450(a) (2) ("Indian people will never surrender their desire to control
their relationships both among themselves and with non-Indian governments, organizations,
and persons.").
351. Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3602, 3611-3614,
3621, 3631 (1994)).
352. See Resink, supra note 49, at 121 (noting, however, that as of yet, federal funding has
not been forthcoming).
353. See 25 U.S.C. § 3601(4) (1994) ("[llndian tribes possess the inherent authority to
establish their own form of government, including tribal justice systems .... ).
354. See id. § 3601(5) ("[T]ribal justice systems are an essential part of tribal governments
and serve as important forums for ensuring public health and safety and the political integrity
of tribal governments . . .
355. Seeid. § 3601(6).
356. See Remarks to Native American and Alaskan Tribal Leaders, 1994 PUB. PAPERS 800
(Apr. 29, 1994). Among other things, the Executive Memorandum directed that all executive
departments and agencies act in a "knowledgeable, sensitive manner respectful of tribal
sovereignty," consult more extensively with federally recognized tribes on matters affecting
them, and to remove procedural impediments that impede working directly with tribes on
issues effecting their self-governance and trust properties. See Memorandum on Government to
Government Relations with Native American Tribal Governments, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
936, 936 (Apr. 29, 1994); see also Department of Justice Policy on Indian Sovereignty and
Government-to-Government Relations, 61 Fed. Reg. 29,424, 29,425 (1996) ("The Department
shall be guided by principles of respect for Indian tribes and their sovereign authority.").
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Tribal justice was established within the Department of Justice,15 7 and
various tribal court initiatives were developed, including the Tribal
Courts Project 5s  to assist Indian tribes in developing and
strengthening their justice systems and obtaining needed funds." In
May of 1998, President Clinton expanded on the government-to-
government policy with Indian tribes by signing an Executive
Memorandum of Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal
Governments. Under this Memorandum, wherever possible,
Executive agencies are directed to consult with tribes on regulatory
or programmatic proposals, remove obstacles to meaningful
participation in federal processes, and offer waivers of burdensome
financial and administrative requirements. °
In light of these various post-enactment factors, it is easy to see why
the court rulings during the Self-Determination Period61 reflected
the judiciary's reluctance to interpret an ambiguous Public Law 280
statute as accomplishing anything more than a transfer of federal
jurisdiction to the states. With Public Law 280, the courts face a text
that is unclear,362 an original congressional intent that focuses
primarily on combating lawlessness,6 3 and a subsequent history that
offers no ongoing, congressional allegiance to an assimilationist-
divestiture reading.6
357. The Office's principal mission is to realize the government-to-government relationship
by acting as a liaison between the Department ofJustice and tribal representatives to ensure full
communication and understanding and by coordinating federal Indian policy with the various
federal agencies that act within, or in ways that affect, Indian country. See OFFICE OF TRIBAL
JUSTICE, DEP'T OFJUSTICE MISSION OF THE OFFICE OF TRIBALJUSTICE (not dated) (on file with
The American University Law Review and the Office of Tribal Justice).
358. See 8 TRIBAL CT. REC. supra note 128, at 27 (reprinting the complete text of the DOJ's
November 14, 1994 memorandum announcing the Tribal Courts Project); see also Reno, supra
note 44, at 114 (explaining that the Department provides federal assistance, training and
technical assistance, and strives to increase awareness about tribal justice systems and to
"increase visibility of tribal courts as essential participants in the nationwide administration of
justice").
359. See Tribal Courts Project, NATION TO NATION (Dep't of Justice, Office of Tribal Justice),
Aug. 1996, at 5. Forty-five tribes were selected as partnership tribes and tribes in Public Law 280
states were included in the initiative. The list of selected tribal courts was provided by the
Tribal Courts' Project of the Department ofJustice (document dated September 11, 1995) (on
file with The American University Law Review).
360. Exec. Order No. 13,084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (May 14, 1998).
361. See supra Part III.D.1 (discussing Bryan v. Itasca County, California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, United States v. Wheeler, Native Villages of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, Walker v.
Rushing, and Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g); see also Santa Rosa
Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 663 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding that Public Law 280
did not divest tribes of theirjurisdiction and stating that the court will not "strain to implement
a policy Congress has now rejected").
362. See supra Part III.B and Part III.C.3 (discussing the need for express language when
reviewing the ambiguity of "exclusive" language used in 18 U.S.C. § 1162(c) (1994)).
363. See supra Part II.B (discussing congressional intent of controlling lawlessness,
decreasing federal spending, and assimilation when enacting Public Law 280).
364. See supra Parts III.D.2-3 (discussing subsequent amendments and subsequent acts and
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When the canons of statutory construction relevant to Indian law
are applied and Public Law 280 is analyzed in the context of
increasing recognition of tribal self-government and the development
of tribal justice systems,"" it is reasonable to hope that in the future
courts will move further away from an interpretation of Public Law
280 that abrogates any tribal rights of self-government.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
To the extent that Public Law 280 was intended to improve the
administration of justice on Indian reservations, it has not been
successful by most estimations.36' Today, the problems in Indian
country law enforcement pervade Public Law 280 and non-Public Law
280 states alike. Many tribal leaders in Public Law 280 states perceive
a law enforcement vacuum and believe that Public Law 280
exacerbates this vacuum. In addition, tribal leaders complain that
state and local law enforcement officials are often unresponsive when
tribes do summon them.3  These lingering destructive impacts to
tribal justice systems have qualitatively affected civil and criminal
justice in Indian country. The mandatory states vested with major
crimes jurisdiction over Indian country apparently lack both the
means and, at times, the will to assure enforcement of the laws. 69
Consequently, it has been argued that Public Law 280 has actually
371increased lawlessness in many areas.
The confusion surrounding the precise impact of Public Law 280
has created an environment in which tribes challenge and question
programs consistent with tribal self-governance); see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 246, at
65 (highlighting the Supreme Court's use of subsequent legislative history as a guide to the
current Congress' "attitudes toward ongoing statutory implementation").
365. See supra Part III.B.2 (reviewing the canons of construction applicable to federal Indian
law); see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 246, at 68 (concluding that the canons are not
dispositive in and of themselves, but useful "tiebreaker[s] in close cases").
366. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 246, at 63 (commenting that the changes in social
and political power of the parties affected by law can play an important role in statutory
interpretation).
367. See PUBLIC LAW 280 REPORT, supra note 30.
368. See GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, supra note 31, at 31 (discussing the legal vacuum type of
lawlessness resulting from Public Law 280); Hunter, supra note 2, at 18 (noting tribal leader's
sentiment regarding the vacuum left by absence of state law enforcement).
369. See Goldberg, supra note 56, at 552 (asserting that the lack of necessary funds translated
into unsatisfactory law enforcement on reservations where the states assumed jurisdiction under
Public Law 280). Carole Goldberg specifically notes that in Nebraska, a Public Law 280
mandatory state, the Omaha and Winnebago Reservations were left without any law
enforcement after the state assumed jurisdiction and the federal law enforcement officials left.
See id.
370. MEISSNER REPORT, supra note 10, at 21 ("[T]he chaotic state of the law regarding a
wide range of Indian jurisdiction issues is the source of many of the law enforcement problems
Indians face.").
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the legitimacy of state law enforcement and states themselves second-
guess the scope of their rightful jurisdiction under the Act. Further,
judicially imposed limitations with respect to the applicability of
criminal prohibitions versus regulatory state laws make the prompt
and effective delivery of law enforcement services-especially
emergency response-difficult.
37'
The jurisdictional confusion created by Public Law 280 has
hindered the development of tribal justice systems in the mandatory
states for several reasons. First, tribal justice systems in Public Law
280 states are more vulnerable to state challenges to its legitimacy.3"
This has effectively deterred some tribes from exercising jurisdiction
and further developing their justice systems. 3  Second, in a climate
where funding for tribal justice systems is already grossly inadequate,
some traditional funding streams have been unavailable to tribal
justice systems in Public Law 280 states.374 Finally, the jurisdictional
confusion created by Public Law 280 has impeded the negotiation of
cooperative and mutual aid agreements, in the interest of effective
maintenance of law and order between neighboring jurisdictions.
Such agreements assume heightened significance in Public Law 280
jurisdictions because the inability of state and tribal authorities to
agree on the jurisdictional status quo can foreclose a consensus on
the more complicated issues of major versus misdemeanor crimes,
Indian versus non-Indian offenders, and prohibitory versus regulatory
state laws.
Repairing the negative impact to tribal self-government wrought by
371. See BJ. Jones, Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Issues in Tribal-
State and Tribal Federal Court Relations, 24 WM. MrrCHELL L. REV. 457, 472 (1998); GOLDBERG-
AMBROSE & CHAMPAGNE, supra note 36, at 55 (explaining that the response time for a murder
may be an hour, whereas anything else might be three days); Hunter, supra note 2, at B1 ("State
Troopers sometimes are days away when emergencies arise." (quoting Will Mayo, President of
Tanana Chiefs Conference)).
372. SeeJones, supra note 371, at 472 (observing that "Public Law 280 has proved to be an
impediment to tribal court development both in the mandatory states and in optional states
where some form of state court jurisdiction was adopted"). As another example, the tribal
courts in one mandatory state have been described as operating "in a legal twilight." See Kizzia,
supra note 2, at Al.
373. See Bradley Interviews, supra note 28 (explaining that tribal courts did not develop in
the Omaha and Winnebago Tribes of Nebraska until retrocession, and that the Sioux tribal
court development lags behind Omaha and Winnebago because it is still subject to Public Law
280); see also GOLDBERG-AMBROSE & CHAMPAGNE, supra note 36, at 52 (asserting that "as a
practical matter tribes without law enforcement funds may find it infeasible to operate a court
system or to support a system of alternative dispute resolution").
374. See Aschenbrenner Memorandum, supra note 28, at 5 (asserting that the BIA was not
justified in denying Public Law 280 tribes access to LFAA discretionary grants under the
reasoning that they no longer had jurisdiction). A recent exception has been the Department
of Justice COPS Program which has funded tribal law enforcement in mandatory Public Law
280 states, notably Alaska and California, presumably under the theory that tribes maintain
concurrentjurisdiction. See supra note 228 (describing the COPS program).
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Public Law 280 requires a commitment to comprehensive reform by
tribes, states, and the Federal Government. Specific reform measures
must include: statutory amendments granting tribes the ability to
initiate retrocession, clarification and harmonization of the statute's
judicial interpretations, and related jurisdictional statutes, and
concerted efforts by Congress and the Executive to assure necessary
funding for the adequate administration of civil and criminal justice
in Indian country. The goal of such reforms should be to enable the
participation of tribes as full partners in the nationwide
administration of justice. With adequate recognition and funding,
tribal justice systems would be well-situated to seek incremental
expansions in theirjurisdictions to include major crimes and offenses
by non-Indians, at least on a discretionary basis. 5
A. Proposed Amendments and Judicial Cooperation
As a threshold matter, Congress should consider three
amendments to Public Law 280:
(1) Amend Public Law 280 to clarify that nothing in the Act
precludes tribal jurisdiction and that only a transfer of partial
federal jurisdiction took place. This would preserve some degree
of exclusive tribal jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction with the
states where it previously was concurrent with the Federal
Government.3 76
(2) Amend Public Law 280 to provide a procedure by which a tribe
in any Public Law 280 state-mandatory or optional-can initiate
377
the retrocession process, ideally in conjunction with the state.
375. For example, proposed Senate Bill 10, Juvenile Justice Reauthorization legislation
introduced by Senator Hatch in the 105th Congress, would have directed the Attorney General
of the United States to study tribal justice systems, including their capacity to administer
lengthier penalties. SeeViolent and RepeatJuvenile Offender Act of 1997, S. 10, 105th Cong. §
112. During the hearing on Youth Gangs in Indian Country, the Department of Justice was
asked whether an increase in tribal court penalties under the Indian Civil Rights Act would
better enable tribal courts to address juvenile delinquency and crime. See S. REP. No. 105-108,
at 80 (1997). Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin V. Di Gregory and Tom LeClaire,
Director of the Office of Tribal Justice, responded that such an increase in penalties without
adequate funding for tribal courts, tribal law enforcement, and tribal detention facilities would
not be sufficient. See Gang Activity Within Indian Country: Hearing on S. 10 Before the Senate Comm.
On theJudiciary and Senate Comm On Indian Affairs (1997) 105th Cong., available in 1997 WL
615584.
376. See Letter from Frederick G. Miller, Senior Staff Attorney and Project Director,
National Center for State Courts, to Honorable Elbridge Coochise, Chief Judge, Northwest
Intertribal Court System 4 (Mar. 9, 1994) (on file with The American University Law Review)
[hereinafter Building on Common Ground] (attaching the Center's Building on Common
Ground strategy memorandum that includes numerous recommendations for fostering tribal,
state, and federal cooperation).
377. See id. ("Congress should amend Public Law 280 to vest Indian tribes with authority to
unilaterally retrocede any or all assertions of state jurisdiction over Indian country."); see also
National American Indian Court Judges Association Statement Prepared for Tribal Leaders
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The current state of the law permits states to initiate the process
without regard to tribal consent or support. This is highly
inconsistent with the prevailing federal policies of government-to-
government relations and tribal self-government and
determination.3 7 8 Restoring the voice and influence of tribes in the
retrocession process will enhance the potential for constructive
tripartite cooperation and will assure the realistic assessment of the
tribe's funding needs and existing justice systems to ensure
effective post-retrocession law enforcement.
(3) Amend Public Law 280 to require retroactive tribal consent to
all assumptions of jurisdiction that were undertaken by mandatory
and optional states alike.ss8 Incorporating tribal governmental
consent is the only means to restore moral and legal force to the
statute.
Public Law 280 has tainted tribal-state-federal governmental
relations since its enactment and symbolizes, to many tribal
governments, the apotheosis of federal assimilationist and
terminationist policies. Acknowledging these attitudes in 1975, the
Department of Justice Task Force on Indian Matters reported that
"[m]ost Indian organizations and tribes abhor P.L. 280."'38' Rather
than dissipating since 1953, the negative sentiment has only increased
with time.8 2
Whether or not the Executive and the tribal leaders can muster the
necessary political momentum to enact such amendments to Public
Law 280, it will be important to monitor closely the judicial
interpretations of Public Law 280. Given the current Supreme
Meeting with Pres. Clinton (Apr. 29, 1994) [hereinafter NAICJA Statement] (supporting a
retrocession amendment in absence of complete repeal).
378. See supra note 286 and accompanying text (discussing the new federal policy promoting
tribal self-government and self-determination).
379. While the authors suggest consideration of retrocession, complete repeal of Public Law
280 should not be foreclosed, if appropriately balanced with necessary resource enhancements.
Realistically, because Public Law 280 has weakened tribal governments, tribal justice systems
simply may not be financially or administratively able to take on the case loads previously
assumed by states. See Letter from Robert B. Porter, Associate Professor of Law and Director of
Tribal Law and Government Center, to Hon. Janet Reno, Attorney General 1 (Dec. 17, 1995)
(on file with The American University Law Review) [hereinafter Porter Letter] (noting also that
some tribes may have become dependent on or accustomed to federal and state government
authority or assistance). For this reason, communication between the three sovereigns will
ensure that if retrocession does occur, it will be when the tribes are fully funded to take on the
responsibility.
380. See NAICJA Statement, supra note 377, at 3 (requesting an amendment that makes the
1968 tribal consent provision retroactive).
381. MEISSNER REPORT, supra note 10, at 20.
382. At the historic 1994 Listening Conference in Albuquerque, New Mexico, tribal leaders
expressed their dissatisfaction with Public Law 280 to Attorney General Reno, Secretary of the
Interior Babbitt, and then Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Henry Cisneros. See
Video Tape: The Path of Hope (Listening Conference 1994) (on file with authors).
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Court's relatively low threshold for what constitutes a clear and
express statement by Congress, s83 a negative decision by the Court on
the extent of tribal jurisdiction in Public Law 280 states could
undercut existing precedent supporting tribal concurrent
jurisdiction.84
B. Retrocession Plus
Through retrocession the Federal Government reassumes its
jurisdictional responsibility, namely jurisdiction under the Major
Crimes Act and the General Crimes Act."" By establishing clear
jurisdictional boundaries, retrocession inevitably vests tribes with
heightened responsibility for the welfare of their communities'
Retrocession alone, however, will not improve the administration of
justice in mandatory Public Law 280 jurisdictions. To be effective,
retrocession must be accompanied by a long-term augmentation of
funding and resources for tribal justice systems, the
institutionalization of formal mechanisms to facilitate inter-
governmental cooperation among tribes, states, and the Federal
Government,'" and enhanced respect for and recognition of tribal
justice systems, including law enforcement, traditional dispute
resolution, and tribal orders and judgmentssee
383. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 118 S. Ct. 789 (1998); Alaska v. Native
Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. Ct. 948 (1998).
384. Cf Goldberg, supra note 56, at 594 (suggesting that the Supreme Court should
interpret Public Law 280 to limit state jurisdiction given its unclear statutory language and
legislative history).
385. Under section 1162(c), the Major Crimes Act and the General Crimes Act were
rendered inapplicable in the mandatory states. See supra note 262 and accompanying text
(discussing section 1162(c)).
386. Retrocession does not mean that tribes will suddenly possesses all jurisdiction over
Indian country, it simply means that the jurisdictional dynamic that was present before the
statute's passage will resume-leaving principally a jurisdictional division between the Federal
Government and tribes.
387. See Reno, supra note 99, at 1 (affirming that improving federal-tribal relations is
essential to the realization of a government-to-government relationship and to the federal trust
responsibility to promote tribal sovereignty); Building on Common Ground, supra note 376, at
3 (recommending some measures that tribal, state, and federal courts can take to resolve
jurisdictional disputes).
One measure taken to facilitate such cooperation was the formation of the National Sheriffs'
Association Indian Country-Sheriffs Cooperation Committee to "enhance working relationships
between law enforcement agencies whose jurisdictions include Indian lands and its residents.
See National Sheriffs Association Indian Countr-Sheriffs Coolferation Committee Formed, 8 TRIBAL CT.
REC. (Nat'l Indian Justice Ctr., Petaluma, Cal.), Winter/Spring 1995, at 22 (on file with The
American University Law Review). The Committee hopes that through joint discussions, research,
and meetings, the sheriffs and tribal, federal, and other law enforcement officials will be able to
provide improved services that the community expects. See id.
388. See O'Connor, supra note 48, at 4-5 (stating that the tribal court decision-making
process sometimes differs from state and federal courts due to the incorporation of traditional
values and customs and that such variances are not only acceptable, but often helpful in
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The Supreme Court has acknowledged that "[t]ribal courts play a
vital role in tribal self-government.., and the Federal government
has consistently encouraged their development.'89  The increasing
activity and sophistication of most tribal justice systems in their
struggle to realize the legitimate right of tribes to self-government has
transformed courts into the primary forum for determining the scope
of tribal authority. Tribal justice systems in Public Law 280 states
must assume their roles as equal and essential components of our
nation's "multilayeredjustice system."
Currently, there are at least 200 tribal law enforcement
departments and 250 Indian court systems 9" among over 550
federally recognized Indian tribes.39 As a result of the historic lack of
resources and the jurisdictional uncertainties created by Public Law
280, however, the number and relative sophistication of tribal justice
systems in Public Law 280 states appear to lag behind their non-
Public Law 280 counterparts.3
Although retrocession may be a preferred option for some Public
Law 280 jurisdictions, it will not solve all of the law enforcement
problems in Indian country as long as the governments that remain
reaching alternative dispute resolution practices not available in U.S. court systems).
389. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14-15 (1987).
390. See Wallace, supra note 42, at 152.
391. SeeJoseph A. Myers & Elbridge Coochise, Development of Tibal Courts: Past, Present, and
Future, 79JUDICATURE 147, 149 (1995) (explaining that 232 tribal judicial systems and 22 courts
of Indian offenses were identified in the BIA budget request for fiscal year 1995); see also 25
U.S.C. §§ 1311-1312 (1994) (authorizing the development of a model code governing courts of
Indian offenses); 25 C.F.R. § 11.100-.1115 (1997) (explaining the courts of Indian offenses,
their regulations, procedures, and detailed offenses); POMMERSHEIM, sura note 18, at 61-70
(tracing the emergence of tribal courts and their struggle for judicial legitimacy); Fredric
Brandfon, Tradition and Judicial Review in the American Indian Tribal Court System, 38 UCLA L.
REV. 991, 998-99 (1991) (outlining the BIA's initiation of the "Courts of Indian Offenses" in
1883 and the enactment of 1934 Indian Reorganization Act ("IRA") that permitted tribes to
adopt their own constitutions and establish their own court systems); Margery H. Brown &
Brenda C. Desmond, Montana Tribal Courts: Influencing the Development of Contemporary Indian
Law, 52 MONT. L. REV. 211, 217-20 (1991) (detailing tribal court development); Valencia-
Weber, supra note 45, at 235-37 (recounting the emergence of tribal courts).
392. See supra note 24 (describing the number of federally recognized Indian tribes and the
recognition process).
393. Not all Public Law 280 states, however, are created alike. Goldberg-Ambrose makes a
persuasive argument that California tribes, given their number and need, have received the
least federal assistance and support: "[niot surprisingly, tribal courts and police forces are
exceedingly rare among the more than 100 Californian tribes, even as these institutions have
taken root and flourished on reservations elsewhere in the country." GOLDBERG-AMBROSE &
CHAMPAGNE, supra note 36, at 3. Other mandatory states have witnessed advances among their
tribal courts. Tribes in Wisconsin and Oregon do receive tribal court and law enforcement
funds from BIA, according to GOLDBERG- AMBROSE & CHAMPAGNE See id. at 52.
394. See MEISSNER REPORT, supra note 10, at 20 (discussing retrocession as a means of
improving law enforcement on reservations). Senate Bill 1328, proposed in 1975 by Senator
Abourezk of South Dakota, would have authorized tribes to adopt resolutions to retrocede
jurisdiction back to the federal and tribal governments unilaterally, without the requirement of
state or federal consent. See S. 1328,94th Cong. §§ 101-05 (1975).
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responsible lack adequate funding. While tribes in Public Law 280
states face heightened challenges and struggles in the administration
ofjustice, it should be obvious that tribes in non-Public Law 280 states
also struggle to eradicate crime and maintain a baseline level of
safety. Ironically, retrocession without adequate funding and support
threatens to replicate the negative indirect effects of Public Law 280
itself: law enforcement "vacuums" and non-responsive law
enforcement.3' In this respect, the recent efforts by the Departments
of Justice and the Interior to obtain greater resources for Indian
country law enforcement are well-grounded and laudable. '9 6
Hopefully, federal efforts will also draw upon the lessons of the Public
Law 280 experience and consider meaningful jurisdictional reforms
in conjunction with increased funding.
The struggles of tribal governments in their attempts to assure
safety and stability have been well-documented and attempts at
reform are not a new phenomenon. The Indian Law Enforcement
Reform Act397 was intended to professionalize tribal law enforcement
through the Bureau of Indian Affairs and to enhance the level of
coordination with the Department ofJustice and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation." The Department of Justice has tried to
demonstrate its dedication to law enforcement in Indian country
through the initiation of various programs and grants to augment
available funding through the BIA."'9 True meaningful reform,
395. The Federal Government's continued interest in decreasing its financial obligations
pursuant to its trust responsibility may be as important now as it was at the time of Public Law
280's passage. Moreover, the fact remains that tribal faith in federal promises is not assured.
SeeJOSEPH A. MYERS, NATIONAL INDIAN JUSTICE CTR., STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD 6 (Feb. 9,
1995) (stating that such promises are often "meaningless"). In addition, where the Federal
Government currently bears responsibility for law enforcement, it is often inadequate. See
Memorandum from the Acting Deputy Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Department of the
Interior, to All BIA Area Directors 1 (Apr. 25, 1994) (on file with The American University Law
Review) (asking that area directors advise BIA police officers under their jurisdiction that the)'
should no longer be delinquent in their obligations to "adhere to tribal court orders and
related appearance/testimony in tribal courts").
396. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (describing Departments of Justice and
Interior's joint law enforcement initiative).
397. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (1994).
398. See id.
399. In fiscal year 1996, the BLA's funding was reduced by $160 million or nine percent. See
Peter Carlson, The Unfashionable, THEWASH. POST MAG., Feb. 23, 1997, at 9. The Department of
Justice has undertaken several initiatives to help ease the hardships of the budget cuts. For
example, recognizing that misdemeanor crimes on reservations committed by non-Indians
against Indians often go unprosecuted, the Department's Office of Tribal Justice has begun to
encourage some tribes to consider the convening of federal courts directly on the reservations
using magistrate judges to hear these particular cases. See Law Enforcement, NATION TO NATION
(Dep't of Justice, Office of Tribal Justice), Aug. 1996, at 5, 9 (stating that OTJ is working to
improve prosecution of reservation crime and noting that the Magistrate Project attempts to
address a law enforcement vacuum). On the Warm Springs Reservation, (which is expressly
exempt from Public Law 280), in the mandatory Public Law 280 State of Oregon, a federal
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however, will need to include more comprehensive changes,
including:
(1) congressional clarification, through a legislative amendment,
that the Major Crimes Act provides for concurrent tribal
jurisdiction over the enumerated crimes;4
(2) congressional amendment of the Indian Civil Rights Act.. .. . 401
("ICRA") to expand the tribal court sentencing options;
(3) a congressional enactment to overturn the holding in Oliphant
v. Squamish Indian Tribe and work with tribal justice systems to
enable the effective exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-
403Indians;
(4) consistent with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 404 of 1995,
magistrate convenes court periodically and the tribal prosecutor is cross-designated to
prosecute the crime in that federal forum. See id. (discussing the development of innovative
solutions to fill law enforcement gap); see also Grants and Funding, supra note 228, at 10 (listing
several more allocated grants); Contact List, NATION TO NATION (Dep't of Justice, Office of
Tribal Justice), Aug. 1996, at 11 (listing agencies that provide assistance in area of law
enforcement).
400. See Building on Common Ground, supra note 376, at 4 ("Congress should amend
Public Law 280 ... and similar laws to clarify that these laws do not preclude tribal court
jurisdiction over the same conduct, despite sentencing limitations."); see also Porter Letter, supra
note 379, at 3-4 (recommending that Public Law 280 and related statutes be amended to permit
exclusive jurisdiction for tribes over civil actions arising in Indian country and concurrent tribal-
federal jurisdiction over crimes and an "opt-out" provision for tribes wishing to resume state
jurisdiction where appropriate).
401. See Porter Letter, supra note 379, at 4 (noting that if tribal jurisdiction over major
crimes is clarified as concurrent, those tribes having "law-trained judges" should not be
confined by ICRA's sentencing limitations); see also Building on Common Ground, supra note
376, at 4 (stating that evaluation of tribal court due process safeguards may need to accompany
the increased power); supra note 159 (discussing ICRA's sentencing limitations).
402. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
403. See Building on Common Ground, supra note 376, at 4 (stating that Congress should
authorize tribal authority over crimes committed by non-Indians); NAICJA Statement, supra
note 377, at 3 (recommending that Congress take action to overturn Oliphant v. Squamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)); see also Porter Letter, supra note 379, at 2 (requesting the
recognition of tribal jurisdiction over misdemeanors committed in Indian country by non-
Indians); supra note 162 (discussing Oliphant).
404. See Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified at
2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1571) (Supp. 11997).
The purposes of this Act include:
(1) to strengthen the partnership between the Federal government and State, local,
and tribal governments;
(2) to end the imposition, in the absence of consideration by Congress, of Federal
mandates on State, local, and tribal governments without adequate Federal funding, in
a manner that may displace other essential State, local, and tribal governmental
priorities; ... to begin consideration of the effect of previously imposed Federal
mandates, including the impact on State, local, and tribal governments of Federal
court interpretations of Federal statutes and regulations that impose Federal
intergovernmental mandates.
2 U.S.C. § 1501 (Supp. 11997).
The precise issues raised by Public Law 280 are articulated in the Unfunded Mandate Reform
Act. They include questions regarding the mandatory nature of the transfer of jurisdiction in
the original states, the lack of funding to accompany the transfer, and the impact on tribal,
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a thorough consideration of the fiscal, political, and legal impact of
Public Law 280 on state, local, and tribal governments; and
(5) full implementation of the Indian Law Enforcement Act and
the Tribal Justice Act of 1993."5
The underfunding of tribal justice systems, and its impact on the
ability of tribal governments to maintain law and order and resolve
disputes, has been well-documented and acknowledged by
Congress. Under the Indian Tribal Justice Act,407 over $58.4 million
dollars annually was authorized for tribal court systems for the fiscal
years of 1994-2000.401 In addition, the Act provides resources for a
comprehensive survey of tribal judicial systems to assess their
resources, funding, and functions.4°" However, to date the BIA has
state, and local governments. See§ Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48.
405. See MYERS, supra note 395, at 6 (stating that funding for tribal courts pursuant to the
Tribal Justice Act was placed in the hands of the BIA and without congressional pressure the
BIA will not implement it); see also NAICJA Statement, supra note 377, at 1 (calling for the
Indian Tribal Justice Act's implementation and citing the tribal courts' need for "adequate
funding, resources, support, training or authority").
406. See 8 TRIBAL CT. REc., supra note 128, at 30 (declaring that resource problems are
evident and reminding readers of Senator McCain's 1993 statements that there is an
"overwhelming need for resources.., made evident... [by] witnesses detail[ing] the lack of
funding for basic tribal court functions, including personnel, reporting, records management,
standards development and facilities").
The article specifically notes that the $48,000 allocated per year for each tribal court
system-as requested under the 1995 BIA budget-is woefully inadequate when it is considered
that no state or federal justice system operates on less than $200,000. See id.; see also Senator
Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Introduction, 24 N.M. L. REV. 171, 172 (1994) (asserting that despite
the fact that tribal courts are pulled in many directions, they do not operate full-time, they
function with minuscule budgets, and are understaffed).
407. Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Star. 2004 (1995) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3602, 3611-
3614, 3621, 3631 (1994)).
408. See 25 U.S.C. § 3621(b); Ted Quasula, Will Republican Coup Destroy Gains in Indian
Country?, 8 TRIBAL CT. REC. (Nat'l Indian Justice Ctr., Petaluma, Cal.), Winter/Spring 1995, at
6-7 (on file with The American University Law Review) (discussing funding for fiscal years 1994-
1996).
The NAICJA succinctly summarized the legislation's authorizations:
1. $50 Million for base funding for Tribal Courts;
2. $7 Million for training, enhancement of tribaljustices, technical assistance, etc.;
3. $500,000 for administrative expenses for Tribal Judicial Conferences;
4. $500,000 for administrative expense [sic] for the Office [Section 3611 of the Act
establishes within the BIA the "Office of Tribal Justice Support"];
5. $400,000 for survey (one time only). [Section 3612 of the Act authorizes the
Secretary of Interior to contract with a non-federal body to conduct surveys of tribal
justice systems].
Memorandum from Judge Elbridge Coochise, President, National American Indian Court
Judges Association, to Tribal CourtJudges 1 (Jan. 21, 1994) (on file with The American University
Law Review).
409. See 25 U.S.C. § 3612 (authorizing the survey of tribal court systems). The Act further
states that the Secretary of the Interior will update the information annually. See id. § 3612(a).
In so doing, he shall assess such areas as the people served, the volume and complexity of
caseloads, the capacity of the system, the state of current facilities, personnel needs, and
training and technical assistance needs. See id. § 3612(c). The Act also requires consultation
with the tribes during the survey process. See id.
1700 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSnIYLAW REVIEW [Vol.47:1627
not requested the funding authorized in the Act apart from $500,000
to conduct the survey of tribal justice systems.
C. Tribal-State-Federal Cooperation
The successful administration of law enforcement in any
community is best secured through coordination and cooperation
with adjacentjurisdictions.41 ' Although tribes should be empowered
with decision-making authority over retrocession, the success of such
jurisdictional realignment inevitably hinges on the effective
communication and collaboration among state, federal, and tribal
justice systems. Only through a collaborative process can each party
evaluate its desire to exercise jurisdiction and most importantly, its
financial and structural ability to do so. This involves a mutual
412
respect for each government's justice systems -including a respect
for variations in court systems and traditional dispute resolution.4 "
Regardless of the amount of communication and collaboration,
however, "the strong adversarial features of the American justice
paradigm will always conflict with the communal nature of most
tribes."4  Tribal justice systems may exhibit distinct dispute resolving
mechanisms and modus operandi'4 5 however, state and federal
counterparts can make a concerted effort to extend comity to tribal
courts without insisting they become clones of the federal and state
adversarial courts. State and federal governments can learn much
410. See Myers & Coochise, supra note 391, at 148 ("Tribal courts have yet to receive a single
benefit under the Indian Tribal Justice Act."); MYERS, supra note 395, at 3-6 (outlining the BIA's
dealings with the Act). The survey, which has been in progress since 1995 remains
uncompleted. See Statement ofJill Shibles, President, National American Indian Court Judges
Association, Before Comm. on Indian Affairs, U.S. Senate, Tribal Justice Programs, June 3,
1998, available in 1998 WL 288992.
411. See NAICJA Statement, supra note 377, at 3 (agreeing that while some progress has
been made in this area, much is left to be done).
412. See Stanley G. Feldman & David L. Withey, Resolving State-Tribal Jurisdictional Dilemmas,
79 JUDICATURE 154, 155-56 (1995) (addressing tribal-state efforts in response to jurisdictional
dilemmas in Indian country); Wallace, supra note 42, at 153 (addressing specifically tribal-
federal court cooperation).
413. SeeFeldman & Withey, supra note 412, at 155 (discussing the benefits of comity and full
faith and credit as options to overcoming state-tribal jurisdictional conflicts).
414. Melton, supra note 53, at 133.
415. Ada Pecos Melton does an outstanding job of summarizing many of the differences
between tribal courts and what she refers to as the "American Justice Paradigm." See id. at 126-
28. She explains that one of the principal differences between our justice system and those of
the tribes is the tribes' concentration on "restorative and reparative" concepts and their focus
on healing both the victim and offender and restoring harmony to their community. See id. at
126-27; see also id. at 128-29 (contrasting American and indigenous court systems in chart form);
Carey N. Vicente, The Reemergence of Tribal Society and Traditional Justice Systems, 79 JUDICATURE
133, 135 (1995) (explaining that tribal courts differ from courts of the "non-Indian" world
because of a differing view of culture: for the Indian it is "pervasive, encircling, all-inclusive"
and for the American it isjust an "elective identity").
416. See generally Building on Common Ground, supra note 376, at 1 (observing that state
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from tribes regarding community-based traditions, problem solving,
and dispute resolution, and tribes can learn much from state and
federal justice systems such as the importance of judicial
independence.1 7 With constructive inter-governmental cooperation,
the effectiveness and fairness of the administration of justice in state,
tribal, and federal justice systems will be enhanced.41 ' There are
many possible ways to enhance this communication and
collaboration:
(1) fund and encourage tribal automation and data collection
systems for crime statistics, court documents and orders, and sex
offender registration and release;
(2) increase federal and state court use of certification procedures
when questions of tribal law are at issue;
4 m
(3) provide for greater state, federal, and tribal
agreements/compacts to: share resources, settle jurisdictional
disputes, address such issues as reciprocity and extradition; 4' ° anddiscuss the modified application of the "exhaustion rule" 421 calling
courts frequently do not understand tribal courts and refuse to accept them as legitimate
decision makers).
417. See Canby, supra note 242, at 17 (describing the variations between tribal courts in the
level of protection they possess from "political or external influences").
418. See id. at 8. The National Center for State Courts makes the following suggestions for
resolving jurisdictional conflicts: design specific educational programs for state and federal
judges; provide joint education opportunities for all three sovereigns' personnel; create Indian
law divisions within the state bar associations and American Bar Association; integrate federal
Indian law material into the required curriculum of law students; and have tribal courts make
greater efforts in the public availability and distribution of their decisions, codes, and common
law. See id.; see also O'Connor, supra note 48, at 3-5 (explaining that many state and federal law
principles have been incorporated into tribal codes and that tribal courts can offer state and
federal systems many innovative methods of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR")); Wallace,
supra note 42, at 153 ('Federal courts would do well to look to traditional tribal courts for
alternative dispute resolution methods").
419. Federal courts may utilize this judicial procedure when ambiguous or unsettied issues
of state or tribal law arise in a federal proceeding. The process not only gives the sovereign the
opportunity to clarify its view of the law, but also demonstrates a respect and deference for each
sovereign's authority to determine what is best for the population it serves. See Tribal Courts
Project, supra note 359, at 5 (noting that the court rules of the Navajo Nation provide for the
receipt of certified questions); see also Building on Common Ground, supra note 376, at 5
(highlighting that certification questions to tribal courts on who is an "Indian" are particularly
needed).
420. See Building on Common Ground, supra note 376, at 6 (supporting agreements for
cross-utilization of facilities, programs, and personnel"); NAICJA Statement, supra note 377, at
4 (supporting congressional action permitting state-tribal agreements on "reciprocity, cross-
deputization, civil jurisdiction, criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, enforcement of orders,
extradition, provision of services, utilization of programs and facilities, probation and jail
transfers, [and] access to files"); see also Porter Letter, supra note 379, at 4 (suggesting that,
following the pattern of Indian Child Welfare Act and Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Congress
should enact legislation permitting establishment of state-tribal compacts to deal with
jurisdictional problems).
421. Set Endreson, supra note 45, at 142 (discussing that under the "exhaustion rule" a case
is first heard in tribal court even when legitimacy of federal jurisdiction is not in question).
Endreson explains that the rule is based on the Federal Government's policy to support and
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSMIYLAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1627
upon the states to "stay their hands" while tribes are given the "first
opportunity to decide their own jurisdiction" before the state can
exercise itsjurisdiction;4
(4) ensure that each government makes its court records available
to the oter;
(5) assure full faith and credit and comity to judgments and court
orders;42 4 and
(6) sustain a tribal, state, and federal dialogue on the
administration of justice in Indian country and develop objective
criteria for measuring progress in terms of the reduction of crime
and ability to meet legal needs.4 '
promote tribal self-governance, foster orderly administration ofjustice, and reap the benefits of
tribal courts' expertise. See id. at 144.
Two cases are often cited for the source of this doctrine. First, in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v.
LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987), the federal court, having legitimate diversity jurisdiction (the
plaintiff was an Indian and the defendant a non-Indian), permitted the tribal court to first
determine its own jurisdiction. SeeLaPlante, 480 U.S. at 978 ("Tribal authority over the activities
of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty...."). Second, in
National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985), the Supreme
Court required an exhaustion of tribal remedies so that the tribal court first had the
opportunity to determine the limits of its jurisdiction before a federal forum was permitted
review. See National Farmers Union Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 845-47 (involving a state school district
seeking relief in federal court from an allegation by an Indian student initially made in tribal
court). In the Court's ruling, Justice Stevens specifically stated that tribal courts are uniquely
capable to "provide other courts with the benefit of their expertise in such matters in the event
of furtherjudicial review." See id. at 857.
In his article, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies in the Lower Courts After National Farmer's Union and
Iowa Mutuak Toward a Consistent Treatment of Tribal Courts by the FederalJudicial System, Timothy
W. Joranko urges the application of a clear test for exhaustion. Joranko observes that
"adherence to principles announced in Iowa Mutual and National Farmers Union and the rule of
respect for the judiciary's limited role in defining the parameters of tribal sovereignty dictate
application of the bright line rules requiring exhaustion." 78 MINN. L. REv. 259,307 (1993).
In Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997), however, the Supreme Court appears to
have diluted the precedent supporting broad tribal court jurisdiction, at least as it applies to
non-Indians. See id. at 1404 (holding that the tribal court lacked exclusive jurisdiction over
personal injury action between non-Indian parties that arose on a state highway). To affirm its
interest in strong tribal justice systems, Congress could clarify the narrow applicability of the A-1
Contractors decision.
422. Cf Canby, supra note 242, at 15 (describing the exhaustion rule as applied in the
federal-tribal context).
423. See Building on Common Ground, supra note 376, at 4 (recommending actions to
assure cross-recognition of each court system's judgments).
424. See Feldman & Withey, supra note 412, at 155 (calling for the adoption of state court
rules making recognition of tribal court judgments on a "mandatory (full faith and credit) or
discretionary (comity) basis"); NAICJA Statement, supra note 377, at 4 (requesting state-tribal
compacts on the issue and the expansion of full faith and credit provision in the Indian Child
Welfare Act).
425. The Department ofJustice's Office of Tribal Justice demonstrated progress in this area.
See Myers & Coochise, supra note 391, at 149 (praising the Department of Justice for taking
"substantial" steps in this area despite its "minimal funds"). Since its establishment in 1995 by
Attorney General Janet Reno, the OTJ has sponsored several "listening conferences"
throughout the nation where tribal leaders, along with federal and state officials have come
together to discuss issues relating to tribal self-governance, tribal courts and law enforcement,
and the protection of tribal environment and natural resources. See Listening Conferences,
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The above recommendations are not new but rather recurring
themes that never achieve full implementation. The failure to
effectuate these recommendations has exacted a high cost. The
findings of the 1975 Task Force Report and the 1997 Executive
Committee Report uncannily resemble the legislative history of
Public Law 280 as they describe the break-down of law enforcement
in some parts of Indian country.426 For this reason, prior solutions
have undeniable, contemporary relevance and merit reconsideration.
One historical proposal that is interesting to consider is Senate Bill
2502,427 a 1978 bill proposed by Senator James Abourezk, then
Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs.128 The
bill's purpose was "[t]o authorize the States and the Indian tribes to
enter into mutual agreements and compacts respecting jurisdiction
and governmental operations in Indian country. ,4" Most
importantly, in its original form, the bill recognized that the
'Jurisdictional controversies which surround the relationships
between Indian tribes and the States... are the logical consequence
of ... historical vacillation[s] and inconsistenc[ies] 43  and that
meaningful solutions could not be restricted to "one statutory
formula," or resolved by the judicial processes alone.43' The bill
affirmed that jurisdictional issues "are local in nature and should,
wherever possible, be resolved at the local level...,4 With that
foundation, the bill provided for agreements and compacts based
NATION TO NATION (Dep't of Justice, Office of TribalJustice), Aug. 1996, at 6-7.
426. Both the 1975 and 1997 reports contain discussion of law enforcement crises, or
lawlessness, on Indian reservations, similar to that in the legislative history of Public Law 280.
For example, the 1975 Task Force Report states:
Law enforcement on Indian reservations is in serious trouble.... The major crimes
rate is 50% higher on Indian reservations than it is in rural American as a whole. The
murder rate among Indians is three times that in rural areas, while the assault rate is
nine times as high.
MEISSNER REPORT, supra note 10 at 77.
427. S. 2502, 95th Cong. (1978). The Executive Committee Report of 1997 raised similar
concerns: "There is a public safety crisis in Indian country... According to a 1996 IHS
Report, the homicide rate for Indian males is almost three times higher than the rate for white
males." Executive Committee Report, supra note 6, at 1-2.
428. The Senate Report on the bill, S. REP. No. 95-1178 (1978), clearly indicated what
language was added and stricken on the Senate floor. Because the authors of this article believe
that much of the bill's original language and intent is worth reviving, the authors have cited to
text that was both stricken and added. If the language the authors quote was stricken in the
final bill-though never passed-we have indicated as such.
429. S. 2502, § 1.
430. S. 2502, § 2 (a) (striken text) This citation is to section 2 of the original bill; however
the language quoted in the text of this article was subsequently deleted from the bill and its
sections were renumbered.
431. S. 2502, § 2(c)-(d) (noting that states and tribal authorities have been expressing
greater interest in engaging in such compacts); see also S. REP. No. 95-1178 (stricken text).
432. S. 2502, § 2(c); see alsoS. REP. No. 95-1178 (stricken text).
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only on mutual consent;41" judicial enforcement of the agreements
and compacts; 4m  and federal assistance for personnel or
administrative expenses incurred through the execution of the
agreements or compacts.435  Moreover, the bill clarified that
jurisdictional statutes such as Public Law 280 were not a bar to the
making of said agreements and acknowledged that ongoing federal
involvement and supervision of this process was a duty of the Federal
Government rising out of its trust responsibility not only to "preserve
and protect Indian tribes," but also to ensure that "a legal framework"
existed that would enable states and tribes to exist in harmony and
engage in cooperative efforts.436 Under the bill, the federal presence
in Indian country law enforcement was assured through: continued
federal financing, 37 mandatory Secretary of the Interior approval of
all agreements and compacts, 4" a commitment to encourage the
433. See S. 2502, § 2 (stating that the United States should establish a legal framework
through which "viable intergovernmental agreements" between tribes and states based on
mutual consent may be established).
434. See S. REP. No. 95-1178, § 301 (added text) (granting original jurisdiction to federal
courts over any actions for equitable relief-including injunctive and declaratory--actions to
enforce any agreement or compact).
435. The revised version of the bill provided that:
[T]he United States, upon agreement of the parties and the Secretary, may provide
financial assistance to such party for costs of personnel or administrative expenses in
an amount up to 100 per centum of costs actually incurred as a consequence of such
agreement or compact, including indirect costs of administration which are clearly
attributable to the services performed under the agreement or compact.
Id. § 102 (added text).
436. See id. S. 2502, § 2 (added text). In reference to Public Law 280 and any statute or state
constitutional provision which might be interpreted to preclude such compacts, the bill
explained:
Notwithstanding the Act of August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588), as amended, or any other
Act transferring civil or criminal jurisdiction over Indians... to the various states, or
establishing a procedure for such transfers, and notwithstanding the provisions of any
enabling Act for the admission of a State into the Union ... the States and the Indian
tribes... are hereby authorized to enter into compacts and agreements ....
S. 2502, § 101(a).
437. See id. § 102 (authorizing federal assistance). The bill provided a list of eight factors
that the Secretary of the Interior could consider to determine the extent of federal financial
assistance. These eight factors were: (1) whether parties were already obligated to perform the
function; (2) whether federal assistance would allow that party to perform the function even
better; (3) the financial capacities of the parties; (4) the extent to which the program's success
depended on the money; (5) the program's capacity to foster better Indian and non-Indian
relationships; (6) the program's ability to protect Indian and non-Indian resources; (7) the cost
to the Federal Government to perform the same functions alone; and (8) the extent to which
federal assistance is already provided through other federal programs, grants or revenue
sharing. SeeS. REP. No. 95-1178, § 102(a) (added text).
The bill, presented in 1978, authorized the appropriation of $10,000,000 for the fiscal year of
1980 and authorized that Congress appropriate additional money in each subsequent fiscal
year. See S. 2502, § 102(g) (striken text). The final bill indicated that $10,000,000 may be
appropriated in fiscal year of 1980 if necessary. See S. REP. No. 95-1178, § 102 (g) (added text).
438. The original bill provided for Secretary approval but this requirement was stricken on
the Senate floor. See id. § 101(b); S. REP. No. 95-1178 (stricken text). Instead, the final bill
provided that the agreements and compacts could be revoked by either party upon six months
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formation of state and tribal boards and councils, 43 9 and an
authorization to all federal departments, agencies, and executive
branches to support the implementation of these agreements
through technical assistance, material support and personnel.""
Senate Bill 2502 is noteworthy in its apparent recognition of the
need to preserve the integrity of tribal and state sovereignty. The bill
recognized the perils of unfunded mandates, such as Public Law 280,
provided for and encouraged local solutions, and embraced the
logical conclusion that the best way to improve law enforcement was
not to withdraw resources and actors, but rather to maximize the
players, their choices, and their resources. It is in the spirit of such
ideas that future cooperative efforts should be promoted.
CONCLUSION
To assure the peace and safety of its people, a government must
exercise the power to "preserve the innocent and restrain
offenders., 441 In the interest of tribal self-government, Indian tribes
strive to maintain safe and peaceful communities. Public Law 280
impedes the full realization of tribal self-government, not only
because it intrudes upon tribal authority, but because it creates
uncertainty regarding the scope of tribal authority.
There are many grounds upon which to challenge the legitimacy of
Public Law 280: its conflict with the trust responsibility to Indian
tribes borne by the Federal Government; the lack of tribal consent
provisions and dissonance with the Jeffersonian concept of the
consent of the governed; pragmatic assessments of the detrimental
impact of the statute on tribal justice systems; and possible increased
"lawlessness."
Federal, state, and tribal governmental institutions need to
cultivate a new paradigm regarding Public Law 280 and tribal justice
generally. Current reforms initiated by the Departments of Justice
and the Interior in response to President Clinton's 1997 directive on
Indian country law enforcement demonstrate an unprecedented
federal commitment to assist tribes in improving the administration
written notice. See S. REP. No. 95-1178, §101(b) (added text). The final bill did, however,
require the Secretary to post the agreements and compacts in the Federal Register which were
properly filed with the Secretary "within thirty days of consummation." See id. § 1010(c) (added
text).
439. Set S. 2502, § 201 (encouraging the establishment of planning and monitoring boards).
440. See id. § 102(e) (authorizing federal support to implement compacts formed under the
Act). The Federal Government is also permitted to make arrangements with other federal
agencies and departments for the transfer and contribution of funds to the designated
programs. Se id. § 102(d).
441. LOCKE, supra note 1, at5.
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ofjustice on Indian lands and to provide a comparable level of safety
for citizens living in Indian communities. The assistance advocated
by Attorney General Reno, in conjunction with reforms through the
Office of Law Enforcement Services at the Department of the Interior
(discussed throughout paper) is an essential first step in procuring
meaningful improvements in Indian country law enforcement.
However, despite their laudable intentions, the reforms are
conspicuously silent with respect to Public Law 280.442
Truly comprehensive law enforcement reform must address Public
Law 280. Consequently, responsible policy makers, attorneys, and law
enforcement personnel should not ignore the complicated questions
presented by Public Law 280 as they contemplate future initiatives.
They must be willing to challenge the statute's ambiguity, aggressively
assert and put into practice a non-divestiture interpretation, and
regularly argue that Public Law 280 has failed to achieve its primary
goal of improving law and order in Indian country.
The Termination Period is over, and the contemporary federal
policy is one of self-determination. Except for a few misguided and
nostalgic individuals, most see the mutual benefit in working toward
enhanced tribal self-governance and self-sufficiency. Tribal justice
systems are critical components in the nation-wide administration of
justice14 3 and their continued viability bears directly on the quality of
life in tribal communities. The prevailing federal policy emphasizes
community-based solutions and community policing as the
appropriate means of reducing the level of crime throughout the
nation. To accomplish this, however, Indian tribes must have within
their means the appropriate tools and support to mete out justice in
their inherently community-based endeavors.
The administration of justice is not just a challenge for tribal
government.444 Our actions must be informed by the recognition that
442. See generally Reno Statement, supra note 45 (outlining proposed reforms and budget
requests).
443. See Canby, supra note 242, at 16 (explaining from the perspective of a federal judge
that "tribal courts are doing a huge business, and ... the federal and state judiciary could not
do without them").
444. Felix Cohen aptly noted the interrelatedness of United States Indian policy by likening
the Indian to "the miner's canary" which marks the shift from fresh air to poison gas in our
political atmosphere" and "our treatment of Indians reflects the rise and fall in our democratic
faith." See Felix Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62
YALE LJ. 348, 390 (1953). The analogy of the "miner's canary" has since become a ubiquitous
phrase for numerous subjects closely and remotely related to Indian law. See Chapoose v. Clark,
607 F. Supp. 1027, 1036 (D. Utah 1985) (quoting Cohen's miner's canary analogy in discussing
importance of safeguarding Indian rights); Rennard Strickland, Indian Law and the Miner's
Canary: The Signs of Poison Gas, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483, 484 (1991) (noting Cohen's
contention that Indian law acts as a miner's canary-a barometer for society).
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the rights enjoyed by all citizens under the justice system of the
United States are only as secure as the right to swift and effective
justice in Indian country. Addressing Public Law 280 and the legacy
of its ambiguity will demonstrate the commitment of the United
States to meaningful self-government and justice for Indian tribes
and their members.

